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USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

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19 April 1985

USSR REPORT

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MILITARY POLITICAL ISSUES

LEAD ARTICLE ON COMBAT READINESS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 23, Dec 84 (signed to press 19 Nov 84) pp 13-18

[Article: "To New Limits of Combat Readiness"]

[Text] Soviet army and navy troops embarked upon the new training year -- the final year of the five-year plan, year of active preparation for the 27th CPSU Congress and year of the 40th Anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War -- in a well organized manner. These important landmarks in the history of our state are greatly influencing the social and political activeness of the personnel and the entire spiritual life of army and navy collectives.

The defenders of the homeland unanimously approve and support the foreign and domestic policy of the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government. The troops took as a guide to action the instructions and conclusions set down in the speeches of Comrade K. U. Chernenko, CPSU Central Committee general secretary and USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium chairman, at the April and October 1984 CPSU Central Committee plenums and in his profound speech at the CPSU Central Committee Politburo session which examined the drafts of the State Plan for Economic and Social Development of the USSR and the USSR State Budget for 1985. In an environment of growing international tension and real military danger from imperialism, they consider it their duty to double and triple their efforts in military labor, strengthen the country's defense in every way and improve the combat readiness of the Armed Forces.

Today, Lenin's instruction that we must accompany our steps toward peace with the intensity of all our military readiness is timely as never before. "As long as military and political tension exist and as long as nuclear missile danger from the U. S. and NATO states hangs over our country," emphasizes Comrade K. U. Chernenko, "we must keep our powder dry and be always on guard, so that the correlation of forces does not change to the advantage of imperialism and we do not end up weaker."

Military and naval units have every opportunity to fulfill successfully the demands of the party and the large and difficult tasks set down by the USSR Minister of Defense for the new training year. A stable foundation was laid during the past training year for further improvement of combat readiness.

There was a marked increase in the responsibility shown by the men for carrying out combat watch duty, for high quality field, air and naval training of troops and naval forces and for mastery of weapons and military equipment. There were increases in the number of leading units and ships; standouts in military and political training; class rated specialists and masters of military affairs. The initiators of socialist competition in the Armed Services -- troops from units commanded by officers A. Pavlov, A. Stolyarov, V. Nechayev and Yu. Temnikov and the nuclear missile cruiser Kirov -- were an example of purposefulness in training and the unity of word and deed.

Thus, in the Proskurov Red Banner Order of Suvorov and Kutuzov Motorized Rifle Regiment, the times required to bring the regiment to combat readiness were reduced by 12-15 percent and subunit training received a high mark in all basic disciplines. The time indices for accomplishing military training tasks were significantly surpassed. All those eligible are class qualified, more than 70 percent at higher levels. Complete interchangeability has been achieved in all sections, crews and teams. More than 90 percent of the officers, warrant officers, sergeants and soldiers became VSK [military sports complex] medal holders and rated sportsmen.

On the basis of the implementation of the decisions of the 24th CPSU Congress and the June 1983 CPSU Central Committee plenum, the level of ideological and mass political work increased, its forms and content were enriched and its influence was strengthened on fulfilling the tasks of military and political training and forming in the soldiers communist convictions and responsibility for protection of the socialist fatherland. Military-patriotic upbringing was increased in scope and communist leaders and veterans of the party and armed forces are actively participating in it.

Considerable positive experience was acquired in party political work aimed at maintaining high military readiness. Realizing the demands of the CPSU Central Committee on questions of party leadership and the recommendations of the All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Party and Komsomol Organizations, the political organs and party and komsomol organizations strengthened their influence on the whole life and activity of the military collectives of subunits, units and ships, on solving the tasks of military and political training and on strengthening military discipline.

Of course, these tasks were not solved equally well everywhere. Consequently, during the new training year, along with consolidating everything positive and valuable, it will be necessary to eliminate the possibility of repetition of the shortcomings and negative phenomena noticed in the course of final inspections in some subunits, units and ships.

The increasing tension in the world's military-political situation, deployment of new American missiles directly on the border of the socialist states and acceptance into the inventories of the imperialist armies of highly accurate weapons and other extremely dangerous means of warfare, still further increase the training demands on the Armed Forces as a whole and on each unit, ship and subunit. Therefore, all the political, organizational and ideological work of the military soviets, commanders, staffs and political organs must be subordinated to a task of priority importance -- bringing vigilance, combat

readiness, organization and discipline to the highest levels, providing more intense daily military training and more fully using existing reserves for higher quality fulfillment of the tasks set before units and formations.

The interests of combat readiness demand that principled conclusions be drawn from instances when individual commanders and political officers assess the situation correctly overall but at times permit serious flaws in the organization of military training and political work aimed at solving specific tasks. In particular, in one of the units in the Transcaucasus Military District, a number of subunits had low results in their final inspection. Meanwhile, this unit was in good standing with the senior officers. Nor did the political section or party organization see in time the noticeable slump there. As it became clear, they were not sufficiently specific in their work of fulfilling the main tasks of military training and became accustomed to deviations from training plans.

Such facts indicate that here and there more is to be desired in terms of effective political support to fulfilling the tasks of military training. Also impacting here was the compromising attitude of some political organs and party organizations to shifts and even cancellations of lessons and oversimplifications and indulgences in training, and their inadequate influence on reducing the times required for mastering equipment and weapons and increasing the class qualifications of the men.

Taking into account the lessons of the past year, it is necessary to improve more persistently party political work of fulfilling the plans and tasks of military and political training, as a most important element of improving the combat readiness of troops and naval forces. Political organs and party organizations are called upon to facilitate in every way the nearing of military training to the conditions and demands of combat operations in modern war; to strengthen party influence on the organization of the training and upbringing process and on the preparation of leaders and materials for lessons; and to ensure that the personnel are fully included in the training process and that qualitative military training indices steadily improve.

MSU D. F. Ustinov, USSR Minister of Defense, emphasized in a report at the All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Komsomol Organizations, that the level of combat readiness is the basic criterion of the party and state assessment of the qualitative state of unit and ship training. Improving combat readiness is a constant process. That which was achieved yesterday is not enough today. This is even more so in that the possibilities in this area are still far from fully used.

First of all it is necessary to seek constantly and persistently to ensure that every Soviet soldier thoroughly understands the acuteness of the present international environment and the demands of the party upon the Armed Forces -- to be always on guard and prepared to repulse any imperialist schemes, so that no chance events can catch us unawares. It is the duty of commanders, political officers and party and komsomol organizations to explain purposefully the party's foreign and domestic policy and the speech of Comrade K. U. Chernenko at the CPSU Central Committee Politburo session, and to expose the aggressive, anti-popular essence of imperialism and the dangerous policy

of the U. S. and its NATO allies toward achieving military superiority. In this regard, it is necessary to improve still further the quality and effectiveness of all forms of political training and to display more concern for the training of propaganda cadres and for informing them about the most important problems of CPSU foreign and domestic policy and the life and activity of the troops and naval forces. It is also important to raise in the future the role of the mass information and propaganda media in personnel upbringing and to provide a stronger ideological and moral thrust in the work of cultural and educational institutions.

One of the urgent tasks of party political work in the current situation is to ensure that combat watch is carried out vigilantly. Some experience has been accumulated in this matter. Creatively using this experience, it is important to concentrate the soldiers' efforts on reducing the times required for operational readiness of each combat crew, most rapidly mastering complex modern weapons complexes and systems and means of control and communication, and achieving punctual execution and precision in the actions of all duty shifts and their close coordination. In political work it is necessary more resolutely to combat the slightest manifestations of carelessness and indifference.

Combat readiness is meaningless without high operational and tactical training of officer cadres. Therefore, those units and formations are correct where questions of military theory and CPSU policy, tendencies in the development of the Armed Forces and the experience of the Great Patriotic War are systematically and thoroughly examined with the officers, and where scientific and scientific-practical conferences are conducted regularly on these questions. To strengthen the influence of political organs and party organizations, especially in headquarters, on commanders' training of officers, most of all at the regiment and ship level, means to be concerned daily about developing their tactical field of vision, initiative, growth of methodological skill and ability to organize modern combat, and to arm them with leading experience in personnel training and upbringing. At the same time it is necessary to be concerned about the complete use of the rich opportunities of troop and tactical exercises, aircraft flights and ship sea and ocean voyages, mindful of the fact that it is namely in the field, the air and on the sea that one acquires skills of controlling subunits and units and the ability to solve successfully military training tasks under any conditions, including involving specific geographic and climactic features.

Improving combat readiness depends directly on field, air and naval training, the level of tactical, firing and technical preparation of the men, their physical and psychological tempering and the military teamwork of crews, teams, subunits, units and ships. This is why it is necessary to devote maximum attention both to the individual training of soldiers, seamen, sergeants and petty officers -- to those lessons conducted in the first weeks and months of winter training within sections, crews and teams -- and to comprehensive exercises of subunits and their all-round material support. The entire system of command-administrative and party political measures must actively seek unity of training and upbringing and improve the influence of the training process on subunit cohesion, precision, initiative and

decisiveness in the men's actions and ability to use fully the capabilities of their weapons and military equipment, especially the new models.

It must not be forgotten that in modern combat moral-political and psychological tempering of the troops is an extremely important factor in the combat readiness of a unit or ship. This aspect of training requires daily party influence.

Socialist competition being developed in the army and navy for a worthy celebration of the 40th Anniversary of the Great Victory and the 27th CPSU Congress is a powerful means of mobilizing the personnel for intense military labor. Competition among soldiers by specialties should be more widely practiced and healthy competitiveness should be developed in struggling for the best detachment, crew, team, platoon, company, battalion, regiment or ship. It would be useful to approach the ensuring of competitiveness more thoughtfully in each lesson and when working out military training elements and to be more demanding in assessing the results obtained and in determining standouts and class qualified specialists. It is necessary to free oneself decisively from formalism and the attraction of interminable initiatives; be more specific in work, ensuring the unity of word and deed; and be more concerned about the educational consequences of competition. Communists and komsomol members are called upon to display an example of high responsibility for fulfilling socialist commitments.

In accordance with the instructions of the USSR Minister of Defense, work is being carried out to improve the planning of military and political training. The task of political organs, party committees and party buros is to ensure the realism of training plans, the effective use of training time and the organic combination of training and upbringing. They must achieve this by political methods inherent to them, actively influencing the style of work of communists engaged in supervising military training, developing in them a feeling for what is new and a need to analyze thoroughly the problems of training and upbringing and to generalize and introduce advanced experience.

Improving the military training of troops and naval forces and the entire process of training and upbringing is daily, meticulous work with people, demanding not a one-time burst of energy, but an orderly system of actions and a high degree of organization and order. Consequently, it is necessary to view the steady, purposeful work of commanders, political organs and party and komsomol organizations in fulfilling the instructions of the 26th CPSU Congress and the subsequent CPSU Central Committee plenums on the strengthening of discipline, self-discipline and order as a most important component of the struggle to ensure high combat readiness and combat effectiveness of units, ships and formations. What brings returns in this work? They result from constant concern about raising the maturity and military cohesiveness of each military collective, the disciplining role of classes on military training and political upbringing work and the whole tenor of military life, living conditions and service. They also result from a principled assessment of each deviation from military regulations and each instance of a lack of discipline and from persistent work to root out instances of drunkenness and to prevent various kinds of immoral delinquencies. Finally, they result from patient individual work with people,

an active influence on their strong and weak aspects, on the relationships among servicemen and collectives and the frame of mind of the soldiers.

The practice of comprehensively studying the causes of specific negative phenomena, adopting effective measures to prevent and eliminate violations of law and rendering assistance to lagging subunits merits support and dissemination.

Success in improving combat readiness depends decisively on cadres -- their selection, placement, training and upbringing, professional knowledge and organizational abilities. In the light of the instructions of the CPSU Central Committee, it is incumbent upon political organs and party organizations to influence more effectively the selection, placement and upbringing of military cadres and actively to form in them high political, professional and organizing qualities and an ability to work with people and to rely on the party and komsomol organizations. It is necessary to be particularly attentive to the making of young officers, to influence more specifically the content of methodological training classes with them on the problems of training and upbringing and to create in all officers' collectives an environment of trust, mutual respect and high standards.

Fulfilling the tasks of military and political training will be predetermined to a significant degree by the effectiveness of all party political work, its practical thrust, professionalism and link with life and with the activities of the troops and naval forces. Therefore, in its planning and in determining the content and sequence of measures, urgent problems of combat readiness should be fully considered. Life demands that each political organ, party committee, buro and party organization know well the programs and course of military and political training and the state of military discipline, more fully use the methods of monitoring and checking fulfillment, uncover shortcomings in a timely manner, render assistance on the ground and demonstrate initiative in presenting urgent problems to the command and in generalizing and disseminating leading experience. In this work it is necessary to increase the role and activeness of the instructor personnel in the political organs and party aktiv.

A central task of each political organ is to improve further the leadership of primary party organizations as the political nucleus of military collectives. In preparing for the 27th CPSU Congress, it is important to raise still higher the level of all intra-party life, to achieve complete realization of the recommendations of the 6th All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Party Organizations, to improve the activeness, professionalism and principled nature of their work and to strengthen the link with the non-party masses. In this effort particular attention should be devoted to the consolidation and work of party organizations in subunits standing combat watch and to improving the personal examples presented by all communists in implementing the policies and decisions of the party, fulfilling their military duty and observing party and military discipline and moral and ethical norms. Questions are justifiably raised in the course of reports and elections in party organizations concerning the need to strengthen and improve the practice of listening to reports of communists and to individual conversations with them; to develop criticism and self-criticism; to increase the upbringing role of

party meetings and to use more completely the opportunities of political organ party commissions to strengthen control over the observance of the CPSU Charter by communists. Political organs and party organizations are expected to continue in the future to fulfill persistently the requirements of the 19th CPSU Congress, the directives of the CPSU Central Committee and the instructions of Comrade K. U. Chernenko on questions of further improving party leadership of the komsomol and increasing its role in the communist upbringing of young people. The efforts of all komsomol organizations should be concentrated on fulfilling the recommendations of the All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Komsomol Organizations; taking into account more fully the processes occurring in military collectives of young people; addressing constant concern for the selection, upbringing and instruction of the komsomol aktiv; and more boldly supporting the initiatives of komsomol organizations aimed at improving the personal examples of komsomol members in training, service, discipline, competition and the struggle for leadership in military collectives.

The tasks of military training are constantly becoming more complicated. Their solution demands that command and political cadres search constantly for more modern methods of working with the personnel. This means that it is necessary to be concerned about improving the competence, professionalism, high principles and effectiveness of the work of commanders and officers on staffs and in political organs and to develop in them a keen feeling of responsibility for punctual fulfillment of the tasks assigned to them. Political organs must strengthen their influence on ensuring teamwork and organization in the activity of all command and control elements of troops and naval forces; assess the work of communists more strictly and from a standpoint of higher principles; and persistently eliminate shortcomings in checking on the fulfillment of troop decisions and the orders and instructions of commanders and supervisors.

The increased demands for combat readiness require that political organs and party organizations work more vigorously with personnel directly in the company, battery, squadron and ship's department, and ensure that communists and komsomol activists are always involved in individual education. It is necessary to find forms and means of political influence which will not only facilitate successfully solving the tasks of each training day, but also ensure constant high troop readiness for immediate combat operations.

Army and navy personnel are closely united around the Communist Party and thoroughly recognize their responsibility to ensure the country's security in today's complex military-political environment. It is important that their high political consciousness be manifested daily in specific deeds -- in effective military training, vigilant service and maintenance of high combat readiness and in exemplary fulfillment of their patriotic and internationalist duty.

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MILITARY POLITICAL ISSUES

'MILITARY PARITY AND SECURITY OF THE PEOPLES'

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 23, Dec 84 (signed to press 19 Nov 84) pp 19-26

[Article by Col G. Lukava, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor]

[Text] Among the problems being worked on by Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army and by Soviet military science, that of preserving the strategic military parity existing between the USSR and U. S. and between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the NATO bloc has acquired particular significance. It represents a most important factor in ensuring the security of the Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist countries and preventing a new world war. "The existing strategic military balance between the USSR and U. S. and between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO," it was stated at the 26th CPSU Congress, "objectively serves to preserve peace on our planet" ("Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], p 22).

The exceptional urgency of this problem at present is caused most of all by the international and military-political situation, sharply aggravated through the fault of the imperialists. "This concerns a problem," stressed Comrade K. U. Chernenko in answers to questions of American NBC correspondent M. Kalb, "which, one might say, overshadows all others -- how to ward off the threat of nuclear war, find a method to stop the arms race and create such a situation in the world that the peoples will not feel fear for tomorrow. In this matter it is impermissible to allow delay."

U. S. imperialist circles, pursuing an openly hegemonistic and aggressive policy, are carrying out intensive preparations for war. The chief of the current United States administration declared a "crusade" against world socialism as a social system. The aim of the feverish military preparations and unprecedented ideological diversions of imperialism, most of all American, is to achieve military superiority over the USSR and other Warsaw Treaty Organization countries, and then, threatening them with force of arms, to secure for itself undivided world supremacy and to direct global affairs according to its own will.

It should be said directly that the adventuristic plans of the U. S. administration are highly dangerous and just as illusory. MSU D. F. Ustinov, USSR minister of defense and CPSU Central Committee Politburo member, states:

most definitely: "We are not striving for nuclear superiority, but will not allow the American administration to use nuclear blackmail to implement a policy of force against us. The Soviet Union will give an appropriate answer to U. S. actions aimed at destroying the existing balance of strategic forces. The USSR is forced to develop corresponding modern strategic weapons systems, and not permit the U. S. to achieve superiority in this field."

* * *

Military-strategic parity is a great achievement of the Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist countries. It is an approximate balance of military capabilities (strategic nuclear forces, intermediate range nuclear forces and conventional forces) between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the NATO bloc.

In order to understand more thoroughly the role of existing military-strategic parity for the fate of the peoples on our planet and for world social progress, it is necessary to view this problem through the prism of a Marxist-Leninist characterization of the present era, its features and the interaction of contemporary social-political and military forces.

The present era, the essence of which is the transition from capitalism to socialism, is the era of struggle between the two opposing social systems, the era of social and national liberation revolutions, the era of the fall of imperialism and liquidation of the colonial system, and the era in which more and more peoples shift to the socialist path and socialism and communism triumph worldwide. At the center of the present era stands the international working class and its main offspring -- the world socialist system.

After the victory of the socialist revolution in Russia, V. I. Lenin concluded that henceforth all world history is defined as "the struggle of a small group of imperialist nations against the soviet movement and Soviet states, headed by Soviet Russia" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Works], vol 41, p 242). Developing Lenin's ideas and taking into account the new line-up of forces in the world arena after World War II, the Marxist-Leninist parties determined that the main contradiction of the present era is that between socialism and imperialism. This contradiction is expressed in the struggle between the two world social systems. The struggle takes place in the areas of economics, politics and ideology. It can also spill over, through the fault of imperialism, into armed clashes.

At the same time, analysis of the post-war correlation of class forces in the world enabled the international communist movement to advance the most important postulate that a new world war can be averted. This possibility arose in connection with the fundamental change in the correlation of class forces on the world arena.

Real socialism became a mighty barrier in the path of imperialist war-mongers. Year after year friendship among the socialist states grows stronger. Predatory wars are foreign to socialism by its very nature. The socialist states have no class or social groups interested in an arms race or in militaristic preparations. Peace is a most important condition for building socialism and communism and for developing the world revolutionary process.

Imperialism is the source of war in the present era. V. I. Lenin instructed that imperialism, the highest and final stage of capitalism, "by its fundamental ECONOMIC characteristics, is distinguished by the least love of peace and freedom and the greatest and most universal development of militarism" ("Poln. sobr. soch.", vol 37, p 248). "...Politically," emphasized Vladimir Il'ich, "imperialism is entirely a striving for force and reaction" ("Poln. sobr. soch.", vol 27, p 388). These formulations expressed concretely one of the most important characteristics of imperialism -- its aggressive essence. Lenin's assessment of monopoly capitalism remains entirely relevant today. "Reactionary imperialist circles cannot reconcile themselves to the main tendency of present world development," notes Comrade K. U. Chernenko. "They recognize that the wheel of history in its natural movement is working for socialism and for the universal affirmation of the principles of national freedom and social justice. Therefore, they also strive to conduct their international affairs from a position of strength and strive to violate the natural course of history. This is the reason for the unprecedented scale of their arms programs. This is the reason for their persistent attempts to destroy military-strategic parity."

In materials of the 26th CPSU Congress and subsequent Central Committee plenums, our party gave a thorough analysis of the current world situation and the main aspects of the present military-political situation. Such CPSU conclusions as the sharp increase in aggressiveness of the policy of imperialism, most of all American, its adventurism, and its readiness to risk the vital interests of mankind in the name of its narrow selfish aims are of fundamental importance. American imperialism, claiming the role of "savior" of the entire capitalist system, heads the forces of the most double-dyed world reaction. The adventuristic policy of the present Washington administration is most closely linked with the entire past history of the hegemonistic, anti-socialist and anti-soviet pretensions of U. S. monopolists to decide to its benefit through force of arms the historical conflict between socialism and capitalism.

After the Second World War, in which the United States suffered relatively small losses and was incredibly enriched through military deliveries, American imperialism took on the role of world policeman and initiator and organizer of the policy of anti-communism and anti-sovietism. The U. S. in fact became the political, economic and military center of modern imperialism, and American monopoly capital intended to achieve undivided world supremacy. In its great power, hegemonistic policy Washington placed great reliance on United States atomic monopoly.

It is known that the U. S. first developed and used nuclear weapons. During the Potsdam Conference in 1945 then American President Truman informed the USSR leaders that America had an atomic bomb. On 6 and 9 August of that year Washington used this new weapon. On the order of the U. S. President the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were wiped from the face of the earth by atomic strikes. Thus American imperialism clearly showed the whole world how it planned to use atomic energy. The White House selected Japanese residents to be the victims of these barbarian bombings, but the political objective of this inhuman step was nuclear blackmail of the Soviet Union. On

the one hand, the U. S. tested its weapon of mass destruction on a "live target," and on the other it demonstrated a new, and as viewed in Washington, an effective instrument of deterrence against the USSR and of strengthening the impudent pretensions of its overseas monopolists to supremacy in the post-war world.

United States ruling circles undertook to stockpile and improve atomic weapons. Already at the end of 1945 the U. S. committee of chiefs of staff in a secret report recommended making atomic strikes against the Soviet Union, and the joint intelligence committee in its documents 329 and 329/I selected 20 of the largest Soviet cities for atomic bombing. Corresponding plans for atomic bombing of the USSR were developed one after another in the Pentagon offices: "Charioteer," ("Kogvill"), ("Trojan"), ("Chanpaunder"), ("Flitvid") and others.

The evil American plans to inflict atomic strikes on the territory of our country and the other socialist countries became more vast as the number of atomic bombs stockpiled in U. S. arsenals grew larger.

The plan for a nuclear attack under the code name Dropshot, prepared by the U. S. committee of chiefs of staff in 1949, provided for raining down on the Soviet Union 300 atomic and 250,000 tons of conventional bombs. It calculated at turning into ruins the major cities of our country, destroying up to 85 percent of Soviet industry and invading USSR territory with the combined armed forces of the aggressive North Atlantic bloc, which had been created by that time.

During the post-war years the U. S. developed a dense network of military bases around the USSR. At the end of 1982 they already numbered approximately 1,500 on the territories of 32 states. Both the creation of the NATO bloc and surrounding the socialist world with numerous American military bases were subordinated to a single objective -- to achieve overwhelming military-political superiority over the USSR and the whole socialist community and from a position of strength to try to dictate its conditions in international affairs.

Stubbornly carrying out its policy of strengthening existing and knocking together new aggressive blocs, the U. S. ruling circles began to encourage in every way revanchist forces in the FRG and Japan and the all-round militarization of these states. An unprecedented arms race was developed. In the 1950's B-52 strategic bombers entered the U. S. inventory. In the early 1960's the Pentagon began massive deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles, as well as the development and deployment of nuclear missile submarines in the world's oceans. In the late 1960's and early 1970's the U. S. administration started to equip its intercontinental ballistic missiles with highly accurate MIRV'd warheads and began the development of strategic cruise missiles. Today Washington authorities have set about to implement a program of massive deployment of air, sea and land based cruise missiles.

In 1981 the U. S. President decided on the full scale production of neutron munitions. Finally, already possessing the world's largest arsenal of chemical weapons, the American authorities started to produce new binary

chemical munitions and to equip the armed forces with them. In 1982, the Reagan Administration, despite agreements signed by the United States, announced the start of production of 100 MX intercontinental ballistic missiles and achieved the agreement of its NATO allies on deploying approximately 600 intermediate range nuclear missiles in Europe.

Programs adopted in recent years and already being realized by Washington to develop weapons based on the latest achievements of science and technology, including systems and means for conducting military operations in space and from space, are aimed at multiplying U. S. military might many times over and at destroying military-strategic parity with the Soviet Union.

It goes without saying that such imperialist actions have necessitated and still necessitate that the USSR take steps to ensure the reliable defense of socialism and to foil the feeble aggressive impulses of imperialist reaction. The practical defensive measures of the Soviet Union and a number of European socialist countries were embodied in the formation of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in 1955, which facilitated creating the conditions of military-political parity. By the late 1960's and early 1970's military-strategic parity between the USSR and U. S. and between the countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO was also achieved. The hegemonistic, anti-soviet and anti-socialist calculations of American imperialism turned out to be clearly unfounded.

In February of this year, MSU D. F. Ustinov, USSR minister of defense, stated directly: "Approximate military-strategic parity exists between the USSR and U. S. and between the Warsaw Treaty Organization countries and NATO, and the Soviet Union has not violated it and does not intend to violate it."

It is important to emphasize that it is namely the advantages of socialism over capitalism in the economic, socio-political and ideological spheres which made it possible for us to achieve military-strategic parity in a relatively short historical period. Military-strategic parity with the U. S., achieved at the cost of great efforts by the CPSU and all the Soviet people, is saving the world from extremely dangerous adventurist impulses of imperialism to push the peoples into the abyss of nuclear war.

Maintaining military parity is in no way an end in itself of the socialist states, but it is an absolute vital necessity. While preventing the destruction of military parity, the USSR and other Warsaw Treaty Organization states have been doing everything possible to achieve agreements with the West on halting the nuclear arms race, working out reliable confidence building measures, reducing the military danger and completely eliminating the threat of nuclear war.

The Soviet leaders have frequently indicated that agreements on limiting and reducing nuclear weapons on an equal basis and on the principles of equal security are a most important condition for consolidating military parity. This would make it possible to maintain military parity at lower levels of nuclear opposition, to reduce political tension and the threat of nuclear war arising, and in the final analysis even to completely eliminate this threat.

In negotiations with the U. S. on limiting and reducing strategic weapons, the USSR conducted a clear policy of achieving a constructive and fair agreement. The Soviet side proposed that all strategic weapons in their aggregate be subject to limitations and reductions, and not individual, arbitrarily selected types.

The USSR believes that there are real opportunities to improve decisively the international situation. This is the objective of the entire complex of proposals advanced by the Soviet Union: on the nuclear powers adopting a commitment not to use nuclear weapons first; on non-use of force in relations between NATO and Warsaw Treaty Organization states; on an immediate quantitative and qualitative freeze on nuclear weapons; on preventing the militarization of space, etc. An agreement by the nuclear powers to adopt jointly a system of norms to govern relations among them, proposed recently by Comrade K. U. Chernenko, would be especially important in ridding mankind of the threat of nuclear war.

However, all the peace efforts of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries meet with stubborn resistance from the U. S. and NATO, which are striving no matter what to realize their far reaching anti-socialist, anti-soviet plans through aggravating the international situation, intensifying the arms race and achieving military superiority.

We will refer to recent facts. Thus, year after year the U. S. military budget is growing. Its rate of growth during 1981-1983, i.e., during the Reagan Administration, averaged 17 percent annually according to official American data. In Fiscal Year 1984, budget allocations for militaristic aims were approved in the amount of \$265.3 billion, which is almost 50 percent higher than in Fiscal Year 1981. In Fiscal Year 1985, Washington authorities allotted some \$300 billion to preparations for war. For the next five years (1985-1989) the U. S. military department is counting on receiving allocations in an amount greater than \$2 trillion; i.e., more than in the preceding 15 years. The military budgets of the other NATO countries are also constantly swelling.

The achievement of military-strategic superiority over the USSR and Warsaw Treaty Organization is the alpha and omega of the program for the all-encompassing growth of strategic weapons right up to 1990, which has been advanced and is being rapidly implemented by the Washington administration. This program encompasses all components of strategic offensive forces and includes the deployment of new MX and Midgetman ICBM's; new strategic bombers; further accelerated construction of Trident nuclear missile submarines; and expanding the production of cruise missiles of various types. By 1990 the U. S. plans to bring its strategic capability to 20,000 nuclear warheads.

Since 1958 Pentagon hawks have nurtured plans for the use of space for military purposes. The Reagan government gave the green light to such plans, which are leading to turning space into a bridgehead for aggression. Billions in allocations are set aside for these aims. Washington flatly refuses to negotiate on preventing the militarization of space. In 1983 and 1984 expenditures on military space programs were \$8.5 and \$9.3 billion respectively. In 1985 they are increasing to \$12.9 billion. The American

press acknowledges that in 1988 the U. S. military budget for space may increase to \$20 billion. U. S. bosses make achieving scientific and technological superiority in the use of space for military purposes one of their most important tasks.

Intensive work is underway in the U. S. to develop a large scale ABM missile defense system, which is in fact making null and void the permanent Soviet-American treaty on limiting such a system. Tremendous sums have already been spent on this. Special organizational structures have been created and scientific centers and industrial capacities fitted out.

The Reagan Administration has adopted a policy of expanding production of new, binary, chemical munitions. In 1983 a large scale five year program of "chemical rearmament" of all types of U. S. armed forces was begun. It is intended that \$10 billion will be expended on its realization. The program provides for a fundamental modernization of the military chemical arsenal and increasing the number of munitions to five million over a five year period.

In short, the United States is undertaking feverish attempts to alter military-strategic parity through modernizing the vehicles and warheads in its nuclear arsenals; replacing former weapons systems with more effective ones; improving their means of guidance; creating fundamentally new weapons; deploying weapons systems in various spatial spheres, etc. In general, fundamentally new opportunities for unleashing a world war are being hurriedly sought.

The position of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries with respect to preserving military parity is well known and remains firm and unshakable. "We do not require military superiority," stated Comrade K. U. Chernenko at the February 1984 CPSU Central Committee plenum, "and we do not intend to dictate our will to others, but we will not allow the military parity which has been achieved to be destroyed. And let no one have the slightest doubts: we will continue to take care to strengthen the defense capability of our country, so that we will have enough means to cool the hot heads of the militaristic adventurers. This is a very essential prerequisite for preserving peace."

The peoples of our entire planet have satisfied themselves anew that the words of the USSR do not deviate from its deeds. It is known that the deployment of American intermediate range nuclear missiles on the territory of Western Europe created an additional threat to the security of the socialist countries. In essence these missiles are NATO strategic weapons with respect to the USSR and its allies, which substantially changes the military-political situation on the European continent. In the interests of ensuring the security of the countries of the socialist community, the Soviet Union was forced to begin deployment of extended range operational-tactical missiles on GDR and CSR territory, and to deploy corresponding Soviet weapons in ocean areas and seas adjacent to the territory of the United States, equivalent in characteristics to the threat which the American intermediate range nuclear missiles in Europe poses for the USSR and Warsaw Treaty Organization countries. Other necessary measures are being taken, as Soviet leaders have repeatedly stated.

All honest minded people on Earth approve and support our clear and firm position regarding preventing the destruction of military-strategic parity. Hundreds of millions of workers in various countries and continents are more and more convinced each day that preserving military parity serves the cause of peace and the security of all peoples.

The workers of the socialist countries can successfully solve their great creative tasks under conditions of military-strategic parity. The peoples of the former colonial countries are also vitally interested in peaceful conditions for accomplishing the many most difficult tasks of building a new life and strengthening their sovereignty and independence.

Objectively the peoples of the capitalist countries are also interested in preserving parity in the military-strategic area, since the sinister designs of imperialism to achieve military superiority over the socialist states are aimed at preparing for war, which inevitably will lead to a worldwide nuclear conflagration. Thousands and thousands of representatives of the most varied strata of the population in the ranks of the participants in the mass antiwar, antinuclear and antimissile movement are coming to an ever more profound understanding of this truth.

Military-strategic parity has reliably served and continues to serve as an insurmountable barrier to the war-mongers. This enrages the imperialist strategists. American and NATO hawks stake everything, ignore good sense and the lessons of history and try to bury in oblivion the historical fact that 40 years ago the Soviet people gained a great victory in a most fierce clash with the strike forces of world imperialist reaction, honorably defended the freedom and independence of their socialist fatherland, brought liberation from the fascist yoke to many peoples and saved mankind from the brown plague.

Today the USSR and fraternal socialist countries are a powerful alliance of the creators of the most advanced society on earth, and a reliable bulwark of peace on our planet. And attempts to blackmail us with the imperialist nuclear bludgeon are in vain. The military-strategic parity of the world of socialism and the world of capitalism is an objective reality which the American plunderers and their NATO accomplices will not succeed in destroying.

The consistent and principled policy of the CPSU and the Marxist-Leninist parties of the fraternal countries, aimed at strengthening in every way the economic and defense might of the socialist states, is a most important condition for preserving military-strategic parity. The peoples of the Soviet Union and the other countries in our community see it as their primary patriotic and international duty to redouble their political vigilance and work selflessly in the name of further strengthening the economic and defense potential of real socialism. As Comrade K. U. Chernenko stressed in his speech at the CPSU Central Committee Politburo session, the needs of strengthening the country's defense capability have been duly considered in the plan for social and economic development of the USSR for 1985.

The constant combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces, which along with the other armies of the Warsaw Treaty Organization countries are reliably safeguarding the revolutionary gains of our peoples and peace on earth, is a

sure guarantee that military-strategic parity will be preserved. Socialism's armed defenders know well their direct involvement in solving the responsible task of preventing imperialism from destroying existing military-strategic parity. They see it as their primary duty to be always on guard and in constant readiness to foil any machinations of our enemies and to give a decisive rebuff to aggression.

Maintaining combat readiness of the troops and naval forces at the required level depends decisively on exemplary fulfillment of the tasks of military, political and operational training, through integrating a precise plan with creative initiative by the troops; constantly improving methods of training and educating the personnel; daily struggle for new successes in improving military skill, the forms and methods of military operations and the use of weapons and military equipment; and scientific command and control of these processes. A high level of military discipline, self-discipline and order is absolutely essential to maintaining constant combat readiness.

One of the decisive directions for improving combat readiness of army and navy subunits and units is ideological tempering and moral-political and psychological preparation of personnel for actions under conditions of modern combat.

The purposeful and active activity of military councils, commanders, political organs, party and komsomol organizations and all of army society helps form in the personnel a correct, scientific view of the existing military-political environment; the nature of modern warfare, should the aggressors risk unleashing it against the USSR and its allies; the probable enemy; and the ways of decisively defeating any aggressor.

* * *

The urgent problem of preserving military-strategic parity and not allowing it to be destroyed by imperialism is at the center of attention of our party and the Soviet State. And the firm will of the Soviet people and the peoples of the whole socialist community not to allow the enemies of socialism and peace to achieve a unilateral military advantage is a most reliable guarantee that imperialist predators will not realize their aggressive, misanthropic objectives.

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MILITARY POLITICAL ISSUES

REVIEW: KOROLENKO ON THE POLITICAL WORKER

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 23, Dec 84 (signed to press 19 Nov 1984) pp 86-88

[Review by Col V. Voronov of book by V. I. Korolenko, "The Political Worker's Calling"]

[Text] Political workers are the legendary commissars of the time of the civil war and the fearless politruks [political commissars] of the Great Patriotic War. They are those thousands and thousands of people who today, along with the commanders and party organizations, unite the troops around the Communist Party and its Leninist Central Committee, and in a difficult international environment devote all their efforts and knowledge to further strengthening the Soviet Armed Forces.

A recently published book by Lt Gen Avn V. I. Korolenko* is dedicated to them, political workers of various generations. Its author, a participant in the Great Patriotic War and today deputy chief of the Cadres Administration of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy, reflects on the profession of the political officer and his calling, and discusses both experienced teachers and those who are taking their first independent steps.

Party political work, the book notes, is special, very needed, noble and difficult work. It does not permit indifference, impassivity or nonchalance. Concerned people with clean hearts and unsullied consciences are capable of this work. The profession of a political work requires broad knowledge, love and loyalty to one's cause, competence and a feeling for the new, self-discipline, modesty, probity, optimism and good will and an attitude of respect toward people. The essence of the profession itself requires the political worker to be above reproach in questions of ethics and morals.

The book being reviewed here talks precisely about such people. It is remarkable that the multi-faceted experience of party political work is transmitted in it through the lives of real individuals. Winning over its readers with its authenticity and vivid portrayals, the book aims at solving actual problems of military development: further strengthening military

* V. I. Korolenko, "Prizvaniye politrabotnika" [The Political Officer's Calling], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1984.

discipline, sole responsibility and self-discipline, and increasing the vigilance and combat readiness of the troops and naval forces.

Its first chapter, "Called by the Revolution," is welcomed with interest. In it the author talks about the establishment of the institution of military commissars and shows the courage, heroism and selflessness of its representatives during the years of the Civil War and foreign military intervention. One cannot help but be excited in reading the lines about the life and feats of Nikolay Markin, commissar of the Volga Military Flotilla; Petr Kobozev, chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Eastern Front; Dmitriy Furmanov, famed commissar of the 25th Chapayevskiy Division; and other staunch and loyal soldiers of the party.

There were dozens and hundreds of these selfless heroes and fearless knights of the revolution, notes the author. They imbued the ranks of the Red Army masses with revolutionary spirit, unity of thoughts, feelings, objectives and practical actions and a single understanding of the tasks of the struggle. They imbued it with their fiery Bolshevik words and personal example of irrepressible passion, their loyalty to the revolution, valor and steadfastness, their selflessness and crystal purity of heart. "The party can view with complete satisfaction the heroic work of its commissars," it was stated in a resolution of the 8th RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] Congress, "who arm in arm with the best commanders swiftly created a combat effective army."

"They Led us to a Heroic Deed" is the title of the second chapter, dedicated to commissars and politruks in the Great Patriotic War. Ideologically staunch, courageous and brave, they had the gift at the most dangerous and difficult minutes of uniting people around the party and inspiring them to fulfill the combat order of the commander. How many of them, young and older, experienced party members and new communists, remained lying there on the fields of battle! The spirit of the defense of the Brest Fortress was regimental commissar Ye. M. Fomin. Back in August 1941, Aleksandr Pankratov, a junior politruk, covered an enemy embrasure with his body. Politruk-Panfilovite [political officer of the heroic Panfilov 316th Rifle Division] Vasilii Klochkov is a legend. N. F. Loboda, commissar of an air attack regiment, repeated the feat of Nikolay Gastello. These and hundreds of other political workers of the terrible war days personified our glorious fighting party, the party of Lenin, and led the Soviet people to the great victory over fascism.

One front line episode recalled by the author leaves a deep impression. Before battle the regimental commissar came to the company. He was with the soldiers about a half an hour, but when he left the troops long remained under the influence of their talk with the commissar. Then one soldier asked his senior comrade:

"What do you think, is commissar a rank or a duty?"

The middle-aged, long-time soldier answered:

"Commissar is both a duty and a rank, and it is a faith. A faith in man and in our victory."

It could not have been said better, more briefly or more accurately, it seems to me!

Those who participated in the Great Patriotic War know what burning hatred the fascists felt toward the Red Army political workers. This is eloquently indicated, for example, in the special order by Hitler's main headquarters mentioned in the book, which on the eve of the war in May 1941 was issued to troops sent to the Soviet Union. It stated: Political commissars in the Soviet forces are not to be considered prisoners of war. They are not to be sent to the rear, but annihilated in special camps.

Political work, which in combat did not stop for a single hour, united the efforts of commanders and commissars; political section workers and deputies for political affairs; komsomol leaders and unit and ship agitators; cultural and educational workers and journalists. Hundreds and thousands of activists, agitators and political fighters stood behind them. And party organizations were one of the most important elements in this chain. They were in each company and battery, in each squadron and air squadron and in the battalions and regiments. They were able to look in the face of death without fear and they inspired the soldiers to attack with their fervent summons and personal example. The author also found good words for the heroic komsomol leaders, who were held up as standards in battle and were imitated at the front. And this, no doubt, was no accident. V. I. Korolenko himself was a komsomol leader during this terrible time.

A large portion of the book is devoted to a discussion of today's political workers. The names of the chapters themselves, which illuminate various aspects of their activity, are indicative of the vital nature and urgency of the problems they deal with. They are: "We Inherited This;" "If Sure of Your Choice;" "At the Start of the Path;" "Strength of Moral Fiber;" "To Meet People Half-Way;" "By the Weapon of the Word;" "To Know and Be Able;" "Loyalty to the Cause."

Conduits of the ideas of the party, able and good-willed mentors of the soldiers, ideologically convinced, highly educated and competent, combining firmness and high principles with spiritual generosity -- such are the political workers of today. Like all of our officer corps, they are utterly devoted to the Communist Party and Soviet homeland and to the ideas of Marxism-Leninism.

Today's generation of political workers are worthy heirs of the commissars and politruks. In their thoughts and deeds they bear comparison with them and sacredly honor and multiply their heroic traditions. One is again and again convinced of this as he meets on the pages of the book people who fervently fulfill their party and professional duty, and in difficult and vital situations display moral beauty and strength of spirit and are high models of collectivism, military comradery and mutual assistance.

Sr Lt Nikolay Shornikov, deputy company commander for political affairs, accomplished an immortal feat on the soil of fraternal Afghanistan, for which

he was awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union. In a critical situation which took place in training, Lt Aleksandr Kiselev, deputy company commander for political affairs, covered a soldier with his body who had dropped a live grenade that was about to explode. Political workers are invariably found where it is most difficult and where success is decided -- at missile launch positions, tactical field exercises, airfields, tank parks and ranges, difficult flights, long sea voyages and military construction sites.

The author, an experienced army political worker, shares his thoughts and reflections on the growing importance of party political work under present conditions, and does so in a well-reasoned and convincing manner. His views on forms and methods of party political work which take into account specific Armed Services and branches of arms and various categories of personnel, and his thoughts on strengthening the authority of the commander, professional military training of political workers, recommendation procedures and their ability to master the weapon of the word are undoubtedly interesting. Nor are the shortcomings avoided which, unfortunately, are still found in the activity of some political organs and political workers: red-tapism, creativity only on paper, dogmatism, formalism and conventionalism.

Thinking about ways of improving the professional skill of political officers, the author shares in particular the thought of the need to develop such qualities as moral fiber, education and culture. Emphasizing that the main source of moral fiber, Marxism-Leninism, is as inexhaustible as life itself, he shows, based on the experience of the best propagandists and political workers, how important it is to have a firm grasp of revolutionary theory, to study the works of the classics of Marxism-Leninism and party documents, and to expose the hostile ideology of contemporary imperialism.

The author's views on the ability to work with people, to catch precisely their moods and needs and effectively respond to them, warrants particular attention. The political worker is entrusted with the most valuable and important capital -- people. He is entrusted with the upbringing of ideologically staunch defenders of the homeland. Stagnation, formalism, self-conceit, arrogance, self-admiration and spiritual callousness contradict the nature of the political worker as no one else. The political worker is obligated to feel any man's pain as his own, to experience deeply his joy and his sadness and to display genuine participation in the fate of his co-workers. This is his mission -- to penetrate subtly into the spiritual world of a person, listen attentively and support him in a difficult moment. And not only to listen, but also to hear!

The political workers of the older generation know well from their own life's experience how dear and truly invaluable is this gift of the teacher and leader. And it is not only a gift. It is also constant searching, study and professional skill, which is developed, sharpened and perfected through daily effort and creative assimilation of many years of experience in party political work, including at the front lines. The political worker to whom people are drawn and with whom they are prepared to speak frankly and entrust with their innermost feelings knows well what is going on in the subunit and how the barracks lives in those hours when there are no officers present. As a rule the moral climate in such a collective is firm and healthy, and deviations from the demands of military regulations are not found there.

Speaking at the All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Komsomol Organizations, Comrade K. U. Chernenko stressed that our army today, as always, is strong not only with modern equipment and good training, but also in its ideological fervor and high moral and political spirit. To make their personal contribution to the cause of further strengthening the moral and spiritual potential of our Armed Forces and to instill in the troops a feeling of love for the homeland and hatred toward its enemies, high political and class vigilance and constant readiness for a heroic deed -- this is what the political officers about whom the author speaks see as their social mission.

Filled with thoughts about the profession of political officer, the book undoubtedly will be read with interest by officers, students and cadets in military educational institutions and the army and navy party aktiv.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

MSU V. PETROV ON COMBAT TRAINING

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 24, Dec 84 (signed to press 4 Dec 84) pp 9-18

[Article by MSU V. Petrov, commander in chief of the Ground Forces, USSR deputy minister of defense: "Persistently Improve Military Training"]

[Text] The first days of the training year in the Ground Forces units and large units were marked by great patriotic enthusiasm and improved organization and efficiency. The personnel welcomed with deep satisfaction and unanimous approval the decisions of the October 1984 CPSU Central Committee plenum, the instructions and conclusions contained in the speech of Comrade K. U. Chernenko at the 15 November 1984 CPSU Central Committee Politburo session and the documents of the second session of the 11th convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The soldiers see in them a new and vivid manifestation of the concern of Lenin's party for the well-being of the Soviet people and the further strengthening of the economic and defense might of the country. They clearly recognize their tremendous responsibility for ensuring the security of the homeland and for reliably defending the gains of socialism in today's tense international situation, under conditions of a real imperialist military threat.

"A dangerous situation has been created in the world as a result of the growing aggressiveness of imperialism," indicates Comrade K. U. Chernenko, CPSU Central Committee general secretary and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. "It places special demands on all of us, all of the Soviet people, to work with unprecedented organization and selflessness, be always vigilant and strengthen the country's defense in every way..."

These words found a fervent response in the hearts of the soldiers, sergeants, warrant officers and officers, and became for them a guide to action. The personnel are toiling with all their efforts and energy to fulfill the demands of the party and the tasks set by the USSR minister of defense for the new training year. Socialist competition under the slogan, "To the 40th Anniversary of the Great Victory and the 27th CPSU Congress -- Our Selfless Military Labor," was widely developed in the military collectives at the call of the personnel of the guards motorized rifle regiment commanded by Guards Lt Col V. Zhuravlev. Further improving the combat readiness of units and large units to repulse aggression immediately and defeat the enemy decisively under

any conditions in which he may unleash and wage war is the main and determining objective to which the efforts of the soldiers and the political and organizational work of commanders, political organs, staffs and party and komsomol organizations are entirely directed.

High level military training of the troops has always been one of the decisive factors of combat effectiveness and a necessary condition for achieving victory in combat. At the present time its role has significantly increased, for a number of objective reasons. First, the danger of a sudden attack by the aggressor and his use both of weapons of mass destruction and of precision weapons has increased. Therefore, the readiness of units and large units to deal a crushing rebuff to the enemy must be constantly high, for there simply will not be time to finish learning. Second, fundamental changes in the technical equipping of the troops and in operational art and tactics have led to a sharp increase in the number and complexity of the tasks being solved by the personnel and to the knowledge, abilities and skills which they require. Third, the very nature of modern combat -- dynamic, rapid flowing and distinguished by great spatial scope, unprecedented destructive force of weapons and tremendous burdens -- has immeasurably increased the requirements for military and moral-political qualities and psychological and physical staunchness on the part of the soldiers.

Military training is a many-sided concept. It includes, first of all, the mastery of weapons and equipment and the ability to use them effectively in combat and the perfection of soldiers' skills in fulfilling their functions. It presumes the thorough training of subunits, units and large units, in accordance with their missions, to carry out highly maneuverable, active and decisive combat operations at any time of year and day, in any environment -- on level terrain, in mountains, forests, deserts and populated areas -- with the use of both conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction.

Each category of serviceman, branch of arms and special troops, it goes without saying, has its own specific attributes, which are taken into account in determining the criteria for their military training. For a commander the main index of his professional maturity is his ability to organize for combat and to direct the efforts of his subordinates to carry it out successfully and the ability to destroy the enemy not with numbers but with ability. For staff officers it is preciseness and effectiveness in their work and the ability to provide for the commander reliable and constant command and control of his forces and weapons. For the motorized riflemen, tankers, missilemen and artillerymen it is high level tactical, firing and technical training which enables them to use their weapons and equipment most effectively, and constant readiness to defeat a strong, active, technically equipped and well-trained enemy.

Of course, in order to achieve a high level of military skill it is necessary to organize carefully and be able carry out the training plan methodically, and to accomplish all field exercises in a difficult environment which is as close as possible to real combat.

It is well known that rising to the heights of military skill begins with technical training and thorough mastery of weapons and equipment. In the

Ground Forces, as in the other Armed Services, a natural, constant process is underway of equipping the units and large units with more modern, but also more complex weapons and military equipment. Naturally this entails changes in organizational structure and tactics and in the methods of preparing for and conducting combat operations. Consequently, the requirements for intensivity and quality, both of individual troop training and of the combat teamwork of subunits and units in their entirety, are also increasing. Today the problems of improving the all-round effectiveness and practical thrust of military and political training, effectively using training time and mobilizing the men for selfless military labor are acute as never before.

The interests of combat readiness dictate an insistent need to master new equipment in the most compressed time periods and to arm the soldiers with profound knowledge, firm skills and the ability to maximize their fire, strike and maneuver capabilities. "Weapons and military equipment," indicates MSU D.F. Ustinov, USSR minister of defense, "can have the required effect only if they are in able and reliable hands, and if study and mastery of the methods of their military functioning are combined with further improvement of the field, air and sea training of the troops, with the development of tactics and operational art, and with the combat teamwork of subunits, units and ships."

Therefore, developing in the men firm skills, which have become automatic, in accomplishing practical tasks of military use and servicing of equipment in field exercises and thorough mastery of the rules of its operation and repair, and training high class-qualified specialists must be viewed as among the main tasks of military training. It is especially important to raise the level of training of driver-mechanics in driving combat vehicles over broken terrain in any weather, day and night, and to arm them with the ability to create optimal conditions for conducting effective fire on the enemy.

On the whole these tasks are being solved consistently and in an exemplary fashion in Ground Forces units and large units. Commanders, staffs and political organs, on the basis of the requirements of orders and the directives of the USSR minister of defense, military regulations and instructions, the recommendations of military science and the creative use of front-line experience and the leading experience acquired in troop units, are improving the planning and organization of military and political training.

For example, much is being done in this regard in the Proskurov Red Banner Order of Suvorov and Kutuzov Motorized Rifle Regiment; the Shepetov Thrice Decorated Guards Tank Regiment; the Tamanskiy Red Banner, Order of Suvorov Guards Motorized Rifle Division imeni M. I. Kalinin and others of our best units and large units, in which the military training level of the personnel increased markedly in the past training year.

The stable successes achieved here are determined most of all by the responsible and creative attitude of the command and political personnel to the matter and to setting up a clear and productive training process. Thoroughly thought out planning of military and political training in leading units is accomplished by staffs under the direct control of commanders and with the involvement of their deputies and the chiefs of branches of arms and services. This makes it possible to determine most accurately the main

directions and tasks of troop training; to allot effectively training time, motor transport resources, ammunition, fuel and the use of the training material and technical base; and to ensure the complete coordination of regimental and battalion plans and company training schedules, thus eliminating any discrepancies, overlaps or interruptions in the training process.

However, development of carefully thought out military and political training plans is merely the beginning. The main thing is their strict fulfillment. After planning, which gives military training a precise rhythm, consistency and intensiveness, in the best units there follows persistent, creative daily organizational and upbringing work by commanders, staffs, political workers and party organizations. The sphere of their activity is inspiring people to conscientious work; arming officers, warrant officers and sergeants with methodological skills; inculcating superb discipline in the personnel and maintaining an atmosphere of irreconcilability to shortcomings in the military collectives. Improving the level of the soldiers' military training in this area largely results from commanders, political organs and staffs striving to imbue military training with the spirit of modern combat and make training and upbringing approach its demands. In particular, the comprehensive method of training and upbringing is used ably and effectively, which makes it possible simultaneously to accomplish tasks of tactical, firing and technical training and moral-psychological and physical tempering of the personnel.

What is the essence and value of this method? It is in approximating training to the reality of combat and the ability to increase its intensiveness and effectiveness and to give the soldiers more knowledge, abilities and skills in the allotted training time. After the problems of the individual training and teamwork of small subunits have been completely solved, the lessons become more complex, with all the subunits of training subordinated to the interests of tactics. Various tasks of reconnaissance, firing, special and engineer training, driving and protection against weapons of mass destruction are worked out in company, battalion and regimental exercises, according to a single plan and against a specific tactical background. In the concluding stages these exercises also are carried out in coordination with subunits of various branches of arms and special troops. In addition, such exercises make it possible to work out problems of command and control, achieve teamwork in staff work, precise coordination of all participating subunits, and in the final analysis attain a combined arms thrust in training, which is of fundamental importance in our time.

In devising comprehensive exercises in the interests of tactical training, experienced commanders create difficult, dynamic situations which demand full exertion of efforts, sharp wit, resourcefulness, military cleverness and staunchness in overcoming difficulties. For example, parallel training carried out during movement to training centers and long marches on deployment to pre-battle and battle formations and solving suddenly arising tasks -- repulsing air raids, negotiating "contaminated" terrain sectors, forcing water obstacles from the march and destroying "enemy" landings -- are of undoubted benefit.

In firing training, more rigid norms, reducing the time required for reconnoitering targets and preparing and accomplishing firing exercises, increasing the distance to targets and reducing the amount of ammunition required for their destruction all justify themselves. What is needed is to develop in the men firm skills in the complete and effective use of the firing capabilities of modern weapons for destroying targets with the first round or volley and to teach commanders the art of making increasingly strong fire strikes in the course of combat. To achieve a high level of firing training and increase the number of masters of firing it is necessary to organize and carry out competition ably for fulfillment of fire missions among crews, teams, sections, platoons, companies, batteries, battalions and artillery battalions.

The use of the comprehensive training method, of course, involves certain difficulties, solving a large number of organizational questions and the need to intensify political-upbringing work. For this reason, some leaders are not introducing this method into practice as rapidly as life demands. For example, in the units where lieutenant colonels A. Saidov and A. Shlebkienko and majors V. Koblov and A. Borisov are serving, instances of "bureaucratic" frames of mind have not been eliminated, in which the chiefs of particular branches of arms and special troops are reluctant to combine efforts in the interests of the tasks of combined arms combat, and in these instances combined armed commanders do not display necessary demandingness, insistence and high principles. To be reconciled with this means to forget that on the battlefield victory is attained by combined, precisely coordinated efforts of all branches of arms, special troops and types of weapons.

Success in increasing the intensity and effectiveness of military training largely depends on the officers -- its direct organizers and leaders. It depends on their political maturity and responsibility for that which is entrusted to them and on their professional, pedagogical and methodological skill. It depends on their ability to observe strictly the fundamental principles of military training: teach the soldiers that which is required in war; teach under conditions which correspond as closely as possible to a real combat situation and ensure the inseparable unity of training and upbringing.

In recent years, visible changes for the better have taken place in commanders' training of officers. Active forms of training are being ever more widely applied. These include, for example, such forms as solving a single comprehensive tactical task with the conduct of group exercises; short tactical exercises on the ground; command-staff exercises with training problems worked out hour by hour in real and operational time; two-sided tactical exercises and live-fire and bombing exercises. They give a practical thrust to the professional training of officers and facilitate the rapid development of commanders as the creators and organizers of battle and the leaders of the training and upbringing of their subordinates. Demonstrations give good returns in improving the methodological skill of officers. Both the techniques and methods of actions related to solving various tasks in offensive and defensive combat, and the most effective methods of training personnel and developing combat teamwork in subunits and units are assimilated in such demonstrations.

But, as is well known, the vital force of any form of training depends entirely on its content. What is important is not only which drills and exercises are carried out in the system of commanders and methodological training, but also what they encompass and what they provide the officer for understanding the nature and special features of modern combat, the art of its organization and conduct and the firm control of organic, attached and supporting forces and weapons. How they facilitate developing a feel for that which is new, creative initiative, commander's independence, boldness and breadth of tactical thinking, and acquiring of practical skills is also exceptionally important.

In his speech to the recent jubilee plenum of the administration of the USSR Writers Union, Comrade K. U. Chernenko emphasized that today a creative approach to one's work must be a distinctive feature of each Soviet man -- writer, artist, scientist, engineer or worker. This demand also fully and entirely refers to military cadres. More than anywhere else, stagnation of thinking, adherence to stereotype and to fixed systems are impermissible in military affairs, for our work is of great national importance -- reliably defending the country's security. This requires of commanders at all levels thorough knowledge of military affairs, a high degree of creativity, strict assessment of the existing situation and a display of intelligent initiative.

Modern combat is not only a sharp conflict of men and military equipment, but also an intense battle of minds, will and skill. Its outcome is determined by people, their military training and desire to fulfill the mission no matter what. Every battle is unique, since it is conducted under various conditions, on varying terrain and with a different correlation of forces and weapons. The decision, methods and techniques which secured victory in one battle cannot always bring success in another combat situation. A battle is also unique because the probable enemy is improving his means and methods of combat.

In the U. S. and NATO countries, along with an increasing nuclear capability, a new generation of conventional weapons is also being developed at a rapid rate. The armies of the imperialist countries are equipped with highly accurate weapons systems -- automated long range reconnaissance-strike systems; cruise missiles equipped with cluster munition warheads; pilotless, remote controlled aircraft, and qualitatively new means of command and control, air defense and electronic warfare. As a result the criteria for weapons effectiveness are changing. Taking this into account, the U. S. armed forces command is developing new concepts for waging war.

We cannot fail to consider all this in troop training and, most of all, in commanders' training for officers. In his report at the All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Komsomol Organizations, MSU D. F. Ustinov, USSR minister of defense, set forth the task of learning to fight according to modern requirements. And he disclosed what this means. First, to know the enemy and his weapons and tactics well and to organize and conduct reconnaissance capably. Second, to combine in battle, flexibly and constantly, powerful fire, deep strikes and sudden maneuver on land, sea and air. Third, to hold the threads of troop control firmly in hand in a complex environment and under conditions of massive radioelectronic interference created by the enemy.

In implementing these requirements, many commanders, staffs and political organs are displaying the required insistence and a creative approach, have begun to struggle more resolutely with indulgences and oversimplifications in training and exercises, and have strengthened control over the independent work of officers. Non-standard situations are more and more often being created in command-staff and combined arms tactical exercises, during the development of which complex situations and moments of acute crisis, corresponding to the nature of modern combat, are introduced and commanders and staffs obtain only a minimum of information about the "enemy" and are confronted with instances of unexpected development of events and the need to solve tasks which arise suddenly. All of this inspires the officers to an independent, creative search for ways to achieve victory and to seek out new operational methods and ways of using forces and weapons. It trains them to conduct active reconnaissance, analyze the situation quickly, develop bold and original decisions and strive to forestall the enemy in deploying combat formations and making fire strikes.

At the same time, there are still frequent instances when field and classroom training are not sufficiently instructive, are stereotyped and oversimplified and resemble one another like twins. Sometimes the concept of the exercise becomes known to its participants in advance. In such drills and exercises, where everything proceeds according to the scenario, the "enemy" is portrayed as passive and weak and he comes under attack where and when it was known in advance that he would appear and the work of commanders and staffs is monotonous and shorn of initiative, creative inquiry and difficulties. All the senior commander needs to do is to complicate the situation and introduce elements of novelty into it, and hitches, mistakes and uncertainty appear. This took place, in particular, in the graded tactical exercise in several subunits in the regiment where Captain I. Sudakov is serving.

A major omission in commanders' training in some units is that questions of organizing for and conducting combat are not completely worked out. At times subunit commanders in exercises, short tactical exercises and group drills merely evaluate the situation, make a decision and report it to the senior commander; i.e., they stop half way. In this case the most difficult stage for the commander and staff, controlling the subunits and units in the dynamic of combat, is left out of the training. As a result a certain gap appears between their theoretical knowledge and practical skills. When it comes to organizing offensive or defensive combat on the ground; reconnaissance; systems of fire; maneuver and close and long range fire fights, such commanders get into difficulties, become confused and make mistakes.

The necessary attention is also not yet everywhere being paid to problems of command, control and coordination. Some officers are still bashful in using the technical means of control at their disposal, relying more on methods learned previously while still within the walls of academia, and on analyzing the situation "visually." Only this can explain such phenomena, which are not permissible even rarely, when time drags out inadmissibly on assigning tasks to the subunits, beginning the attack and making the fire strike, and when attached and supporting subunits fall from the field of vision of combined arms commanders and are used in far from the best manner. In a recent

battalion tactical exercise in the unit where Major A. Popov is serving, an attached self-propelled artillery battalion actually did not get to the action due to mistakes in command and control, although with its firepower it could have brought success to the attackers. The tank company attack turned out to be listless and ineffective.

It is hardly necessary to prove that real combat will not forgive such errors and omissions. It is necessary to learn the correct lessons from mistakes and omissions so that they are not repeated in the new training year. Senior commanders and party and komsomol organizations are called upon to help those who are unable to learn them themselves. As we say, we have no shortage of denunciations of negative phenomena. In professional conferences and party meetings sharp criticism is heard and correct ways of eliminating shortcomings are determined. But, unfortunately, verbal reactions are not always reinforced with specific organizational and moral educational measures for actually improving the situation.

The quality and effectiveness of military training are largely determined by the condition and utilization of the training material base. However, its development and improvement are still not everywhere given constant attention. In some units the training facilities on hand are not use purposefully enough. The training resources located directly at the military settlements are especially poorly used. At the same time these resources are accessible at any time, carry out training by visual means, reduce the expenditure of motor transport resources, ammunition and fuel and preserve costly military equipment. As experience developed in many units, especially training units, shows, simulator sets and complexes on firing training and driving for tankers and motorized riflemen, when used properly, provide for improved training quality and save an average of up to 20 percent of motor transport resources and up to 10 percent of ammunition, fuels and lubricants for each student. Such an economical approach corresponds to party demands to intensifying savings. And we have considerable reserve capacities here. The creation of the so-called barracks training-material base, especially for firing training, and small tank ranges of the artillery training school type and indoor ranges next to military settlements and in the area of the tank park merit universal approval and support. This is even more true of the portable equipment sets which are centrally set up for this purpose.

An excellent field material technical base and training and exercise equipment have been developed, for example, in the Rezhitskiy Thrice Decorated Guards Motorized Rifle Division imeni Hero of the Soviet Union Maj Gen I. V. Panfilov. They are maintained in good condition and are constantly improved and used to the maximum for individual training of specialists and military teamwork of small units; commanders' and methodological training of officers, warrant officers and sergeants; and forming psychological stability in the personnel. It is no accident that here the level of military training in subunits and units is also high.

This direct relationship is confirmed by the practice of the majority of units and large units, and it is also confirmed by facts of another sort. In places where there is no real concern for improving, good maintenance and effective use of the training base, which applies to a number of units in the

Transcaucasus, Odessa and Baykal military districts, as a rule deficiencies are disclosed during inspections.

We cannot become reconciled to the fact that, at times, valuable training time is spent by personnel on completing the equipping of training sites and preparing tank parks and moving target gunnery ranges, not to mention eliminating malfunctions in the mechanisms and instruments with which they are equipped. Apropos of this, here and there time is wasted not only for this reason. Complaining about a time deficit and correctly reasoning about the time factor in modern combat, success in which is decided by minutes and even seconds, some officers erroneously believe that each minute needs to be conserved only in a tactical exercise and when working out the decision in a training battle, while in other military training exercises minutes and even hours need not be considered. This leads both to protracted guard mounts for exercises, distracting some of the men for economic and other work and lack of coordination in planning and in material and technical support to exercises. It is time to put an end to this and to close firmly all channels for wasting training time. The struggle to use effectively each hour and minute of training must be considered a duty of every commander and political worker and each staff officer and chief of a branch of arms or service. Party and komsomol organizations are called upon to take a more active part in this struggle.

In speaking about the ways of improving the effectiveness of training one must not overlook the important role which active, purposeful party-political work plays. It has been proven indisputably by many years of military practice that greater successes in military and political training are achieved in those military collectives in which people are truly attuned to the cause, recognize the vital necessity and social-political importance of military labor, work with all their strength and display creative initiative.

The ideological and qualitative level of ideological work and the liveliness of party and komsomol organizations improved, and party influence on all aspects of the men's life and activity, most importantly on solving tasks of further raising combat readiness, was strengthened under the beneficial influence of the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and subsequent CPSU Central Committee plenums and decrees.

There is much that is positive in this plane in the previously mentioned Tamanskiy Guards Motorized Rifle Division and other leading large units and units. Here political organs persistently seek to ensure that each primary party organization is in fact the political nucleus of the military collective, that a healthy moral-political climate is maintained in it, and that all communists and komsomol members demonstrate a personal example in study and discipline. They concentrate their efforts and the efforts of the party and komsomol active directly in the subunits, the training centers, ranges and tank ranges, where the military training plan is implemented and military skill is forged. By all means and forms of mass political work they make the soldiers fully cognizant of the party's demands, disclose the real growing danger of the aggressive strivings of imperialism and mobilize and inspire people to intense training and staunchness in overcoming difficulties.

Presently, in connection with preparation for the 40th Anniversary of the Great Victory, commanders, political organs and party organizations are using more widely in their activity the invaluable front-line experience in party-political work. They have begun to pay more attention to political support of specific military training tasks and various types of training battles, to inculcating in the soldiers high combat activeness, offensive fervor and psychological staunchness and to developing boldness, decisiveness and resourcefulness. In the course of field exercises, it is important to increase the physical burden on the personnel and to achieve high level training and endurance. To do this short forced marches on foot and in winter on skis should be systematically conducted and sports with military applications should be actively developed.

While exercising care first of all for the dissemination of leading experience and supporting everything new in the training and upbringing process, political organs and party and komsomol organizations at the same time have begun to reveal shortcomings more boldly and from a more principled stance, to hold those at fault more strictly accountable and to be more active in helping commanders eliminate these shortcomings.

However, as indicated in the results of the past training year and the electoral meetings in party and komsomol organizations, there are still many unexploited reserves and opportunities for improving ideological and all party and political work. Specificity, purposefulness and high effectiveness have not been attained everywhere, especially in such important directions as improving the style and methods of work by communists in control organs, strengthening military discipline and adherence to regulations, increasing the quality of tactical firing training and improving the cohesion of military collectives. Here and there the recommendations of the All-Army conferences of secretaries of primary party and komsomol organizations are not implemented with the needed persistence. These and other shortcomings undoubtedly must be eliminated without oscillations and delays and party-political work raised to the level of modern party demands. It is important to pay particular attention to the specific study of methods which commanders and political workers at the company-battery and battalion-artillery battalion level use in working with personnel, and to ensure that these categories of officers more actively influence their subordinates and their military cohesiveness.

Socialist competition is a tested means of mobilizing personnel for selfless labor and developing their creative initiative. Competition significantly improves the level of military training and combat readiness in places where it is well organized and has become an indispensable part of the training and upbringing process, where the Leninist principles of visibility, comparability, practical repetition of leading experience and creative mutual assistance are observed, as well as the party's demands to concentrate people's initiative to achieve high qualitative indices. For example, in the guards motorized rifle regiment commanded by Guards Lt Col V. Zhuravlev the soldiers have a clear definition of what they can and are expected to achieve in a week, a month or a training period in their military maturation. Drills and exercises here are imbued with a spirit of competitiveness for the best results. Commanders exactly and objectively sum up the results and give moral incentives for zeal and initiative. And this has its returns.

But it would be incorrect not also to see that the powerful mobilizing and moral educational power of competition is still not used ably everywhere and that there are places where a formalistic approach to its organization still exists and where the struggle for unconditional fulfillment of obligations undertaken is not being carried out in an exemplary fashion. It is important in each specific case to examine the reasons for such negative phenomena -- whether permitted due to lack of experience or from the irresponsibility of leaders. In the first case it is appropriate patiently to teach commanders, political workers and the party active the practical organization of competition; in the second to be more strict with those at fault. And, without question, it is necessary to inculcate in all categories of servicemen unity of word and deed as the moral norm of behavior.

In the coming training year it is necessary more extensively to practice competition between soldiers by specialties, for the best crew, team, subunit and unit. It is important to ensure the development of an initiative-filled, creative struggle to exceed the norms of military work on equipment, to observe technical discipline and safety measures and to take care of the weapons.

Successes in training are meaningless without further strengthening of discipline and self-discipline, unwavering fulfillment of the requirements of regulations and improving the drill training and teamwork of subunits on foot and mounted on vehicles. High level execution and discipline in drill are the unseen touchstone, with the help of which the moral-military strength of the subunits and their healthy cohesion, mutual assistance and combat effectiveness are cemented.

In order for military training plans to be fulfilled on time and the quality of training to improve, senior commanders and political organs must know the true state of affairs in each subunit and unit and render assistance and realize constant and effective control over the course of the training process. Control and the objectivity of evaluations are inseparably linked. V. I. Lenin taught: Nothing so spoils people and engenders in them conceit and indifference as lack of control. He viewed checking on people and checking the actual execution of tasks as the essence of all work. Today, as well, the party directs us to this end and orients us through the positions and conclusions set forth in the speech of Comrade K. U. Chernenko at the All-Union conference of People's Controllers.

True control is the organic combination of checking on fulfillment with organizational work, rendering practical assistance to subordinates in putting things right and eliminating shortcomings which have been revealed. It achieves its aims if it is implemented systematically and on the basis of thorough study of the state of affairs in subunits, units and large units. Rash and artificial checks, carried out hurriedly and superficially merely interfere with people's ability to work. We must get rid of them forever. And it is especially important to improve the organizational work of staffs and other control organs in every way, so that their influence on the training process becomes more and more effective. There is much which political organs and party organizations of staffs and administrations can do here.

The tasks of the new training year are difficult and crucial. Their successful accomplishment will facilitate further improving military skill and combat readiness of the troops. There is no doubt of the fact that the personnel of the Ground forces will make every effort to solve them at a high quality level and to greet worthily the 40th Anniversary of the Great Victory and the 27th Congress of Lenin's party.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

ARTICLE ON PROBLEMS OF PARTY-MILITARY RELATIONS IN 1920'S

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 24, Dec 84 (signed to press 4 Dec 84) pp 19-23

[Unsigned Article: "In the Struggle to Restore the Economy"]

[Text] The third volume of the collection, "The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums,"* recently published by Politizdat, includes most important documents on party activity from December 1922 through December 1925. It contains a thorough scientific analysis of the foreign and domestic situation of the Soviet State and defines tasks of building socialism and defending the gains of the October Revolution.

The decisions of the 12th, 13th and 14th party congresses and resolutions of the October 1923, January 1924, October 1924 and other party Central Committee plenums published in the collection indicate the need to further unite party ranks, strengthen the moral and political unity of Soviet society and the economic and defense might of the Soviet State, and work out ways of further developing the Soviet Armed Forces.

It is important to note that the volume opens with the last letters and articles of V. I. Lenin (December 1922-March 1923), which were not included in the 8th edition of "The CPSU in Resolutions..." These works became Lenin's political behest. In them he finished developing the plan for building socialism in the USSR, having thoroughly grounded his ideas for industrialization of the country, socialist transformation of agriculture, cultural revolution, national-state construction and solidifying the defense might of our homeland.

The documents published in the volume reflect the development of the struggle to implement Lenin's plan for building socialism in the USSR and show that Lenin's ideas and the specific tasks which he set forth defined the entire activity of the Communist party. The decisions of party congresses and conferences as well as other materials in the volume disclose the leading and

*"KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s'yezdov, konferentsiy i plenumov TsK (1898-1986) [The CPSU in Resolutions of Congresses, Conferences and Plenums (1898-1986)], vol 3, 1923-1925, 9th edition, supplemented and corrected, Moscow, Politizdat, 1984.

organizing role of the party in implementing economic policy and socialist transformations in all spheres of life and in developing the defense might of the socialist state under those difficult international conditions.

It is known that the 12th RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] Congress, which took place in 1923, did not discuss the military question in particular, but all of its decisions were filled with concern for strengthening the country's defense capability and increasing the military might of the army and navy. The resolutions of the Central Committee report stressed the danger of new attempts at intervention by the imperialist states and indicated the need "as before to devote all-round attention to the material and cultural needs of the Red Army and Red Fleets" (p 56). The Congress tasked the party Central Committee to develop state industry in a well-planned manner as the material basis for the country's defense might.

The decisions of the congress indicated the need to organize widespread agitation-propaganda work in the territorial units, put forth the task of strengthening the link between the komsomol and the Red Army and expanding its patronage over the navy. The congress also came out in favor of organizing national military units, with the observance of all measures necessary to ensure high defense capability of the Soviet republics. The decisions of the 12th Party Congress on the national question demanded that "upbringing work in the Red Army be intensified in the spirit of sowing the ideas of brotherhood and solidarity among the peoples of the Union..." (p 87).

Armed with the decisions of the 12th Congress, the Communist Party actively carried out organizational activity in the masses and achieved remarkable successes in restoring the economy. However, this work of the party was complicated by serious difficulties of both a foreign and domestic nature.

It is obvious from the documents included in the collection that the foreign difficulties were related to the increased activity of the ruling circles of the leading imperialist states, directed at implementing plans for suffocating the Soviet Republic. The domestic difficulties were those of restoring the economy. Taking advantage of this, as well as of Lenin's illness, Trotskiy and his supporters again began to struggle against Lenin's Central Committee core for the purpose of seizing control of the party and country.

The party accomplished a tremendous amount of work in order to destroy Trotskiy's opposition. The 13th Party Conference summed up the results of this work. The conference resolutions stressed with particular force that "the main prerequisite for further successes of the proletarian revolution is the unshakable unity of the RKP [Russian Communist Party]..", and that the unity of the party "must be cherished as the apple of one's eye" (p 160).

The conference indicated the need to strengthen party-political work in the army and navy and to curtail decisively the factional activity of the Trotskiyites in the army and navy party organizations. "The party must punish especially severely attempts to conduct factional 'work' in the ranks of the Red Army" (p 159).

On the third day after the 13th Party Conference the most profound grief befell the party and Soviet people. On 21 January 1924 at 1850 hours, Vladimir Il'ich Lenin, great leader of the party and founder of the Soviet State, died in Gorkiy. On the night of 22 January an emergency party Central Committee plenum was held which adopted the decree, "To the Party. To All Workers," which is published in the book. The decree characterized the life of V. I. Lenin and expressed firm confidence that, in the days of deep sorrow, the ranks of the party would not falter and the party would close ranks still more tightly under the fighting banner of Leninism.

Lenin's death occasioned unprecedented cohesion of the working class around the Leninist party. In the days of mourning tens of thousands of statements from workers requesting acceptance into the party began to reach the party organizations. Taking this into account, the RKP(b) Central Committee plenum held at the end of January 1924 adopted a decree, "On Accepting Factory Workers Into the Party" (see pp 184-185), which stated Lenin's summons to the RKP(b). Lenin's summons strengthened the party and still more closely linked it with the working class and with all workers.

The 13th RKP(b) Congress, held in May 1924, confirmed this tendency. The questions of strengthening the union between socialist industry and agriculture and solidifying the alliance of the working class with the peasantry occupied the central place in the work of the congress. An important role in solving these questions was assigned to army and navy men. The resolutions of the congress noted in particular: "The Red Army must be used in every way as a link with the countryside. Through servicemen on leave, cadre personnel of territorial units, pre-induction age youth and letters from Red Army soldiers it is necessary to bring the countryside close to the ongoing tasks of the Soviet State" (p 253).

The congress indicated the need to strengthen party leadership over the komsomol, improve the social composition of students in VUZes through working class youth and intensify the communist upbringing of youth. Particular attention was devoted to the importance of komsomol members and student youth studying party history and the party's struggle against anti-Leninist groups. "The work of the RKSM [Russian Young Communist League], which must be carried out in a spirit of internationalist military upbringing, is of tremendous importance," it was noted in a resolution of the congress. "The entire union must be involved in this work. Strengthening military propaganda and political-educational work among pre-induction age youth, concern for the living conditions of Red Army soldiers and sailors, propaganda about the air force and about increasing the overall military might of the USSR, propaganda concerning military knowledge, in particular information from the field of military chemistry, etc. -- these must be the main tasks of the RKSM (p 280)."

The 13th RKP(b) Congress devoted a great deal of attention to military problems. It confirmed the measures developed by the party Central Committee on which the military reform was based. The congress resolution on the Central Committee report stated: "The Congress welcomes the steps taken by the Central Committee for carrying out a completely timely reform in the military department and for strengthening it with party workers" (p 286).

The congress also devoted attention to eliminating the existing shortcoming in the activity of army party organizations, which expressed itself in a certain isolation from local party organizations. The decisions of the congress set forth the task of intensifying upbringing work among army and navy komsomol members and pre-induction age youth. It also proposed taking steps to strengthen communist influence in territorial formations.

The basis of the military reform carried out under the leadership of the party Central Committee was: a shift to an integrated territorial-cadre system of building up the military; reorganizing the military administrative organs; creating national military formations; strengthening the army with technical units; restructuring the system for training military cadres; introducing sole responsibility; improving the work of the military rear area; changing the organizational structure of units and large units and improving ideological-political upbringing of Armed Forces personnel.

During the course of the reform the party Central Committee purged the military apparatus of Trotskiyites and their supporters. By resolution of the Central Committee plenum of 17 January 1925, published in the volume, and by decree of the USSR TsIK [Central Executive Committee] presidium of 26 January of that year, M. V. Frunze was named chairman of the USSR RVS [Revolutionary Military Council] and people's commissar for military and naval affairs, and K. Ye. Voroshilov was named his deputy.

As a result of the heroic labor of the working class and the toiling peasantry, under the leadership of the Communist Party, the restoration of the economy neared completion in 1925. The question of further prospects for building socialism and of the fate of socialism in the USSR became an ever more persistent part of the agenda. The 14th RKP(b) Conference, held at the end of April 1925, devoted its main attention to this question. The conference adopted one of the most important documents in the history of our party -- the resolution, "On the Tasks of the Comintern and the RKP(b) in Connection With the Expanded IKKI [Executive Committee of the Communist International] Plenum." This resolution emphasized Lenin's position that our country has everything necessary for the victory of socialism and gave directions for building it in the USSR.

In contrast to the capitulationist concoctions of the Trotskiyites, the conference resolution instructed that the party of the proletariat "must make every effort to build a socialist society, confident that this construction can be and undoubtedly will be victorious..." (p 392).

The historic importance of the 14th Party Conference is that it made Lenin's instruction about building socialism in our country a general party law. The conference instilled in the party masses firm confidence in the triumph of Lenin's cause and inspired communists and all workers to struggle for the victory of socialism in the USSR.

Oppositionists of various stripes, who were trying to knock the party off of the Leninist path in order to restore capitalism in our country, opposed in every way the carrying out of this policy. The 14th Party Congress was held in this difficult situation in December 1925. The congress resolutions and

decrees published in this volume noted the strengthening of the international positions of the Soviet Union, but at the same time indicated the unceasing anti-Soviet intrigues of the imperialist powers headed by Britain and the U. S., which contained the danger of a new intervention.

In connection with this, the congress recommended that the Central Committee not yield to possible provocations of the imperialists, and instructed it to struggle for peace, strengthen the alliance with the international proletariat and oppressed peoples, and "take all possible steps to strengthen the defense capability of the country and the might of the Red Army and Navy and the Air Fleet" (p 427).

Generalizing the experience acquired by the people and party in the period during which the economy was restored, the congress instructed that the key element in the building of socialism is industrialization of the country, which consists, first of all, of developing heavy industry and its core, machinebuilding. Only as a result of creating this economic branch could the country change from backward and agrarian into a mighty industrial power; the elimination of capitalist elements and the victory of socialism be ensured in all economic spheres; and the defense capability of the Soviet State in the face of hostile capitalist encirclement be strengthened.

Thus, industrialization was an objective necessity for our country. Stemming from this, the congress in its resolution on the Central Committee report wrote: "...conduct economic construction from the standpoint of turning the USSR from a country which imports machinery and equipment into a country which produces machinery and equipment...(p 427).

Thus, the policy for socialist industrialization of the country as the main element of the party's general policy for building socialism in the USSR was defined in the decisions of the 14th RKP(b) Congress. But the oppositionists opposed this general party policy at the congress with their capitulationist policy which stemmed from the belief that the Soviet Union for a long period of time would still remain an agrarian country, exporting agricultural products and importing machinery from abroad.

Rejecting the essentially traitorous platform of the opposition, the congress in its resolution on the Central Committee report wrote that a most important condition for accomplishing industrialization and for the victory of socialism "is the struggle against skepticism in the cause of building socialism in our country..." (p 429), and the struggle against attempts to distort Leninism.

The new Party Charter, adopted at the congress, defined specific measures for strengthening party unity, improving its quality and further developing intra-party democracy. The new regulation eased the conditions for accepting factory workers into the party and made them more stringent for persons coming from other parties. It introduced a section on party organizations in the Red Army. This was important in increasing all party-political work in the Armed Forces.

The Charter clearly defined the structure of the Red Army's party-political apparatus and emphasized that the RKKA [Workers' and Peasants' Red Army]

Political Administration, functioning as the Central Committee's military section, accomplished general supervision over party work in the army and navy.

Thus, the documents contained in the collections permit the conclusion to be drawn that, during the period of restoring the economy, the party shifted the Armed Forces to a peacetime status, reduced them in size, improved them qualitatively and strengthened its leading influence in the army and navy. It creatively developed Marxist-Leninist positions on the military organization of the socialist state and inflicted a decisive blow to Trotskiyite and other oppositionists who were distorting Leninist policy on building the military.

The volume also included for the first time the following documents: Central Committee decrees, "On Work Among Women;" "On Selecting Workers for Trade, Cooperative and Credit Institutions;" "On Training and Retraining Agitators and Propagandists;" "On the Work of the 'Down With Illiteracy' Society;" "On the Work of the Komsomol in the Countryside;" "On Immediate Tasks in the Area of Work Among Working, Peasant and Laboring Women of the East;" and "On the Workers and Peasants Correspondent Movement." They make it possible to understand more fully the activity of the Communist Party in restoring the economy and shifting to socialist reconstruction and in developing mass political work among the workers.

The documents contained in the third volume eloquently testify that in this period of the country's life the Communist Party raised its authority with the masses still higher as the organizing and directing force of the new society. It grew in size, grew stronger ideologically and intensified its influence and party leadership of the whole society. The Soviet people rallied still more closely around the Leninist party.

* * *

The publication of the third volume of the ninth edition of "The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums," is an important event in the publication of documentary party historical literature. The book gives a vivid impression of the tremendous heroic activity of the Communist Party, directed at implementing Lenin's plan for building a socialist society in our country and defending the gains of the October Revolution.

The collection of documents is intended for a broad circle of readers, the party aktiv, teachers of social sciences and propagandists. It will be of valuable assistance to commanders, political workers, students and pupils in military educational institutions and to all who are studying the heroic history of our party.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

UNITY OF NATIONALITIES PROVEN IN WAR

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 24, Dec 84 (signed to press 4 Dec 84) pp 33-38

[Article by Col. O. Bel'kov, doctor of philosophical sciences: "Military Brotherhood of the USSR Peoples"]

[Excerpts] The Great Patriotic War, foisted upon us by Fascist Germany, fully disclosed the economic, social-political and spiritual capabilities of socialism. During its course the ideological, social-political and international cohesion of Soviet society was convincingly demonstrated.

The multinational Soviet people, a single family of more than 100 nations and nationalities comprising the mighty Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, became the main hero of the Great Patriotic War and the creator of victory. In those terrible years the fraternal peoples stood shoulder to shoulder to defend their single homeland and fought heroically and toiled selflessly for the common victory over the enemy.

"The Great Patriotic War," it says in the CPSU Central Committee decree on the 40th Anniversary of victory, "demonstrated convincingly the monolithic unity of the party and people, the indestructible union of the working class, the kolkhoz peasantry and the working intelligentsia, and the friendship and brotherhood of the USSR peoples."

The traditions of military cooperation of the Soviet nations and nationalities, which formed and developed in the crucible of war, represent a tremendous value of our society. Their preservation and increase are a powerful factor in bringing up the younger generations.

* * *

The emergence and strengthening of friendship among the peoples of our country is the result of the purposeful activity of the Communist Party and its consistent implementation of Leninist principles of national policy. Under its wise leadership the socialist foundations of social life and the conditions for close, all-round cooperation among the peoples liberated by the October Revolution were laid and developed, and each nation and nationality obtained the opportunity to participate actively in solving creative tasks and defending the revolutionary achievements.

Progressive advances in the social structure of the nations were favorably reflected in the Armed Forces. First, they expanded the military mobilization resources of the state. The general educational level of the population rose during the years of building socialism. Complex military specialties became accessible for mass assimilation by the workers in each republic. Owing to this the social and national base of the army was expanded. Whereas on 1 October 1922 soldiers of non-Russian nationality in the Red Army comprised 21.3 percent, in 1940 they were already 40 percent.

Second, as a result of changes which occurred in the social make-up of Soviet society, homogeneity and class unity of the personnel in the army and navy grew and the working class nucleus in the Armed Forces increased. The working class, being by its social status an internationalist class, brought to the army its ideas and a spirit of cooperation and friendship of peoples.

Owing to state unity the Soviet homeland was able to create indestructible defensive might, which reliably secured the freedom and independence of the peoples and conditions for their peaceful creative labor.

Marxism-Leninism, proletarian internationalism and the socialist consciousness of the masses comprise the spiritual foundation of the friendship of the USSR peoples. Victory in the Great Patriotic War, it states in the anniversary decree of the CPSU Central Committee, "confirmed the powerful vitality of Marxist-Leninist ideology. Profound ideological conviction and boundless faith in the correctness of the great Leninist cause serve as an inexhaustible source of Soviet people's spiritual power and moral and political cohesion."

Thus, during the years of Soviet government, the indestructible Leninist friendship of nations, which became characteristic of the socialist way of life, took shape in the joint struggle for a new, just system in our country. For the first time in history the multinational composition of a state turned into a source of its strength.

* * *

Preparing aggression against the USSR, the fascists counted on a quick victory, which was to have been accelerated by the existence, in their opinion, of "national dissension" in Soviet society. However, the hopes of our enemies for the disintegration of the world's first socialist state were not justified. Contrary to the calculations of the aggressor, all nations and nationalities united still more around the Communist Party and staunchly defended their fatherland. The friendship of the USSR peoples, which was manifested in various forms, multiplied the might of the Soviet multinational state and its Armed Forces. Its role in the armed defense of the homeland had its impact in the very first days of the war.

The call of Lenin's party, "The Socialist Fatherland is in Danger!" carried the alarm throughout the country. From Russian, Ukrainian and Belorussian villages, Caucasian auls, Central Asian kishlaks, Baltic khutors, and stanitsas along the Kuban, from cities and villages in all regions of the

country the Soviet people went into combat and rose up to battle against the fascist invaders. All Soviet army and navy units were multinational in composition. Any of them served as a living embodiment of cooperation among the fraternal peoples. Soldiers of all nationalities stood to the death in the same foxholes, attacked in the same lines and shared their last bullets and crusts of bread.

The number of national units was comparatively small: 20 rifle and 18 cavalry divisions, 16 rifle brigades. But with their creation the military cooperation of the Soviet peoples acquired new features. The national units, which were also multinational, by the very fact of their existence and combat actions symbolized and strengthened the friendship and cohesion of the nations and nationalities of our country.

The monolithic unity of Armed Forces personnel was ensured by the Communist Party's great and varied ideological and mass political work. During the war years, special importance was given to bringing up the soldiers and commanders in the spirit of Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism, and in the spirit of friendship of the USSR peoples. Party-political work in the active army was structured taking into account the multinational composition of units and subunits. In the interests of increasing its effectiveness the RKKA [Workers' and Peasants' Red Army] Main Political Administration issued a special directive in September 1942, "On Upbringing Work With Red Army Soldiers and Junior Commanders of Non-Russian Nationality." In Summer 1943 an All-Army Conference of Agitators was held on this question. Party-political work was a powerful factor in strengthening the indestructible friendship of the peoples and improving the combat effectiveness of units and large units.

Communists were the cementing force in military collectives. In the first six months of the war alone, the Party dispatched to the Armed Forces more than a million communists, one-third of the territorial party organizations. Some 36 percent of the members of the Belorussian party organization, 43 percent of the Ukrainian organization, 44 percent of the Leningrad, 48 percent of the Moscow, 52 percent of the Azerbaijan, 60 percent of the Armenian, 65 percent of the Novosibirsk, 74 percent of the Omsk, etc., were in the troop units. Throughout the entire war the party organizations in the active army placed special importance on increasing their ranks with the best soldiers of various nationalities. As a result, not only did the number of communists in the Armed Forces grow, but the multinational composition of the party organizations also increased. Communists were in the most difficult and decisive sectors of the battle with the enemy. By personal example and fervent party word they inspired and led the Soviet people to victory.

Every Soviet soldier clearly recognized that his fate was linked to that of the homeland. They all understood that, regardless of where they were fighting, they were defending themselves and their homeland, their family and their homeland, their home region and their homeland. Here is an interesting document, a letter by eight soldiers, defenders of Leningrad. Its authors, Uzbeks Mirzayev and Dauletov, Kazakhs Biguzhinov and Tiksyanyov, the Tajik Odinayev, Tatars Nagumanov and Baybikov and the Buryat Khakayev, wrote: "We know that by defending Leningrad it will be good to live in Siberia, and that by defeating the Fascists at Leningrad the Uzbeks, Tajiks, Tatars and Chuvash

will not be slaves..."

In the days of the heroic defense of Stalingrad, the words "Beyond the Volga is Not the Land for Us!" became a sacred oath for all of its defenders. They defined the determination in combat of Soviet soldiers fighting for their own Mother Volga. Guided by them, Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians and Lithuanians, whose lands were under the heel of the occupiers, stood to the death for the "main street of Russia." These words inspired to great feats Uzbeks, Kazakhs and Kirgiz, whose families lived far beyond the Volga.

The indestructibility of the international unity of our society was also demonstrated convincingly by the partisan struggle of the Soviet people in the territories temporarily occupied by the fascists. Sons and daughters of various nationalities joined the ranks of the people's avengers. Thus, sons and daughters of 70 nationalities fought in the Belorussian partisan detachments, over 60 in the Ukraine, 45 in Smolensk Oblast, about 30 in the Bryansk area, etc. The history of the partisan movement in the years of the Great Patriotic War knows many feats accomplished on Russian, Ukrainian, Belorussian and Baltic lands by the sons of the peoples of the Volga, Caucasus, Central Asia and Kazakhstan.

The great strength of the friendship of peoples and the unity of the Soviet multinational state were displayed not only on the battlefields. One cannot exaggerate its role in supporting the active army and partisan movement with everything necessary for victory, and in maintaining and strengthening in the soldiers a firm confidence in the indestructibility of the socialist fatherland. "Toilers in the rear area," notes the CPSU Central Committee decree, 'On the 40th Anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945,' "accomplished a great feat in the war years. Workers, kolkhoz peasants, scientists, engineers and designers won with their selfless labor an unprecedented battle for metal and bread, fuel and raw materials, and to create the mighty Soviet weapons."

The contribution of the multinational Soviet peasantry in strengthening the Soviet rear area and destroying the enemy was great. Hitler's forces seized almost half of the country's most fertile sowing areas. Millions of men left agriculture for the front and for work in industry. Women became the decisive force in agricultural production. It was mostly through their heroic labor that the sowing and harvesting of crops took place on time and state orders for deliveries of agricultural products were fulfilled.

Already in 1942, sown areas were increased by almost three million hectares in the eastern RSFSR, Kazakhstan, Central Asia and the Transcaucasus, through the selfless efforts of the Soviet peasantry. Throughout the entire war the country received agricultural raw materials and foodstuffs in amounts which satisfied the basic needs of the front and rear. This was truly an invaluable contribution by the workers in agriculture to the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War.

The activity of Soviet scientists was also subordinated to the struggle against Hitler's aggression. Scientific forces of all republics worked for victory in research laboratories, design bureaus, test ranges and on

geological expeditions. The establishment during the war of academies of sciences in the Georgian, Uzbek, Armenian and Azerbaijan SSR's was public recognition of the services of the republic scientific centers and national scientific cadres. One of the vivid manifestations of the unity of the Soviet people of all nationalities was the patriotic movement to render all kinds of assistance to the front. It arose almost simultaneously in all republics. From the first days of the war workers voluntarily gave their personal savings to the needs of the front. A significant number of weapons was developed from funds gathered. The universal character of the defense fund is seen in the very names of the tank columns, air squadrons and military ships created through the fund: "Tambov Kolkhoznik;" "Voronezh Komsomolite;" "Moscow Pioneer;" "Kherson Pre-Inductee;" "Georgian Kolkhoznik;" "Bashkir Komsomolite;" "Young Pioneer of Dagestan;" etc.

Thus, during the years of the Great Patriotic War the Soviet rear area was completely and entirely subordinated to the needs of the front. The thoughts and deeds of the workers, their social activeness, production activity and personal lives were determined by the interests of supporting the army. The Soviet rear area -- the population of major industrial centers and small villages through the territory of the USSR -- accomplished a feat without which defeat of the enemy would have been impossible.

* * *

The historic victory in the Great Patriotic War became indisputable proof of the great vitality and indestructibility of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It demonstrated the inviolable unity of all the country's nations and nationalities. Party-political work -- truly a powerful weapon of the party in bringing up soldiers as patriots and internationalists -- played an exceptional role in strengthening this unity. Lenin's national policy brilliantly withstood the test of stability and served and continues to serve as an inexhaustible source of the might of the Soviet State and its Armed Forces.

Our party's experience in uniting the multinational family of the peoples of the Land of the Soviets is of great importance under contemporary conditions as well. This experience reliably serves to improve developed socialist society and to bring up all the Soviet people and the armed defenders of the homeland in a spirit of utter devotion to the ideals of Communism and constant readiness to rebuff any aggressor.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

TRAINING ARTICLE: FUNCTIONS OF 'STATE OF WHOLE PEOPLE'

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 24, Dec 84 (signed to press 4 Dec 84) pp 68-74

[Article by Capt 2d Rank G. Dorozh, candidate of historical sciences: "The Soviet Socialist State of the Whole People"*)]

[Excerpts] Study of this topic will help soldiers to understand more thoroughly the role of the Soviet state in building and defending the new society and in strengthening peace and the people's security. The purpose of the lesson is to facilitate the students' further development of fervent patriotism and proletarian and socialist internationalism, pride in their homeland and readiness to defend its interests consistently and firmly in the face of a sharply increased military danger from the U. S. and its NATO allies.

Six hours are devoted to studying this topic. It is useful to divide this time as follows: two hours for narrative (lecture); two hours for independent preparation and two hours for discussion (seminar).

In the narrative (lecture) it is recommended that the following questions be taken up: 1. The socialist state -- the organization of the workers' political power; 2. The substance and main directions of the activity of the Soviet State. 3. Defense of the socialist fatherland -- one of the most important functions of the Soviet multinational state.

It is necessary to note briefly that the state of a new, socialist type, born of the great October Revolution, is a main weapon for building socialism and communism in our country and for defending the revolutionary accomplishments of the Soviet people against the aggressive intrigues of imperialism. It is a political organization which expresses the interests and will of the whole people, and is the organ of power for all Soviet workers. In the international arena, the socialist state carries out a class policy in the interests of the working class and all workers and in the interests of

* Material for political classes on the topic, "The Soviet State of the Whole People -- Main Weapon for Building Communism and for its Armed Defense."

socialism, and defends the rights of all peoples to national independence, freedom, democracy and social progress.

One of the most important functions of the Soviet State is the defense of the Soviet fatherland. This status is codified in the USSR Constitution, where it states that the state ensures the security and defense capability of the country and equips the USSR Armed Forces with everything they require.

1. THE SOCIALIST STATE -- ORGANIZATION OF THE WORKERS' POLITICAL POWER

In beginning to lecture on the first question it should be noted that the socialist state is a state of a new type. All types of previously existing states were political organizations of the exploiting classes.'

The October Revolution destroyed the old state machinery, overthrew the power of capitalists and landowners and created a state of a new, socialist type. During the period of transition from capitalism to socialism, all the way to its complete and final victory, it is the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The main activity of the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat is the revolutionary transformation of capitalist society into socialist. V. I. Lenin, founder of our party and state, noted that the dictatorship of the proletariat is a special form of class alliance between the proletariat as the vanguard of the workers, and numerous non-proletarian strata of workers (petty bourgeois, small owners, peasants, intelligentsia, etc.), or the majority of them, against capital. It is an alliance to overthrow capital completely, totally destroy bourgeois resistance and its attempts at restoration, and achieve the final creation and consolidation of socialism ("Poln. Sobr. soch." [Complete Works], vol 38, p 377).

V. I. Lenin repeatedly devoted attention to the transitory nature of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the inevitability of its transition into power of the whole people. Time completely confirmed Lenin's foresight. In connection with the tremendous changes which took place in our country as a result of the complete and final victory of socialism and the attainment of its stage of maturity, the need for state leadership in the form of a dictatorship has already passed. The USSR Constitution states that upon completing the tasks of the dictatorship of the proletariat the Soviet State became the State of the Whole People. The State of the Whole People is the political organization of the entire Soviet people.

The entry of the Soviet State into a newer, higher stage of development extends its social base still further and strengthens the economic and social-political foundations of democracy. The 26th CPSU Congress concluded that the establishment of a classless structure in our society in the main and basically will take place within the historical framework of mature socialism. This, in turn, will accomplish yet another major step in the further improvement of the Soviet State of the Whole People.

The basis for the organization and activity of the Soviet State is the principle of democratic centralism, which is set down in the USSR

Constitution. This principle signifies the election of all organs of state authority from bottom to top, their accountability to the people and the mandatory nature of decisions by higher organs on lower ones. Thus, unified leadership is combined with the initiative and creative activeness of the masses and an inseparable, living link between all administrative elements. The decisions on the further development of socialist democracy adopted by the 26th CPSU Congress and the subsequent party Central Committee plenums are aimed at the constant improvement of the forms and methods of workers' participation in the management of state and social affairs and production. "Realism is an invaluable quality of our democracy," noted Comrade K. U. Chernenko, speaking to participants in the All-Union Conference of People's Controllers. "And the party attaches tremendous importance to its real development and extension. You know well how seriously the April 1984 Central Committee plenum considered this question. Its solution is directly aimed at making the work of the soviets more active. The task is one of ensuring that these mass organs of state authority learn how to use in practice all their constructive powers. The party considers this same task urgent also for trade unions, the komsomol and the labor collectives. It is equally important for people's control. On the whole it is a matter of developing the creative power of socialist self-government of the people to its full extent. This is also the meaning of improving the political system of our society. It is also drawing it nearer to the ideal of socialism.

Only under socialist conditions are the concepts of freedom, human rights and social justice filled with true content.

Noting this fact, the propagandist must indicate not only the broad democracy of our State of the Whole People, but also its profound international nature. Created by the genius of Lenin, the Soviet Union is the most viable and perfect structural form of a multinational state. The whole history of the Land of the Soviets convincingly confirms the profound scientific nature and vital force of Lenin's strategy in solving the national question. In world history there is no state which in the shortest period of time has done as much for the all-round development of nations and nationalities as the USSR. The peoples of former Russia, doomed by the old system to eternal backwardness, confidently stepped into the socialist future and achieved the heights of social progress.

The CPSU brings together the energy and will of all classes, social groups, nations and nationalities, and all generations of the Soviet people. Under conditions of developed socialism it serves as the political leader of the whole people and unites in its ranks more than 18.5 million of the best of its representatives. This raises still higher its responsibility for the proper functioning of the organs of state authority and for the building of communism in our country. For the purpose of successfully solving the tasks of unprecedented scale and complexity which face the Soviet people in the stage of developed socialism, the Communist Party is called upon to coordinate and unite all the efforts of state organizations for the achievement of common goals. It implements its decisions primarily through the communists working in them, through their party organizations and groups. In so doing the CPSU does not permit mixing its own functions with the tasks of other organs. The party proceeds from the fact that the organs of state authority, in accordance

with the USSR Constitution, are called upon to establish unified law and order in society, and to endow various organizations, officials and citizens with corresponding powers. The April 1984 CPSU Central Committee plenum underscored this with particular force. As it leads the masses, it strives constantly for all-round development of socialist democracy in all areas of state and social life, and sees in this one of the decisive conditions for the successful building of communism.

In finishing the material on the first question, the students' attention should be directed to the fact that the Armed Forces of the Land of the Soviets are an integral part of our society. As full-fledged citizens of our country, Soviet soldiers take most active part in the political life of the Soviet State. Thousands of servicemen are elected deputies of local Soviets and the higher organs of authority of the union republics. Our people assign the most deserving of them to be its representatives in the USSR Supreme Soviet. Thus, the great achievements of our multinational socialist homeland, which is in the vanguard of social progress, vividly bear witness to the triumph of Lenin's principles of democracy. The further Soviet society develops, the more the extremely rich opportunities of developed socialism and the advantages of the socialist State of the Whole People will be disclosed.

2. THE SUBSTANCE AND MAIN DIRECTIONS OF ACTIVITY OF THE SOVIET STATE

In the stage of developed socialism the social base of the State of the Whole People substantially expanded and was consolidated. However, its class nature remained. Our state served and continues to serve as a powerful weapon for realizing the world historical mission of the working class -- building a classless communist society. This postulate is set down in the USSR Constitution.

The main tasks of the socialist State of the Whole People are to create the material and technical base of communism, perfect socialist social relations and their transformation to communist relations, bring up the man of communist society, improve the material and cultural standard of living of the workers, ensure the country's security and contribute to strengthening peace and developing international cooperation.

The content and main directions of the activity of the Soviet State of the Whole People are embodied in its foreign and domestic functions, which are organically united and coordinated. Among the domestic functions, managerial and organizational are of particular importance. Having concentrated in their hands all the threads of management of the country's economic life, the socialist state serves as the main organizer of social production. Its role at the present stage is growing immeasurably. This is caused by the grand nature of the tasks of building communism and the tremendous scale of our economy.

The tempo of development of the economy of the Soviet Union is growing year after year. This becomes particularly apparent if one compares the average annual growth rates of primary indicators for 1951-1983 (in percentages) with similar United States indices: national income -- in the USSR 7.1 percent, in the U. S. 3.2 percent; industrial production 8.2 percent and 3.7 percent.

respectively; agricultural production 3.1 percent and 1.5 percent; cargo turnover of all types of transport 7.0 and 2.2 percent; capital investment 7.6 percent and 2.6 percent; overall labor productivity 6.1 percent and 2.0 percent; industrial labor productivity 5.4 percent and 2.9 percent.

Thus, as a result of the tremendous creative work of the party and people, developed on the basis of the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and subsequent Central Committee plenums, our country achieved such heights in its development that qualitative advances came to the fore and became necessary in the development of productive forces and their transformation on the basis of scientific and technological progress. The people's well-being must be raised to a qualitatively new level. The thinking of the party and its Central Committee is now riveted on these problems. This is the main thing which is determining preparations for the 27th CPSU Congress, work on the new edition of the Party Program and the working out of plans for the country's economic and social development.

The State Plan for Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1985 is also aimed at solving these tasks. In his speech at the CPSU Central Committee Politburo session where the draft of this plan was being discussed, Comrade K. U. Chernenko noted that the plan stressed the intensification of social production. Almost the entire increase in national income and 94 percent of the growth in industrial production are planned to result from improved productivity.

Such an important state function as controlling the measures of labor and consumption was also significantly enriched. This function is aimed at ever more completely satisfying the needs of the Soviet people and at the welfare of the human being as the main productive force of society. The Soviet State is ensuring an increase in workers' incomes through raising wages and increasing the social consumption funds.


In our state, which expresses the will and interests of all the people, the right of control belongs to the people themselves as the sole owners of their country. The party views people's control as a tested means of improving economic and cultural construction, strengthening discipline and self-discipline and increasing the feeling of responsibility in all areas of building communism.

The All-Union Conference of People's Controllers, which was held in Moscow on 5 October 1984, was dedicated to further improving the activity of public patrols, which number more than 10 million people in the country. It became an important landmark in the country's development of socialist control.

The framework of the state's cultural and educational function has substantially expanded. This function is aimed at the development of public education and advanced Soviet science; developing the culture of all the USSR peoples -- national in form, socialist in content; forming a scientific world outlook in the broad mass of workers and inculcating a communist attitude toward work.

The propagandist emphasizes further that, under conditions of mature socialism, the State of the Whole People continues to accomplish the function

of protecting socialist law and order and socialist property, and the interests and rights of citizens. It vigilantly stands guard over socialist legality. The Basic Law of the USSR notes that each citizen in our country must observe the USSR Constitution and Soviet laws, respect the rules of the socialist community, work honestly and conscientiously, conserve and enhance socialist property, safeguard the interests of the Soviet State, contribute in all ways to defending the social system, strengthen the friendship of nations and nationalities, care about the upbringing of children and protect the environment. These duties necessitate further improving the law enforcement functions of our State of the Whole People. It strictly watches the observance of law and order in socialist society and the universal fulfillment of Soviet legislation.



Social Composition of Soviets of
Peoples Deputies (in percentages)

Further, it is necessary to discuss the foreign functions of the socialist State of the Whole People. The function of organizing cooperation with the fraternal socialist states on the basis of the principles of internationalism and comradely mutual assistance is of great importance among them. Questions of strengthening ties with the liberated peoples also have an important place in the activity of our state. The USSR gives them comprehensive support. The Soviet State is concerned about developing political, economic and cultural relations with the capitalist countries, based on the principles of peaceful coexistence.

It is useful to discuss in more detail the functions inherent in a socialist state from the moment of its origin -- the struggle for peace and international security. It should be stressed that, as it raised the workers of Russia up to the socialist revolution, the Communist Party pronounced as one of its most important slogans: "Peace to the Peoples!" Since that time the Land of the Soviets has served by right as the bulwark and standard-bearer of peace in the eyes of people throughout the world.

At the same time, another tendency is also clearly visible in international policy. Losing position after position in peaceful competition with socialism, the imperialist states, first of all the U. S. and other NATO countries, are trying to oppose progress by naked force. The dirty U. S. aggression in Grenada; preparations for invasion of Nicaragua; support of reaction in Chile and El Salvador; approval of apartheid in the YuAR [Republic of South Africa]; the bloody Israeli terror on Lebanese soil and other occupied Arab territories -- all these are links of the same chain, with which imperialism is trying to fetter and stop the onward march of history.

The deployment of Pershing and cruise missiles at our doorstep is a direct threat to the security of the USSR and the entire socialist community and a step extremely hostile to the cause of peace. Still more dangerous for mankind are attempts of the Washington administration to militarize outer space and turn it into an arena of military operations.

Under these conditions the consistent and constant peaceloving foreign policy of the USSR finds universal recognition and support. Today there is no more important task than the preservation of peace on Earth and the prevention of nuclear war.

Our devotion to the cause of peace is consistent and unwavering. At the same time the party and state display constant concern about ensuring the country's security. The USSR Constitution reflects one of the important Leninist principles of the foreign policy of the Soviet State: the struggle for peace and readiness to repulse aggression. In completing the discussion of the second question it is necessary to emphasize that the profound democracy and humanism of the socialist way of life and one of the fundamental advantages of the new social-political system are manifested in the functions of the socialist state. History's first Soviet State of the Whole People is a tremendous creative and constructive societal force. It is a primary weapon with the help of which the Soviet people, under the leadership of Lenin's party and in a consistent and well-planned manner, are transforming the society of developed socialism into a communist society.

3. DEFENSE OF THE SOCIALIST FATHERLAND -- ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT FUNCTIONS OF THE SOVIET STATE OF THE WHOLE PEOPLE

Among the difficult tasks which the Soviet State is solving in the process of building a communist society, one of the main ones is ensuring the country's security, as the USSR Constitution states. Our Fundamental Law states that defense of the socialist fatherland is among the most important functions of the state and is a matter for the whole people.

Our state fulfills this function through legislative and executive organs of authority, with the active participation of all the people. In accordance with the constitution, the USSR Supreme Soviet is empowered to decide questions of war and peace, defense of the sovereignty of the state and protection of its borders, territorial integrity, organization of defense and leadership of the Armed Forces. The Fundamental Law of the state also obligates local soviets to contribute to strengthening the country's defense capability.

Important powers in matters of the country's defense are given to the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. It declares martial law throughout the country or in its individual regions and general or partial mobilization. In the period between sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet, its Presidium declares a state of war in case of armed attack on the country or to fulfill its treaty obligations for mutual defense against aggression. The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium forms the USSR Defense Council and names and replaces the high command of the USSR Armed Forces.

The USSR Council of Ministers solves important state tasks in the area of defense. Within its authority it exercises leadership over Armed Forces development and determines the annual contingents of citizens subject to call-up for active military service.

The USSR Constitution sets down the highly humanistic mission of our Armed Forces. They are created to defend the gains of socialism, the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state. The duty of the USSR Armed Forces to the people is to reliably defend the socialist fatherland and be in constant combat readiness, guaranteeing an immediate rebuff to any aggressor.

The entire history of the Soviet State demonstrates convincingly that it is successfully fulfilling its function of defending the socialist fatherland. Already at the dawn of its birth the Land of the Soviets was required to defend itself and beat back armed attacks by numerous enemies. And our army carried its combat colors worthily through all of its trials. In the fire of the civil war and repulsing the foreign intervention, and in the last battles for freedom and independence of the socialist fatherland, one of the most important precepts formulated by Lenin was tested and affirmed: "Any revolution is worth something only if it can defend itself..." (Poln. sobr. soch., vol 37, p 122). This precept entered the treasure trove of the common experience of world socialism as an immutable truth. Aimed at preserving and strengthening the most advanced social system and defending the socialist fatherland, it answers both the fundamental national and international interests of the workers of all countries and the cause of mankind's social progress.

The high mission of the Soviet Armed Forces and their truly popular character were displayed with particular force in the years of the Great Patriotic War. These were the forces which, led by the Communist Party, first stopped the army of Fascist Germany, the capitalist world's mightiest army, and barred the way to the further spread of aggression. These were the forces which destroyed the main forces of Hitler's hordes and inflicted a devastating blow on Japanese militarism. These were the forces which liberated many nations of Europe and Asia from alien enslavement and worthily accomplished their international mission.

Our Armed Forces today are the armed forces of a State of the Whole People. They are an integral part of the people, live at one with them and have the same concerns and interests. Their development and improvement take place together with the development and improvement of the entire system of socialist social relations. With the formation of the State of the Whole

People, which embodies the social-political and ideological unity of Soviet society, our Armed Forces also became of the whole people. It is an army of the friendship and brotherhood of nations and of socialist internationalism. Representatives of all classes, social groups, nations and nationalities of our homeland serve together in single formation. A close link with the people and profound devotion to the socialist homeland and the ideas of communism are characteristic of our Armed Forces. The humanitarian essence of the developed socialist society and nobility of its aims are reflected in its entire appearance.

The objective historical necessity to ensure the defense of the gains of socialism against attack by imperialist aggressors forces our people to maintain powerful Armed Forces. Both in the past and now they serve as a reliable weapon for defense of the Soviet Union. Mankind sees in the person of the USSR Armed Forces a military organization which is defending the interests of the workers and serving as a bulwark of universal peace.

Today the Soviet Armed Forces represent a powerful military monolith. Army and navy soldiers are closely united around the Communist Party and are utterly devoted to their homeland. The military potential of our Armed Forces, as was noted at the 26th CPSU Congress, represents a stable fusion of high technical equipping, military skill and unconquerable moral spirit. Serving as a powerful weapon to ensure security of the socialist fatherland, at the same time they guard the gains of socialism and the interests of progressive mankind. All honest-minded people on Earth see in the economic and defense might of the Soviet State a reliable support in the struggle against the aggressive aspirations of reactionary imperialist forces.

Soviet soldiers are fulfilling their historic mission of defending the achievements of socialism and the cause of peace and social progress shoulder to shoulder and in monolithic formation with the soldiers of the other states of the socialist community. They generously share their experience and the achievements of military science and practice. Under conditions of increased imperialist aggressiveness the personnel of the fraternal armies are devoting all their efforts and energy to ensuring the security of each of the allied countries and the entire socialist community.

The Soviet people and army and navy personnel received with great enthusiasm the CPSU Central Committee decree "On the 40th Anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945." Moving toward this portentous date, the defenders of the homeland are seeking persistently new and higher limits in the perfection of military skill, are watching vigilantly the intrigues of the imperialist aggressors and, along with their brothers in arms from the armies of the Warsaw Treaty Organization countries, are prepared at any time to come forward to the defense of peace and socialism.

In completing the lecture on the third question, it is necessary to emphasize again that the personnel of the USSR Armed Forces view the defense of the socialist fatherland as their honorable constitutional duty and as a sacred obligation to society. They are prepared to give a devastating rebuff to any aggressor. The Soviet people and their friends and allies can be confident: No imperialist adventure will remain unpunished. The USSR Armed Forces are

vigilantly defending the gains of socialism. They are always on guard and on the alert.

All the activity of the Soviet State of the Whole People and its strengthening and development are taking place under the direct leadership of the Communist Party. It is only owing to this leadership that our state is successfully accomplishing its world historical mission and is a powerful weapon for building communism and defending socialist achievements and peace on Earth.

During the discussion (seminar) it is useful to examine the following questions: 1. What are the characteristic features of the Soviet State of the Whole People? 2. What are the main tasks of our state in the stage of perfecting developed socialism? 3. What are the basic foreign and domestic functions of our state? 4. What successes did the Soviet people achieve in the 67 years since the Great October Socialist Revolution? 5. Why is it necessary to improve the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces?

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

REVIEW: BOOK ON MILITARY, POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF FRUNZE

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[Article by Capt 2d Rank N. Sinitsyn: "An Example of Selfless Service to the Homeland"]

[Text] This book, written by a collective of authors, on the military and political work of M. V. Frunze, the leading proletarian revolutionary, prominent party and state official and famous military leader, was published by Voenizdat* on the eve of the 100th Anniversary of the day of his birth. Frunze's destiny was unusual, like the time in which he lived. It was namely at the time when, stirred up by the Great October Revolution, it became possible for the son of a medical assistant from the city of Pishpek, Semirech Oblast, Turkestan Kray, a man from the lower social strata, to become not only a prominent military leader, but also one of the greatest military theoreticians, people's commissar for military and naval affairs, and chairman of the USSR Revolutionary Council.

As a 19 year old youth, M. V. Frunze entered the ranks of the party of the proletariat and immediately dedicated himself entirely to revolutionary work. He became a professional revolutionary and Bolshevik supporter of Lenin. In a letter to his brother cited in the book, Mikhail Vasil'yevich explained his choice in this way: "I do not seek that which is easy in life. I do not wish to ask myself in my declining years: 'Well, your life is spent and what was it for? What became better in the world as a result of my life? Nothing? Or almost nothing?' No. To thoroughly understand the laws which control the course of history, to plunge head first into reality, to join together with the most advanced class in modern society, the working class, to live its thoughts and hopes and its struggle, and to remake everything root and branch -- this is the goal of my life..." And M. V. Frunze dedicated all of his short, but brilliant life to this high goal.

In the first chapter the authors trace Frunze's becoming a professional revolutionary and organizer of the masses. Here are only a few landmarks on

*"M. V. Frunze. Voenennaya i politicheskaya deyatel'nost'" [M. V. Frunze. Military and Political activity], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1984, 275 pp, 8 illus., 1 ruble 10 kopecks.

this path: The battle at the Moscow barricades in 1905; the creation and leadership of fighting proletarian volunteers in Ivanovo-Voznesensk and Shuya; his first meeting with Lenin at the 4th Unifying Congress of the RSDRP [Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party]; his cruel persecution by tsarism; his long years of imprisonment; and his unremitting underground work right up to the October Revolution.

After the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the task of defending the Soviet republic against foreign and internal enemies loomed large before the party. "...For defense," wrote V. I. Lenin at that time, "a strong and firm army is necessary..." Such a revolutionary, people's army was formed in the fire of battles against the forces of internal counterrevolution and foreign intervention. It was acutely in need of command cadres.

In this difficult situation, the party sent many prominent party and soviet leaders into military work. These included Frunze, who was named military commissar of Yaroslavl' Military District. By this time, as is apparent from the second chapter, the brilliant state and military activity of Mikhail Vasil'yevich had begun, and he already had broad military-theoretical knowledge.

While still a youth, Frunze had studied military history with interest, and he acquired experience in leadership of armed conflict in the difficult condition of the revolutionary underground and in the battles at the barricades at Krasnaya Presnya in Moscow. Frunze significantly added to his knowledge and developed his military field of vision in Siberian exile, stubbornly mastering military affairs, and later while carrying out revolutionary work on the Western Front, where he was sent by the party in 1916-1917. He devoted particular attention to thorough study of the military works of Marx, Engels and Lenin, the works of the great Russian military leaders, and also learned the English and French languages and read the books of Western European military theoreticians.

In discussing in detail the most significant traits of Frunze's style of work in the post of okrug military commissar, the authors come to the conclusion that his military talent was especially needed on the civil war fronts, where a difficult situation had taken shape in early 1919 in connection with the start of Kolchak's offensive. A new period in Frunze's life, that of his activity as a combat commander, begins when he is named commander of the 4th Army, Eastern Front by order of the republic Revolutionary Military Council.

The book is filled with vivid and instructive episodes from his life as army commander. In them Frunze appears first of all as a military leader possessing iron will, organizational talent, uncommon capacity for work and an ability to be close to the masses. He required less than two months to establish discipline and organization in the troops, raise their combat effectiveness and successfully accomplish an offensive operation, during which a large group of White Guard troops were defeated and Ural Oblast was freed.

Appraising at its true worth the skillful operations of his army commander, Lenin and the party Central Committee named Frunze to command the just created Southern Group of Forces of the Eastern Front. Under the leadership of Mikhail Vasil'yevich, the forces of the group stopped Kolchak's offensive and then, going on the counteroffensive, brilliantly carried out the Ufa Operation and began the liberation of Ural. The Bolshevik Commander finished what he had started as commander of the entire Eastern Front.

In the third chapter, "Against Kolchak," the authors disclose more than 18 months of Frunze's activities, which had tremendous significance for his formation as a military leader of the new, Soviet school. Frunze's hand as a commander was developed in battle with an experienced and insidious enemy. It was characterized by large scale concepts, an objective assessment of the situation, depth of foresight, active, maneuver-filled and decisive offensive operations and a close relationship with his commanders, political workers and Red Army soldiers.

It was namely these qualities which enabled Mikhail Vasil'yevich, in developing his counteroffensive plan, to embody for the first time in the Civil War the principle of massing forces and resources on an operational scale. Due to this, the counterattack on Kolchak made by forces of the Eastern Front, was so skillful, and its results so great, that, even without the subsequent victorious operations on the Turkestan and especially the Southern fronts, Frunze's fame as a great proletarian military leader would still have been ensured.

The Eastern Front armies completed the destruction of Kolchak's forces in Western Siberia without Mikhail Vasil'yevich. In August 1919, the party sent Frunze to a more crucial sector, Turkestan, which, in Lenin's graphic expression, had become one of the links in the ring forged by the Entente imperialists to suffocate the Soviet republic. A special chapter illuminates in adequate detail Frunze's activity in the post of commander of the Turkestan Front.

In the battle for Soviet Turkestan, not only Frunze's military leadership qualities, but also his talent as a political organizer and principled diplomat, who was able to understand thoroughly the military-political situation were manifested with particular brilliance. Frunze is credited with developing the tactics for fighting the mobile Basmach detachments under difficult terrain conditions. This tactic and a great deal of political work among the local population enabled the troops of the Turkestan Front within a year to complete the establishment of Soviet authority over the entire territory of the former Turkestan Kray.

I believe it can be said without exaggeration that by the end of the Civil War, M. V. Frunze enjoyed the greatest authority among the military leaders of the young Soviet Republic. And when in 1920 the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] Central Committee Politburo issued to the military department the directive to "take the Crimea before the onset of winter," the republic Revolutionary Military Council decided to summon Frunze immediately to Moscow on orders of the commander-in-chief, for an important assignment. The question of what post to assign to Frunze was decided by Lenin, who

proposed that the RVSR [Republic Revolutionary Military Council] confirm Frunze as "front commander against Wrangel."

The complete, decisive and rapid victory over Wrangel by the troops of the Southern Front under the commander of Frunze was, according to Lenin, "one of the most brilliant pages in the history of the Red Army..." The chapter dedicated to it thoroughly reveals the flowering of the military leadership talent of the 30 year old front commander. It also succeeded in showing Frunze as a remarkable political leader who was able, relying on the party-political apparatus and the party aktiv, to unite the Red Army masses and inspire them to fulfill the most difficult tasks. This was one of the main reasons why the combat readiness, moral staunchness and ability of the men in the troop units not to lose their will in battle and to undertake the most difficult trials improved sharply (we will bring to mind just the night fording of Sivash in late Autumn by Red Army units).

Like no one else, Frunze was able to direct his commanders and commissars to solve specific tasks, taking into account the real situation and the specific features of the moment and situation. Repeatedly risking his life, when necessary he himself went among the attacking soldiers, in the midst of the rank-and-file fighters, lived their needs and interests and cared for their feeding, clothing and combat and medical support.

After the Civil War as well, Frunze placed tremendous importance on the organization of constant and effective political work in the troop units. The book's authors show how, when he was commanding all the armed forces of the Ukraine and Crimea and ably directing their efforts to destroy the bandit formations of Makhno and Tyutyunnik, he demanded that "political work be established widely and intensified in every way. The best, strong commissars are to be involved in military activities, and exemplary political detachments and political work in troop units are to be set up..."

Mikhail Vasil'yevich insistentlly implemented the party instructions that a Soviet commander must be armed with Marxist-Leninist theory, stand on the heights of the latest achievements of the theory and practice of military affairs, and be not only an excellent organizer, but also a skillful political teacher. His concern for the proper conduct of political-educational work permeated the order signed by Frunze on 28 July 1921, "On State Propaganda of Communism in Red Army and Navy Units in the Ukraine and Crimea," which is published in the book. This order and the appended instructions declared propagandizing of communist ideas to be a task of statewide importance. "The main form of state propagandizing of communism in Red Army and Navy units," it is stated in the order, "is daily political lessons with Red Army men and sailors, to which no less than one hour is scheduled..." Presence of all servicemen, including commanders and administrative personnel, at political lessons, was considered mandatory. It is characteristic that Mikhail Vasil'yevich inseparably linked questions of the ideological and political upbringing of commanders and rank-and-file troops with raising their general cultural level.

In addition to military questions, the party charged Frunze to solve extensive economic tasks. Restoring the economy and transport, reviving all economic

life, improving agriculture, strengthening the state apparatus, improving the supply of raw materials to industry and food to the population -- these are the most important areas of economic life to which Frunze, as a member of the Ukrainian KP(b) Central Committee and UkSSR SNK [Council of People's Commissars] deputy chairman, concentrated his indomitable energy and persistence.

The authors succeeded in showing, with the use of specific examples and facts, how well Mikhail Vasil'yevich knew the situation, not only in the whole republic, but also in its various regions, and was able to coordinate the efforts of individual leaders and organs, directing them to solve the main task. He spent a large part of his time on travels around the republic. For example, in May-June 1921 Frunze visited Yekaterinoslav, Aleksandrovsk, Melitopol', Berdyansk and the Crimea, and from mid-August to mid-September he visited Kiev, Nikolayev, Odessa and Volynya. Involving himself in the situation on the ground, he attempted to be closer to the people and production. He often met with workers and peasants and party and soviet leaders. One reads the book and is struck by Mikhail Vasil'yevich's amazing capacity for work. It seems he doesn't get tired and works day and night. But ahead for Frunze was still more intense work. On 11 March 1924 he was named by a USSR SNK decree to be deputy chairman of the USSR Revolutionary Military Council and people's commissar for military and naval affairs. Due to the prolonged absence of his direct superior, Frunze actually had been deciding the most important questions of the country's military management from the very first day. Remaining in this post, he soon held the offices of both the chief of staff and commissar of the RKKA [Workers' and Peasants' Red Army] staff, and was later jointly the chief and commissar of the military academy which today bears his name. From January 1925, Frunze was chairman of the USSR Revolutionary Military Council and people's commissar for military and naval affairs.

Illuminating Frunze's multi-faceted activity in the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs, the authors show with numerous facts that, along with his main concern for developing and carrying out military reform, Mikhail Vasil'yevich was engaged in preparing new Red Army regulations as well as long-term plans for shipbuilding and developing military aviation and armored forces. He also looked after strengthening the firepower of the cavalry and carried out an active struggle against the Trotskiyites on political and military questions.

And it was so from day to day and month to month. For all this, the people's commissar found time to visit units and ships, was present at firing, exercises and maneuvers, and inspected engineer construction, ranges and barracks. It was namely in Mikhail Vasil'yevich's years of work as people's commissar for military and naval affairs that his most close link with the people, the broadest masses of workers, Red Army men, commanders and political workers was still more vividly demonstrated.

Although he was utterly occupied with practical work in the People's Commissariat, Frunze nevertheless wrote an especially great deal and presented articles on the pages of newspapers and journals on fundamental military-theoretical questions. These documents continued, developed and extended the

views which the proletarian military leader had formulated soon after the 10th Party Congress in an article, "A United Military Doctrine and the Red Army."

The final chapter of the book is devoted to examining Frunze's military-theoretical views. In it the authors emphasize that knowledge of the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin and of Marxist-Leninist methodology helped Mikhail Vasil'yevich reach a profound scientific comprehension of the questions under study. And there were many of them: war and military history; the special nature of wars in defense of the socialist fatherland; assessing the military-political situation; paths for creating and strengthening the new army and its main features; the most important forms and methods of training and bringing up the rank-and-file soldiers and commanders; proletarian military science and military doctrine; the relationship between the front and rear; the country's defense system and military economics.

The materials in this chapter give a clear impression about the leading role which Frunze played in implementing the principle of party leadership over all questions of building up the military and in strengthening Communist Party positions in the army. Providing theoretical justification for the importance of unwavering observance of the principle of party leadership of the Armed Forces, M. V. Frunze stressed in particular that a necessary condition for the solidity and combat effectiveness of the army and navy is their profound and unshakable loyalty to the Communist Party, for "the great goals and tasks set before the Red Army and Navy coincide fully and unconditionally with the tasks and goals of the Communist Party. Moreover, they are worked out in tireless party struggle and work."

Frunze believed, and this is convincingly shown in the book, that strengthening the Armed Forces political organs and party organizations is an important condition for strengthening the influence of the party in the army and navy. The greeting which he sent to the Red Army Political Administration on the occasion of the 5th Anniversary of its creation vividly indicated Mikhail Vasil'yevich's assessment of the role of the political organs. It stated: "Who introduced elements of order and discipline in the ranks of our young Red Army regiments, created under the thunder of gunfire? Who, in the hours of failure and defeat, maintained the courage and good spirits of the troops and poured new energy into their shaken ranks? Who organized the army rear, sowed Soviet authority there and created Soviet order, thus ensuring the rapid and successful advance of our armies? Who, by their persistent and tenacious work demoralized the ranks of the enemy, disorganized his rear and thus prepared for the coming successes? The army's political organs accomplished this, and, it must be said, did so brilliantly."

"To Hero of the People -- Mikhail Vasil'yevich Frunze;" this was the inscription engraved on the honorary revolutionary weapon, a sword with gold hilt, which the great military leader was awarded by special VTsIK (All-Russian Central Executive Committee) decree. Mikhail Vasil'yevich gained many glorious victories, did not suffer a single defeat, and even his enemies recognized him as a great military leader of the Soviet Republic. He was an army commander, front commander, chairman of the USSR Revolutionary Military Council and people's commissar for military and naval affairs. He came from the people, lived for the people and was victorious in the name of the people.

This leading party, state and military figure, Mikhail Vasil'yevich Frunze, has not been with us for almost six decades. During this time the Soviet Armed Forces, to the organization and strengthening of the combat power of which he gave his talent and military commander's energy, have been transformed beyond recognition. Frunze's views on war as a social-political phenomenon, on the army as an instrument of politics and weapon of war, on military doctrine and science and on the defense capability of the country were further developed in party decisions on questions of the country's defense and in the works of military theoreticians. Even under modern conditions they have not lost their significance. Moreover, in a situation of increased imperialist aggressive aspirations and the danger that they will unleash a new world war, use of Frunze's military-theoretical legacy facilitates solving many questions of building up the military, training and bringing up soldiers, strengthening the military might of the Soviet Armed Forces and improving their combat readiness.

With this conclusion the authors end the book on M. V. Frunze, whose life was a vivid example of utter devotion to the cause of Lenin and the Communist Party and selfless struggle for the happiness of the people and for socialism. Based on reliable historical archival materials, the book helps one to understand more fully, thoroughly and vividly Frunze's military and political activity and his truly titanic work of creating and strengthening the Soviet Armed Forces.

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MILITARY POLITICAL ISSUES

ARMY GEN YEPISHEV ON PARTY WAR LEADERSHIP, DEFENSE

Moscow PARTIY .AYA ZHIZN' in Russian No 1, Jan 85 pp 10-17 (signed to press 19 Dec 84)

[Army Gen A. Yepishev, chief of the Main Political Administration, Soviet Army and Navy: "The Communist Party: Inspirer and Organizer of the Great Victory"]

[Text] The heroic epopee of the Great Patriotic War recedes ever farther into history. New generations of Soviet people have grown up in the four decades which have passed since the victorious May days of 1945. But the greatness of the heroic feat which the Soviet people accomplished in the name of the freedom and independence of the socialist Fatherland, in the name of saving world civilization from the fascist plague and in the name of the happiness of millions of people throughout the world seems today still more vivid in the memory and hearts of all, both veterans and youth.

Greeting the 40th Anniversary of the Great Victory, the Soviet people and Army and Navy personnel cast their gaze with love and profound gratitude toward their tested vanguard, the Communist Party. By its many-sided activity, it is emphasized in the CPSU Central Committee decree, "On the 40th Anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945," the party ensured the stable unity of political, state and military leadership, the army and people, the front and rear. At its call the whole country rose to deadly battle against fascism. The Communist Party was truly a fighting party. Communists were found in the most difficult and decisive sectors of the battle against the enemy. By personal example and fervent party word they inspired and led the Soviet people to victory.

* * *

The Great Patriotic War was an uncompromising class clash between the first country of victorious socialism and the strike detachment of international imperialist reaction, fascist Germany, which insidiously attacked our Soviet Homeland. This war was a severe test of the stability and vitality of the socialist system. Under conditions of unprecedented encounters with the enemy the historic responsibility of the Communist Party for the fate of socialism and all social progress increased still more.

Lenin's party was equal to this world historical responsibility. The directive of the USSR Council of Peoples Commissars and VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (of bolsheviks)] Central Committee to party and soviet organizations in front line oblasts, adopted on 29 June 1941, was a most important program document which defined the objectives and tasks of the struggle against the fascist aggressors: "The war against Fascist Germany which has been thrust upon us," it stated, "is deciding the question of the life and death of the Soviet State and about whether the peoples of the Soviet Union will be free or will fall into slavery. Today everything depends on our ability to organize and act quickly, not losing a minute of time and not wasting a single opportunity in the battle against the enemy." The party has worked out real ways of solving the main military and political tasks in the battle against fascism, set down just and liberating war aims, disclosed the war's universal, openly class nature and expressed unshakable conviction in the inevitable defeat of the enemy.

Achieving victory in armed conflict against Hitler's army became the main element and main objective of all party policy. "The task of Bolsheviks," it states in the directive, "is to rally the entire nation around the Communist Party and the Soviet Government for selfless support of the Red Army and for victory."

The party not only worked out a correct policy, which met the vital interests of the people, but also was in its deeds the creative organizer of its implementation.

In the first days of the Great Patriotic War, the State Defense Committee (GKO) was created to strengthen the unity of the political and military leadership of the country and Armed Forces. Total state and military authority was concentrated in the GKO. It supervised the restructuring of the economy and the mobilization of forces and means to defeat the enemy. All party, soviet, military, komsomol and trade union organs were required to fulfill its decrees and orders.

Other emergency leadership organs and new elements of the administrative apparatus were also created.

Creation of the GKO and a number of other organs did not replace or weaken the leading role of the party, the VKP(b) Central Committee and its organs, the Politburo, Orgburo and Secretariat, but still further increased their importance in leadership of the armed conflict and in the foreign and domestic policy of the Soviet State.

In accomplishing the most difficult strategic tasks of repulsing the sudden, perfidious attack of the fascist aggressor, the party comprehensively solved numerous problems of turning the country into a single armed camp and conducting the most rapid mobilization, rebasing and deployment of defense enterprises in the interests of the front.

The VKP(b) Central Committee strengthened the decisive elements of the defense industry. Military economic questions became primary in the work of the central committees of the communist parties in the union republics and of the

ray, oblast, city and rayon party organizations. In major industrial centers, especially in the eastern part of the country to where military industry had been transferred at the start of the war, special sections were created in party committees which were in charge of the most important branches of the defense industry -- tanks, aviation, munitions -- as well as the production of metals, fuel and electric power. They were headed by party workers with great experience in economic activity.

The leadership's restructuring of the economy and the decisive switch of all party organs from top to bottom directly to military production and the needs of the Red Army made it possible in a historically unprecedented short period of time to transfer the economy of such a huge state as the Soviet Union to military production and to satisfy practically all the requests of the front.

The party boldly put forth the principle, unprecedented in world economic practice, of maneuvering the country's resources and creating a new economic base deep in the rear area. In the first 6 months of the war alone, 1,523 industrial enterprises were rebased to the east. Approximately 160 more enterprises were moved there in 1942. As a result we succeeded in preserving large production capacities and maximizing their use in the interests of equipping the Red Army, defending the Soviet State and defeating the enemy.

Producing weapons and munitions and equipping the Red Army with material and technical means of combat were based on leading achievements of Soviet military and technical thinking. Throughout the entire war the best tanks were Soviet, especially the famous T-34. The most modern models of aircraft, tube artillery, mortars, the legendary "Katyushas," etc., were constantly entering the fields of battle.

The party led the struggle of the kolkhoz peasantry to provide the front and industry with food and raw materials. Under the guidance of party organs, measures were taken in local areas effectively to arrange agricultural crops, develop auxiliary farming and make each oblast self-sufficient in food products. The situation was made more difficult because the number of rural leaders and communists, most of whom had gone to the front, was sharply reduced. Party organizations were preserved in only a few kolkhozes. Women and juveniles became the main force in the village. Women drove tractors and combines, led the kolkhozes and did so with their total efforts.

The consistent and creative implementation of the principle of democratic centralism, without which the unified actions and conscious discipline of millions of communists and the high degree of organization and purposefulness in the work of party organs were inconceivable, was of fundamental importance for the cohesion of the party ranks and for increasing its role in the leadership of the war. During the war years this was acutely necessary, since the party, as V. I. Lenin taught, "will be able to fulfill its duty only if it is organized in the most centralized manner and is ruled by iron discipline..."

The Communist Party thoroughly took into account the interrelations of the main factors ensuring the course and outcome of the war, and most of all the fact that success in the struggle of the Soviet people against German Fascism was determined by the correlation of military might of the armies of the two warring sides. Such questions as the number of troops, the quantity and quality of weapons and military equipment, the political state and morale of the men, the preparation of command and political cadres and the development of military art and military science occupied a central place in the party's military organizational activity.

At first, when the enemy had superiority in men and equipment, urgent measures were required to augment the Soviet Army with reserve personnel. The tremendous scope and ferocity of the battles and the need to replace casualties necessitated the rapid mobilization of more than thirty age groups. It is easy to imagine what tremendous work was accomplished by local party and soviet organs and military commissariats. By the end of 1941 alone, 286 rifle divisions and 159 rifle and 76 tank brigades were formed.

The party carried out a huge amount of work with military cadres. It helped the leading military cadres master the leninist style of work and brought them up in the spirit of communist ideology and principles and responsibility for fulfilling combat missions. Particular attention was devoted to the introduction of advanced experience in troop leadership. Young cadres were boldly promoted to responsible duties in the army and navy. During the war an entire galaxy of prominent military leaders and political officers developed who possessed high party qualities, profound understanding of military affairs, boldness of thinking and organizational abilities. Many brilliant and exemplary offensive operations in the Great Patriotic War were accomplished under their leadership.

At each stage of the war the Communist Party set specific tasks before the Armed Forces. They were set down in VKP(b) Central Committee decrees and in statements and orders of the supreme commander. The Communist Party slogan, "The enemy will be destroyed! Victory will be ours!" was the combat program for each communist and komсомоl member and each army and navy man throughout the war years. Under the leadership of the Communist Party, the Soviet Armed Forces successfully fulfilled all the tasks which faced them of disrupting Hitler's plan of "lightning war;" preparing for and accomplishing the fundamental turning point in the war; liberating Soviet territory which had been seized by the enemy and accomplishing the liberating mission and final destruction of Fascist Germany.

Not only the army fought against Hitler's troops. At the call of the party, the whole people rose up to battle the enemy. The forms of this battle were most varied. Party organizations led work of unprecedented scale in the creation of defensive fortifications. In summer and autumn 1941, approximately 10 million people took part in this effort. These fortifications played a tremendous role in holding back the enemy's mobile formations and in the defense of Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Odessa, Sevastopol and other cities.

Party organizations in front line rayons provided direct assistance to the Red Army. In the first days of the war, detachments of party and soviet activists and workers' and assault battalions were created on their initiative. Their main missions were to fight against saboteurs, spies and enemy parachutists and to secure important state facilities. As the front line approached the assault detachments and battalions were incorporated into the active army or became partisan detachments. Already by the end of July 1941, 1,755 assault battalions uniting more than 328,000 people were active in the front line area.

The people's volunteer corps, which formed at the initiative of the Leningrad party organization, became a mass form of participation by the Soviet people in the armed battle against fascism. The party central committee approved of the initiative of the Leningrad residents and extended it to other cities. On 4 July 1941, GKO passed a decree on creating people's volunteer corps divisions in Moscow and Moscow Oblast.

In summer and autumn 1941 alone some 60 people's volunteer corps divisions, 200 separate regiments and numerous battalions, companies, platoons and detachments were formed. Their overall number of personnel reached almost two million, the majority of whom were communists and komsomol members, and a significant portion of whom were workers and representatives of the intelligentsia.

The heroic struggle of partisans and the underground in the enemy rear facilitated the military successes of the Soviet Army. The VKP(b) Central Committee created special headquarters for military leadership of the partisan movement, which were led by responsible party workers. Similar staffs were also formed in the military soviets of the fronts.

A network of underground party organizations was developed to lead the national resistance in the enemy rear. The party sent hundreds of its workers and thousands of communists to engage in underground work. Republic, kray, oblast, city and rayon party committees were the direct leaders of partisans and the underground. They successfully solved tasks of creating partisan detachments and sabotage groups, strengthened the party nucleus within them, roused the masses to disrupt the enemy's occupation measures and carried out political work among the population. Overall, 140,000 communists selflessly fought against fascism in the temporarily occupied areas of the USSR.

Improving party political work and the ideological upbringing of the men was constantly at the center of attention of the communist party and its leading organs. The strengthening of military soviets; reestablishment of political sections and political administrations as fully authoritative organs of the party in the army and navy; introduction of the institution of military commissars and strengthening of the political organs with experienced and authoritative cadres played a large role in this. When necessary the VKP(b) Central Committee took timely steps to create new political organs.

During the course of the war the detachment of middle, senior and highest level political officers grew and was enriched with experience. All of this

resulted in party political work improving and becoming more effective. It permeated all aspects of the life and activity of the Soviet Army and the whole process of training personnel to carry out combat actions and combat troop control.

During the course of the war, the Communist Party was tremendously active in further strengthening the moral strength of the people and army. Many features of ideological work at the front and in the rear were: explaining the just and liberating character of the Great Patriotic War; bringing up the workers and armed forces personnel in the spirit of socialist patriotism, the indestructible unity and fraternal friendship of the peoples of the USSR and proletarian internationalism; and forming profound ideological conviction in the rightness of our cause and in the certainty of our victory and the defeat of Fascist Germany.

Active propaganda of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism had tremendous influence on increasing the spiritual strength of the people, army and navy. During the war years, more than 500 editions of the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin were published. They totalled almost 17 million copies. Among them were collections of Lenin's works, "On the Defense of the Socialist Fatherland," "Military Correspondence 1917-1920" and others. Almost 15,000 books, consisting of 216.7 million copies were published on political and social-economic topics.

The work of the press and radio was restructured on party instructions. CIVILIFORMBURE was under the direct leadership of the party Central Committee. It provided regular information on the military-political situation and the heroic doings of the Soviet people at the front and in the rear, revealed the lie of bourgeois propaganda and reported on the atrocities of the fascist monsters.

Writers, artists, composers and theater and movie actors devoted their best works to patriotic upbringing of the Soviet people and to revealing the beastly make up of the fascists.

Particular attention in party organizations was paid to conducting military propaganda, mass agitation work and counterpropaganda. Military Soviets, commanders, political officers and party and komsomol organizations structured ideological work taking into account specific tasks and the existing situation. Ideological work supported the indomitable offensive spirit of the troops.

In the Great Patriotic War, fascism suffered not only a military, but also a crushing ideological and political defeat. Marxist-Leninist ideology served as the spiritual weapon of our victory.

* * *

The leading and directing role of the Communist Party in the Armed Forces during the war years was most vividly manifested in the many-sided activity of army and navy party organizations. The ideological and organizational strengthening of party organizations in the active army, their active work and

close link with the troops and commanders was viewed as a most important condition for improving the combat effectiveness of units and subunits.

Questions of the all-round strengthening of party organizations and restructuring their work in accordance with new tasks and conditions stood at the center of the attention of the party, military soviets, political organs and military commissars. The interests of defending the homeland required increasing party influence directly in the lowest elements of the army and navy, where the high goals of party policy were transformed into daily military deeds and the fate of each battle and operation and the armed conflict as a whole were decided.

It was important to ensure that in all detachments, crews, teams and platoons there were communists to personify the authority of the party, who were capable in word and deed of leading their comrades and arousing them to fulfill military orders.

The redistribution of forces from local organizations into military ones was carried out for the purpose of strengthening the party organizations in the active army and intensifying political influence on the troops. This was accomplished at all levels of our party.

Communists and komsomol members were sent to the troop units as political fighters. They rallied the troops right in the military formations and inspired them with party word and personal example to feats in the name of the homeland. In the first 6 months of the war alone, 8,800 leading party workers entered the army and 60,000 communists and 40,000 komsomol members were sent to the front as political fighters.

Dispatching communists to the front was an exceptionally effective way of providing the active army with experienced leaders, and it helped to raise the combat effectiveness of units and large units and their political spirit and morale and to strengthen decisively order and discipline in the military ranks. Special mobilizations of communists and komsomol members into the Armed Forces helped in the selection of required contingents and were carried out in the country with tremendous political enthusiasm.

Strengthening the vanguard role of communists in the troop units is the most characteristic trait of all the measures of placement of party forces. At the end of 1941, 1.2 million communists were in the army and navy; more than twice the number present on the eve of the war. In the following years the party concentrated more than half of its membership in the Armed Forces, and up to 2/3 of this number in the active army.

Communists unwaveringly fulfilled Lenin's behest that in defending the socialist fatherland it is the duty of every conscious communist to be "in front of others at the front." In critical minutes of combat a call was frequently heard which was not found in any military regulation: "Communists, forward!" Communists had only one privilege and only one right -- to be on the main axis in the offensive and in the most decisive sector in defense; to be there where it was most dangerous and difficult. Everywhere communists

displayed bravery, courage and heroism. That is why almost 3/4 of those awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union are communists.

Already by the end of the first year of the war, full blooded party organizations had formed in an absolute majority of companies, batteries, squadrons, submarines, mine-sweepers and in the military units on major ships. Great was the heroism of the party members, who led their comrades into deadly battle; and great also were the losses in their ranks. But new hero patriots replaced those communists who fell in battle. Thousands and thousands of soldiers and commanders issued a statement with the words, "I want to go into battle as a communist." It is noteworthy that the greatest influx of soldiers into the party was in the gravest months of 1941 and 1942.

Due to real life requirements, the VKP(b) Central Committee made a number of decisions which changed the conditions under which the best soldiers who had distinguished themselves in battles could enter the party. In particular, the Central Committee decree of 19 August 1941 provided that "Red Army soldiers and leaders in the active Red Army who particularly distinguished themselves in battles and were models of heroism, and who had expressed a desire to join the party, may present recommendations by three party members of one year's standing, who worked together with them for even less than one year." In these cases the entrant in addition to recommendations, presented his combat performance reports. In a decree of 9 December 1941 the Central Committee decided to admit into the party after three months' candidacy soldiers who had distinguished themselves in battles. In so deciding the Central Committee required the political organs and party organizations to observe strictly the Leninist principle of individual selection into the party and to study thoroughly the professional, political and moral-combat qualities of soldiers who submitted statements requesting party membership.

This approach to increasing party ranks enabled the party to take into its ranks truly the best representatives of the military collectives, and thereby strengthen the influence and authority of party organizations and elevate the title of communist among the non-party soldiers.

The main addition to party ranks during the war years came through the army and navy party organizations. In all from 1 July 1941 to 1 July 1945 3,750,000 soldiers became party candidate members and 2,376,000 became party members. This constituted nearly 3/4 of all those admitted during this time as party members and 2/3 of the candidates. This is natural. The foundation of the party at war became its fighting party organizations, and additions to its ranks came from those who defended the socialist fatherland with weapons in hand.

By spring 1945 one in four Soviet soldiers was a communist, while at the start of the war it had been one in nine.

The massive influx of new forces into the party made acute the problem of political upbringing and political training of party members.

Lenin taught that with a mass acceptance of new members it is particularly important "to most rapidly, successfully and professionally help to educate

these young party members." The ideological tempering of the young communists and their political education steadily improved. The VKP(b) Central Committee and the central committees of communist parties in the union republics, army committees, okrugs, gorkoms, raykoms, political organizations in the Armed Forces and primary party organizations took care to ensure that those joining the party fully grasped its traditions and mastered the ideas of Marxism-Leninism. The system of party training was improved during the war years. Evening universities of Marxism-Leninism, schools of the party aktiv, political groups, circles and permanent seminars functioned in many union republics, okrugs, districts and in the political organs of okrugs and inactive fronts.

The upbringing of young communists never lessened even under combat conditions. The priority was given to the work of the party aktiv and individual and group talks with communists. In the lulls between battles, short gatherings and seminars were held where party history was studied and questions of foreign and domestic life were examined. A significant role in the political upbringing of communists was played by their fulfillment of party assignments.

Changes in the organizational structure of army and navy party organizations, made in accordance with the VKP(b) Central Committee decree of 24 May 1943, were extremely important in strengthening them. Primary party organizations were created in battalions, artillery battalions and equivalent subunits. The regimental party group was granted the rights of a party committee. The institution of designated regimental, battalion and company party organs was introduced. The entire structure of party organizations became more flexible, meeting the new conditions and tasks facing the troops. Primary concern for political upbringing work with the soldiers was charged to the company level party organizations.

The system of designating party organs made it possible under combat conditions to replace effectively party organs which had been knocked out and to implement constant leadership of party organizations. This was also the purpose for increasing party organ deputies and for creating a permanent reserve of company and battalion party organs.

Komsomol organizations were reorganized according to the same principle.

Changing the structure of party and komsomol organizations made it possible to improve political work in the Armed Forces and to improve its effectiveness and influence in accomplishing combat missions.

* * *

The Great Patriotic War confirmed the law that the party of Lenin is the generally recognized ideological and political vanguard of the Soviet people in the battle against fascism and militarism.

In a new important stage in the history of the USSR and world development, in the difficult circumstances of the Second World War, the party of communists again demonstrated its collective wisdom and ability to develop and conduct

a policy which gave special single-mindedness of purpose to the creativity of the masses, classes and nations, the work of cadres and the functioning of state institutions and social organizations. The course and victorious outcome of the war showed that the Communist Party mastered to perfection the art of concentrating its efforts to solve the main tasks. This is one of the sources of its strength and invincibility and a characteristic of its leadership activity.

Another most important source of the party's strength was the fact that all of its activity was based on the life-giving teaching of Marxism-Leninism. The party fully utilized the capability of socialist society and the strengths of the people for its victory over the enemy and ensured the consolidation of the socialist social and state system, the alliance of the working class, peasantry and intelligentsia, the friendship of the nations comprising the USSR and the moral-political and ideological unity of Soviet society.

The multi-faceted activity of the CPSU in the years of the Second World War was an extremely vivid page in its history. The heroic image of communist -- a courageous soldier, commander and political officer, patriot and internationalist, who does not spare his own life defending his socialist homeland, as well as the peoples of all oppressed and enslaved countries -- appears in all of its grandeur and nobility. Progressive mankind pays its deepest respect to the party of communists who led the battle against fascism and took it to its victorious conclusion. Its experience in leading the armed defense of the socialist fatherland and gaining victory in the war is most relevant even today. It is widely used in the struggle for peace, for preventing a new world war, for improving all of our defensive work and for exposing the bourgeois falsifiers of the past war.

Having gained a world-historical victory in the fiercest of wars, the Soviet nation had to direct its attention to the severe reality of those days and not lessen its vigilance. The volleys of the Second World War had barely died down when the imperialists, most of all the U. S. and Britain, again presented the world with a military threat with their aggressive policy. They developed the "cold war," knocked together aggressive blocs and initiated atomic blackmail. And all of this had and still has a malicious antisoviet thrust. Today we are confronted not simply with an ideological crusade by the anticommunists, but also with the unprecedented mobilization of all the forces of the capitalist world in a desire to achieve unilateral military advantages over real socialism.

Under conditions when the situation in the world has become extremely complicated and the military danger has increased, the Communist Party and Soviet State firmly and consistently struggle to disrupt the aggressive designs of the imperialist adventurers and to remove the threat of a nuclear catastrophe from the world. At the same time the Soviet Union is required to strengthen in every way possible its defense capability to maintain the existing strategic military equilibrium between the USSR and U. S. and the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO.

"Our concern about the security of the socialist fatherland is understandable to any sensible person," states Comrade K. U. Chernenko, CPSU Central

Committee General Secretary and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. "The party Central Committee and Soviet Government understand their highest responsibility to the people. June 1941 will not be repeated! Immediate retribution will befall any aggressor. Let everyone know this -- both our friends and foes."

Owing to the concern of the party and people, all of our Armed Services are today equipped with the most modern weapons and military equipment. The strength and combat might of the Soviet Army and Navy are multiplied many times over by the fact that the most modern weapons are manned by soldiers brought up by the Communist Party and the whole Soviet way of life in a spirit of loyalty to the socialist fatherland and readiness to defend it.

Party organizations are using the preparations for the celebration of the 40th Anniversary of victory to increase the working and political activeness of the Soviet people still further in implementing the decisions of the 26th Congress and subsequent CPSU Central Committee plenums. The Moscow CPSU Gorkom, for example, approved the initiative of the leading collectives in the capital, which decided to develop socialist competition under the slogan, "To the 40th Anniversary of victory -- 40 Weeks of Intense Labor." This patriotic initiative of the Moscovites, like the well known initiative of the Baltic factory shipbuilders to fulfill the tasks of the five-year plan ahead of time, finds a fervent response from the Soviet people. Reports are coming from Belorussia, Kazakhstan, Georgia and other union republic capitals that enterprises, construction sites, kolkhozes and sovkhoses are intensifying their search for additional reserves to improve labor productivity, reduce production costs and save resources. Widespread socialist competition was developed in the USSR Armed Forces under the slogan: "To the 40th Anniversary of the Great Victory and the CPSU 27th congress -- Our Selfless Military Labor!"

Lenin's party, purposefully using the advantages and opportunities of developed socialism to strengthen the country's defense capability, constantly reminds the Soviet people and all the world's peoples about the lasting importance of the lessons of the past war. The main lesson is that it is necessary to fight against war before it starts. We must devote all our efforts, energy, will and intellect to this cause. The lessons of war summon us to vigilance and to a high degree of readiness to stop any feeble aggressive impulses of potential aggressors. The tremendous experience accumulated by the Communist Party in the years of the past war has lasting importance in this respect.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

BRIEFS

VOLKOGONOV SPEECH NOTED -- Deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate for the Soviet Army and Navy Lieutenant General Volkogonov gave an interesting speech on the up-coming 67th Anniversary of Soviet Armed Forces at the CPSU MGK [Ministry of State Control]. The speaker spoke about preparations for Soviet Army and Navy Day, about socialist competition in the forces to reach a worthy meeting for the 40th Anniversary of the Victory of Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War, the 27th CPSU Congress and about propaganda on revolutionary and military traditions in the USSR Armed Forces. [Text] [Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Feb 85 p 9] 12511

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WARSAW PACT

BRIEF

JOINT SOVIET-CZECH EXERCISE -- A long friendship binds soldiers of the Czechoslovakian Peoples Army and the Central Group of Forces. They are often together, both during military training and during times of relaxation. OBRANA LIDU relates how joint exercises involving subunits of the fraternal armies have become a fine tradition. In the course of training personnel pool their experience and brother-soldiers liberally share the "secrets" of military skills. For example, not long ago there were joint field exercises involving Czechoslovakian and Soviet soldiers. After they were over comrades-in-arms ardently discussed the operations with one another, talked about shortcomings and jointly sought ways to eliminate them. When there is free time the friends also try to be together. During one of their free days ChNA [Czechoslovakian Peoples Army] soldiers invited their friends from a Soviet aviation subunit to the Military Aviation and Space Museum in Prague. The OBRANA LIDU newspaper writes that the friendship of the soldiers from the fraternal armies becomes stronger with each day. [Excerpt] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Feb 85 p 3]

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ARMED FORCES

MEETING ON CHEMICAL INDUSTRY AT TIMOSHENKO ACADEMY

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Jan 85 p 2

[Article by Maj V. Baruzin: "Memorable Meeting"]

[Text] During a political day at the Chemical Defense Military Academy imeni Marshal Sovetskogo Soyuza S. K. Timoshenko, the instructional staff and students met with V. V. Listov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee, deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and USSR minister of chemical industry. In his speech the minister presented the results of the national economic plan achieved over the past year and the task confronting the industry in the final year of the 11th Five-Year Plan.

The speaker paid much attention to the future development of the chemical industry. In accordance with the decisions of the 26th Party Congress and subsequent CPSU Central Committee plenums, he noted that there was an undeviating growth in the production of new progressive materials -- high-quality polymers with specific technical characteristics, synthetic fibers and threads, dyes and new medicines. The assortment and quality of household chemical products intended to satisfy consumer goods requirements are improving. A major program directed at intensive production is being carried out in this branch of industry.

The chemical industry workers, the minister emphasized in closing, are fully committed to meeting on the 40th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War and the 27th CPSU Congress with new labor successes.

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ARMED FORCES

ON RESPONDING TO VIOLATIONS OF LEGALITY

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Feb 85 p 2

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel of Justice A. Krasnopevtsev, member of the military tribunal for the Red Banner Central Asian Military District: "The Interlocutory Order"]

[Text] When Private A. Balod caught sight of Voyentorg [Military Trade Organization] driver Raskop and his pals in the Zhiguli near the fence in the unit area at night, all doubts about their intentions disappeared once and for all. A few days earlier Raskop had approached Balod and hinted at the possibility of a profit in kitchen supplies. The soldier had reported this conversation to the command, and it seemed that his report had not been taken seriously. But now the criminals were caught red-handed.

After reviewing the matter of the misappropriation and giving the necessary punishment to the perpetrators, the military tribunal informed the unit commander both about the vigilance shown by Private Balod and about the possible causes and circumstances which had made the misappropriation possible. Court agencies have at their disposal a special form for responding to violations of discipline and order -- the interlocutory order. And if the appropriate officials take the necessary measures, the deeds that were done cannot be repeated there in the future.

I remember that a lot of work was done in an analogous situation in the automotive repair facility headed by Lieutenant Colonel B. Zhitnik. Despite the fact that the court had indicated only a few shortcomings in material economizing and expenditure, the organization fought mismanagement in the enterprise on a wide front. Indoctrinational work and control over observing the internal work routine improved noticeably throughout the production organization. The fact that the organization set up special watches and storage facilities equipped with alarms speaks for itself. This clearly not only allowed the organization to seal off avenues for misappropriation, but also had a positive affect on the overall situation.

Alas, such a reaction to the interlocutory order was not forthcoming in the affair with Raskop and the others. The military court had to try to get officer A. Kapishchev to take the appropriate measures for almost six months. These measures included putting a barrier around the kitchen supplies and

locks on enclosure doors and, finally, setting the behavior of their colleague Private Baibod as an example for the people.

The chairman of the military tribunal had to the disciplinary responsibility for officials who actually ignored court demands. The law requires that issues in an interlocutory order be immediately and totally resolved and that the court be informed about this in the established timeframe.

I do not think there is any special reason to explain this requirement. An interlocutory order is usually established some time after the law has been violated. As a rule, officials usually already know all of the event's circumstances, and more so that inquest and preliminary investigation agencies and other commissions are concerned with their analysis. In such cases the inactivity of officials can only be termed as a sincere attempt at new transgressions.

Certainly cases of clear disrespect for court decisions are seldom seen. But some people have gotten in the habit of formal answers for form only. The military tribunals in the garrisons of our district at times have sent several interlocutory orders to the Kirghiz SSR military commission. The answers arrived on time and their essence was that the shortcomings were reviewed at various conferences and the guilty individuals punished. But what specifically was done to preclude these shortcomings from being repeated in the future was unclear from the answers. And specifically, what would be done to preclude calling people into military service whose health exempts them from serving.

And then there are the workers of the military tribunal in the Alamedinskiy rayvoyenkomat [rayon military registration and enlistment office]. This was where selectee V. Loshchenko was subjected to a careless medical examination. And what has changed in the voyenkomat's selectee commission since the interlocutory order? Nothing. Moreover, as was shown, no measures were taken against those who examined Loshchenko's person and his health. One shouldn't be surprised then that errors which the military tribune has pointed out have also not been eliminated both there and at several other voyenkomats in Kirghiz.

Of course interlocutory orders don't always settle all the details of a violation. Those sent to the republic's military commission have basically contained information that people have been improperly inducted into the military service. And they could contain nothing more since the circumstances surrounding the errors allowed by the courts had not been investigated and the specific perpetrators had not been discovered. Lacking this the voyenkomat officials were certainly obliged to discover the reasons for the violations of law, but as practice shows, some of these reasons are covered up by the non-specific nature of the court decisions.

There are also cases where military tribunals are not trying to correctly react to interlocutory orders. They endure them and ... forget. They show "compliance" that is intolerable in such cases. I recall one interlocutory order from a military tribune in one of the garrisons that called the unit commander's attention to some shortcomings in the organization of his unit

administration and to the lack of necessary control over subordinates. There was no answer from the unit for several months. Instead there were indications of new violations which had occurred for the same reasons the court had warned the commander about. Clearly officials, including Captain V. Podovinnikov, were not paying the necessary attention to the court's decision. And what did the military tribunal do? It sent another interlocutory order to the commander. It should have sent the appropriate decision to the senior commander.

An interlocutory order from a court is a serious sign that there is trouble in a specific work section. Commanders and other officials must take all the necessary measures to eliminate the shortcomings indicated by the court. This is one of the conditions for avoiding relapses in the future and for further strengthening discipline and order.

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ARMED FORCES

MAJ GEN SIDOROV ON SVERDLOVSK VETERANS' AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Feb 85 p 1

[Article by Major General A. Sidorov: "On The Initiative of Deputies"]

[Text] Dear Editor

While meeting recently with a former fellow worker I heard that a special committee composed of people's deputies has been established in Sverdlovsk to work on veterans' affairs. I would like to know more about its work and would also like to know what specific tasks it is resolving.

Retired Lieutenant Colonel M. Gogolev

At the request of the editor, deputy of Sverdlovsk Oblast's Council of People's Deputies and deputy chairman of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs, oblast military commissar Major General A. Sidorov is responding to this question.

First here is one fact. In only the last few years 4500 invalids from the Patriotic War, many other front-liners and 7000 families of deceased soldiers in our oblast have improved their living conditions and have received new quarters. One would think that this fact speaks for itself. This very graphically shows the great care we have for our glorious veterans.

Making this concern yet more active and specific and keeping each veteran and every front-liner's family in view are the primary tasks of the Committee of deputies on Veterans' Affairs that was created at the oblispolkom. The committee is headed by a participant in the Great Patriotic War, general director of the Plastic manufacturing association P. Krivoruchkin. And committee member Hero of Soviet Labor worker N. Ufimtsev also trod the difficult frontal paths. Committee members also include young people such as bridge crane driver from the town of Krasnouralsk, Leninist Komsomol prize winner S. Poyedinshchikov.

The committee was created a little over a year ago but it has already accomplished a lot of good things. Where should we begin? With the fact that they decided to thoroughly analyze what sort of care there was for veterans

both in cities and in villages, whether their needs and demands were always completely understood and whether they always were operationally given the necessary help. Of course they included local soviet deputies in this work.

We all know how important it is in any work to do a good job in organizing the control and verification of its completion. Bringing contents of complaints to the notice of city and rayon soviet ispolkoms, we then strictly followed up on the measures that are adopted. At committee meetings we have regularly heard reports from leaders of the appropriate oblispolkom directorates and have gone to the indicated locations to verify completion of oblast soviet session resolutions and of our recommendations relating to veterans. And I must note that the results were not long in telling.

For example, recently the number of complaints about shortcomings in veterans' domestic services has noticeably diminished. In many of the oblast's cities and villages a system for receiving orders at home has been organized and the time for completing them has been accelerated. At our initiative special marks in the form of red triangles were introduced to strengthen control over front liner-customer receipts. For veterans living in rural locations, domestic services permit help in repairing and constructing living quarters, laying-in fuel for winter and tilling kitchen gardens.

A lot has also been done to improve veterans' health protection. A complete medical study is being done everywhere on invalids of the Patriotic War, many polyclinics and dispensaries have introduced signal cards which allow front-liners to receive treatment without waiting their turn, pharmacies are providing medicines and optics in an organized manner and trade facilities have been improved.

In short, there is a lot of major and important care. And now, as the preparations for the upcoming elections are in full swing, each of us deputies is strictly evaluating what has been accomplished. We will pass the baton of good deeds further on with satisfaction.

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ARMED FORCES

TRET'YAK ON CONTINUED RELEVANCE OF PAST COMBAT EXPERIENCE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Feb 85 p 2

[Article by General of the Army I. Tret'yak: "Front Line Experience"]

[Text] The youthful face of the lieutenant who did not immediately answer my question about why, during his service as an officer, he had read so few books on the historical development of tactics and operational art during the Great Patriotic War sticks in my memory. He first specified, "May I speak frankly, Comrade General of the Army?" "I am counting on frankness", I said, laying down the terms. In stating his views, the lieutenant said, "I suggest that these books hold more cognitive interest than practical interest to us. Actually very little from the tactics of the First World War and the civil war proved useful to us during the Great Patriotic War. And during our time the character of war has changed even more and new tactics have qualitatively taken shape."

I thanked my interlocutor for his frankness and said that I understood and would not condemn him for being categorical, as that was a characteristic of youth, but that I could not share his views on the role and significance of the post-war experiences in military art.

I remember the front-line years, the lessons of the war and from time to time the severe trials and the commanders on whom we, the young officers, modeled ourselves. I come to the conclusion that the new always springs up from the foundation of a past experience and is inseparably linked with it. In order to create and courageously go along unbeaten paths you must enrich yourself with the legacy of the older generation and must regard it very carefully and attentively. And military science and practice are not exempt from this rule.

I was already a battalion commander when Colonel A. Stuchenko was assigned as the commander of our 29th Guards Rifle Division in 1943. Andrey Trofimov had spent his whole life associated with cavalry and he had started the war as a cavalryman. He had participated in the legendary raid on the enemy rear at Moscow as a cavalry regimental commander.

By 1943 it was clear to everyone that horse cavalry had limited capabilities against large, mechanized enemy forces. And one would think that along with cavalry itself, the tactics associated with cavalry would become part of the

past, of history, forever. If one had taken the position of the young officer whose conversation was cited above, one could easily brush aside the major pre-war developments in cavalry tactics, saying that they were old, the science of yesterday.

Colonel Stuchenko was in no hurry to part with the experience he had acquired in the saddle. Employing cavalry tactics he used envelopments and flanking movements against the enemy, carried out daring raids in the enemy rear, set ambushes for the enemy, etc. Of course he took into account the qualitative changes that had taken place in armaments, the organizational structure of forces and their increased capabilities. He finished the Great Patriotic War as a corps commander.

The experience acquired in the fire of the Great Patriotic War has enormous, eternal value. This is our property, our military arsenal, the significance of which is not lessening with time. USSR Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union S. L. Sokolov stresses, "Only by a thorough analysis of the interdependence of the past and the present can one establish the dialectic continuity in military affairs and, using that as a foundation, creatively improve upon it and elevate it to a new qualitative level". Front-line experience is taken into account in every field manual regulation, the directions and requirements of which form the foundation of military training organization. And our combined-arms manuals which regulate the service and life of personnel are permeated with front-line experience. Front-line experience has had and continues to have a strong influence on party-political work.

I often have to visit our forces. I know many junior commanders in the regimental group and I follow their development and growth with interest. I value the chance to visit exercises and I am happy when I catch sight of a front-line trait in the actions of this or that commander.

The regiment commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Grigor'yev went into battle on infantry fighting vehicles. The regiment's mission was to break through the line that was successfully defended by the "enemy". The position, terrain and character of the defensive line which the defenders had strengthened was, as the saying goes, against the regiment and made its mission more difficult. And Lieutenant Colonel Grigor'yev's decision had to be made literally on the move. Motorized riflemen attacked the forward edge after a heavy artillery preparation. The attack was clearly not in the "Grigor'yev" style. Only two companies took part in the attack and their actions lacked the dash and unstoppability without which an attack is not an attack. One got the idea that the motor riflemen did not hope to overcome this line.

By that time I already knew Yuriy Ivanovich Grigor'yev. I knew him as a skillful commander, a man with a strong bent of character and strong will which allowed him to make rational decisions in the most difficult situations. What stirred him to act this way? I became very annoyed. Why in the end result had only insignificant forces attacked the "enemy" and where were the rest of the companies and battalions? I decided to ask the commander himself these questions.

I was told that Lieutenant Colonel Grigor'yev was not in the initial position. Where was he? A staff officer spread his hands, "He disappeared along with the rest of the battalions. This is taiga country. He disappeared like a needle in a haystack". I thought, "Nothing like a needle". Two motorized rifle battalions, an tank battalion, a specialized subunit... So much equipment. This "needle" has a hundred disclosing "threads". I assigned the mission of finding the regiment's location.

A little later people from an airborne helicopter reported that the regiment had shown itself. It showed itself deep in the "enemy" rear area by destroying a missile subunit at its locations and by capturing command posts. An hour and a half went by and the regiment broke through the "enemy" defense with a powerful thrust from the rear area and completed its combat mission.

After the exercise we sat over a map and determined the regiment's routes to the defender's rear area. If you discounted the blue veins of brooks and streams, there was continuous green on the map. "The openings that have been just recently made are still not on the map", explained Lieutenant Colonel Grigor'yev. "Scouts marked them on my map."

The front-line precepts "don't jump into any attack," "respect maneuver," and "do not fear reasonable risk" were formed in the heat of battle and these inspired Lieutenant Colonel Grigor'yev.

Military training in the regiment was arranged so that every theme was addressed twice, once in light of the demands of today's military science and once in light of Great Patriotic War experiences. Officers were given the opportunity to compare, sift out the obsolete and creatively develop those things that which retained their topicality. The professional training process used such methods for teaching the history of war and military art as preparing papers on military historical issues, discussing topical documentary films, artistic and training films, meeting with Armed Forces veterans and holding scientific conferences dedicated to the most important events of war. Historical parallels in the conceptual development of tactical training and field exercise were also discussed often. I am speaking in the past tense because today another commander is organizing the aforementioned work, for officer Yu. Grigor'yev has been promoted to another position.

There are also many instructive things in the creative use of frontal experience in the practice of the Guards four-time award winning tank regiment commanded by Guards Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Antonov. I will quote one example. The regiment was preparing for its next exercise and at the same time an incessant rainfall began. One day the commander gathered the officers in the club.

He addressed those present, saying, "Now comrades, we will watch a documentary training film on the operations of the 6th Tank Army during that time of year when the roads are bad and also in conditions where there were no roads. I ask that you pay attention to the fact that much that you see will prove useful to us while we prepare for the exercise. Moreover you will see the early years of your own regiment."

All the personnel in the unit watched the film later. And when the face of the regimental front-line commander came up on the screen and the formation of brother-soldiers paying their last respects to those who had fallen in battle appeared, the hall stood without the command and froze with emotion. I should add that during the exercise the Guards-tankers operated in a front-line manner and completed their mission at the excellent level under unfavorable weather conditions.

This unit has become accustomed to and is effectively using a form of work called "Meeting The Front-line Day". Commanders and political workers tell personnel what kind of day front-liners had (including their brother-soldiers) exactly forty years ago. The material is drawn from front-line press and memoirs. When possible, participants of battles are invited as guests, although this is difficult to do in remote garrisons.

The main thing is that the regiment in which 21 Heroes of the Soviet Union were trained and which has Guards Senior Lieutenant N. Lebedev enrolled forever on the list of the first tank company is multiplying its military glory in a worthy manner.

Unfortunately the concept of "aligning on front-liners" is still not really totally understood everywhere. Some units have excellent front-line traditions and carry high awards from the Motherland on their Combat Banners, but the results of their military and political training put them in the "middle" and even among those lagging behind. For example, for me the Guards tank regiment commanded by Guards Lieutenant Colonel N. Kholokh fits this model exactly. I had the occasion to command this unit for some time during the Great patriotic War. Its personnel had many heroic achievements to their credit. And how it hurts me to realize that today the tankers are not sparkling with skill. Many of them do not know the military history of the unit or its traditions. There can only be one conclusion -- the regimental commander and his assistant for political affairs Guards Major N. Tarasov are not doing everything they can to indoctrinate subordinates in the spirit of the responsibility of belonging to the Soviet Guard.

As in other units, this unit employs many indoctrinational measures, but they are not reinforced with organizational work.

I compare many of my present observations to front-line reality. Often when doing this I feel proud, but sometimes there are grounds for meditation. During many exercises, for example, subunits operating independently from the main force lose their way and stray into unfamiliar territory. The reason for this is that the commander cannot read a map and is not able to work with one. Senior chiefs look at this in a condescending manner, saying that time will come and they will learn. But I remember one day when our battalion command-observation point was cut off from our main forces. When the Hitlerites detected this, they decided to capture it. We had to call in artillery fire on our position. We got the order to withdraw along a narrow strip of rye, along a distinctive "corridor", which the artillerymen promised to leave for us. Then Major V. Shuvalov calculated the initial firing data and the corrections. We understood that if he made even a one mil error it would cost us our lives. Shuvalov did not make a mistake. Not a single fragment flew

into the strip of rye. The Hitlerites were suddenly cut up by explosions from artillery rounds.

In trying to understand the work of battle organization done by commanders in the battalion and regimental group, at time one notices a certain ease and simplification. This is especially evident during field work. At times the commander's reconnaissance resembles a stroll. No matter how it was allotted, we front-line commanders always had little time to prepare for battle, and especially for offensive operations. We painstakingly specified the results of our observation, worked on the final target reconnaissance and studied the enemy to the last firing point in his position. Command exercises on scaled terrain mock-ups or as they said then, on sand tables, were usual. We got to the point where each of the subunit commanders and staff officers could mentally sculpt the terrain that was held by the enemy and was inaccessible for visual observation.

Certainly combat reality forces any commander to seriously work at preparing combat operations. But today are we not losing some capabilities for improving command and organizational skills?

It is very evident that we must not pattern the experience of war, but must use it creatively, taking into account that some of the many operational-tactical norms and methods for organizing a firing assault and combat formations and conducting an attack or a defense that were used during those years are no longer suitable for modern conditions. But the approach to resolving operational-tactical missions and the ability to train troops to resolve specific combat missions never becomes obsolete.

Front-line experience teaches that we must use every way possible to fight against the phenomena which have the generalized names of indulgence and simplification. The efforts of commanders, political agencies and party and Komsomol organizations must be united in this effort. A well thought-out, creative analysis of the experience of the Great Patriotic War provides us with the key for resolving many of today's problems, opens perspectives for tomorrow and allows us to recognize the objective trends in the development of military affairs more distinctly.

Developing such an approach to studying and instilling front-line experience in military cadres would be a major contribution to increasing the combat readiness of major units and units and would allow us to meet the 40th Anniversary of Great Victory and the 27th CPSU Congress with high indicators.

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GROUND FORCES

AIRBORNE RECONNAISSANCE UNIT TRAINING DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Jan 85 p 1

[Article by Capt S. Tyukin, Red Flag Black Sea Fleet: "On Reconnaissance"]

[Text] In less than 30 seconds the marines had exited the An-12 aircraft. The parachute canopies were quickly floating in the air and the reconnaissance group commander, Sr Lt O. Brey, hoped that they would not be spotted from the ground. There were only a few reconnaissance men. One ambush would be enough to make it impossible for the group to accomplish its mission. But if they could remain undetected....

The mission assigned to the reconnaissance men was simple: locate an artillery battalion in the "enemy" defense, report its coordinates and if possible interdict it during the assault landing.

After landing Sr Lt Brey quickly led the reconnaissance men toward the area they were directed to cover. When they finally decided to rest after many kilometers, their uniforms were saturated with sweat. Everyone was breathing hard and fast. The group commander unhurriedly watched them, comparing his ideas about the men with this first trial during today's parachute jump into the enemy rear. Character, habits, virtues and deficiencies -- reconnaissance men, especially the commander, must know everything about one another. The commander had already decided that Sgt Yu. Zhukovskiy and Sr Seaman A. Donets should be assigned to the patrol. The former, the group deputy commander, is precise, efficient, and wary. He is a USSR candidate Master of Sports in Sambo [Russian unarmed self-defense] and is also capable of quickly analyzing the situation when he is not on the mat. Even on patrol no unexpected situation could arise which would throw him. The second is the company Komsomol organization secretary, the soul of the collective, and a first-class track and field athlete who is always cool and collected.

The patrolmen got up and moved out. The others moved out behind them maintaining visual contact. Some of the terrain was open and in some places the marines had to move in short rushes and in others they had to crawl. Everyone was concerned about one thing--making no mistakes in selecting a route to move quickly to the area indicated by air reconnaissance. The commander glanced at his watch; there wasn't much time. There could be no false starts.

It was time to change the patrol. The officer gave the signal. Now Seaman A. Volkov, a candidate for Master of Sports in Judo, would be in front, even though the more experienced Seaman A. Mart'yanov would be senior to him.

A look at the map and a look at the terrain. It's as is there were no fatigue. The outskirts of the village which they had to approach appeared. The subordinates understood the commander without a word: Move to the target. Here each meter took special effort. They had to see everything, but not be seen themselves. And actually the "enemy," perhaps, had stumbled over their trail which would mean that they were looking for them or maybe would be waiting for them.

Soon it became clear to the reconnaissance men that there actually was an artillery battalion deployed in this area. Encrypted information was radioed to the assault command post. But more complete data was necessary -- they had to move closer to the "enemy" positions.

Suddenly the patrolmen dropped to the ground and quickly crawled into some bushes. The group dropped to the ground, too. Two dark green vehicles emerged from around the corner of the barely visible road. Sr Lt Brey determined that they were staff vehicles.

"This is what we need," -- this was the thought that flashed through his mind. Then doubt immediately set in. "Is it really? Everything is too simple."

The vehicles crawled slowly along the bumpy road. Everyone waited for the commander's decision which was: The vehicles must be "destroyed." Zhukovskiy, Volkov, and Mart'yanov were dispatched from the main group with a grenade launcher.

The remaining group led by Sr Lt O. Brey moved rapidly toward the village using the terrain for concealment. The reconnaissance men again radioed with precise information on the battalion's position. The first part of the mission was accomplished. How best to accomplish the second?

The terrain was open, and they could not allow themselves to be detected, otherwise the "enemy" would simply destroy the group. All the same there is no such thing as a mission that cannot be accomplished. It requires only the proper, at time creative, approach. Of course, the commander and the whole group had previously rehearsed and had played possible variants, but everything could not be foreseen. This is even true during reconnaissance to obtain more reliable data about unknown "enemy" dispositions.

The group commander made final coordination with the reconnaissance men. They prepared a withdrawal demonstration which would be concealed by a smoke screen at the proper moment. The "enemy" would surely rush there. But the reconnaissance group would withdraw to a covered section of the village and on through a swampy area.

The wind lifted the smoke cloud and carried it into the village, and by using it and hiding behind buildings and bushes, the reconnaissance men rushed to the area where the staff vehicles were located. Sr Lt Brey gave the signal, and at the same time Nazarov's assault rifle barked there was a grenade explosion, and hardly had the security unit rushed to that side when thick smoke screen clouds began to move over the ground.

The "enemy" took the bait and seconds after rushing through the smoke screen, the marines were gone. The Sr Lt's plan was working.

They met with Sgt Zhukovskiy's group in the swamp. They had prepared to cover their comrades' withdrawal.

The reconnaissance men did not have to withdraw far. The steel wave of the attacking assault was about to spout from the sea onto the shore. Of course, a reconnaissance group cannot be compared with an avalanche. Nevertheless, reconnaissance men can accomplish a great deal in the "enemy" rear. Innumerable examples of their valor during the Great Patriotic War testify to this.

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GROUND FORCES

NEW TECHNOLOGY REQUIRES CHANGES IN ARTILLERY TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Feb 85 p 2

[Article by Colonel V. Zababurin, staff officer for the Red Banner Odessa Military District: "With Yesterday's Model"]

[Text] It seemed that the artillery battalion commanded by Major P. Kozlov recently had to get used to self-propelled guns that were new to them. There was a lot of training and the crews repeatedly went to the firing range where they used their weapons in difficult tactical situations.

All of this left a mark on the specialized training of the artillery men. They clearly completed all the procedures, quickly made the necessary calculations and reported that they were ready to open fire within the time limits. The chief of the artillery regiment, Lieutenant Colonel V. Pirogov, and the battalion commander, Major P. Kozlov, calmly and confidently managed the subunits. And the training, which I was assigned to monitor, on the whole was well organized. And yet...

The more I tried to grasp the course of the exercise, the more I became convinced that the artillery men were sticking to methods which they had used when they had wheeled howitzers in their arsenal. And this methodology does not fit the requirements of the new equipment and is becoming ways for reducing the effectiveness of the exercise.

The artillery men even selected the firing position for the battery without taking into account the fact that the new artillery system has an angle of elevation that is greater than their former howitzer. Combat vehicles were deployed on the plains although the terrain would have allowed them to be hidden in folds. Officers literally forgot that battalion maneuverability had increased sharply and that the self-propelled weapons allowed them to change firing positions quickly and avoid return fire. One could recall the front-line experience of guards mortar subunits which would fire and quickly displace to a new location.

But the primary shortcoming of the training was the fact that it was not linked to tactics. Exercises were worked out that were characteristic of the old equipment: the artillery battery suppresses an "enemy" at a distance of 6-6 kilometers into its defensive depth. But now the artillery men were also

able to destroy mobile "enemy" reserves at a great distance from the forward edge of battle.

By the way, those training had a scornful attitude toward the "enemy". During the exercise they did not use means for camouflaging and shelters were not set up for personnel. The artillery men came out of their combat vehicles, forgetting about their helmets and personal weapons. Unfortunately the commanders of the firing platoons and batteries also did not set the example.

Several instances during the exercise caused some surprise. We all know that each battery has a command-staff vehicle that is equipped with communications equipment and all the instruments necessary to provide fire, including an EVM [computer]. This equipment was not used to anything near its capabilities.

For example, battery commander Captain A. Duliyenko decided not to use his equipment at all. He left his combat vehicle and controlled his battery by voice. In other words, he preferred the means for command and control that he had gotten used to at the time he commanded a howitzer battery. He had no faith in his radio.

Some time earlier in another unit I had to visit training which was led by Lieutenant Colonel A. Skrypnikov. This training also did not consider the increased capabilities of the equipment. On-board equipment was used in an unskillful manner. And what does that lead to ?

During the course of tactical training the battery commanded by Captain V. Shevchishin displaced after the attacking motorized rifle subunits. As prescribed, the commander was located in the command-staff vehicle whose equipment allowed him to observe the battlefield and conduct effective reconnaissance. Nonetheless, every time there was a short stop Captain Shevchishin set up a dismounted observation point using a rangefinder. This required more time to prepare data and subunits did not always get timely support.

I asked the officer why he did not use the on-board instruments in the command vehicle. He answered that he was more used to the earlier methods and thus found them more reliable.

This is a psychological problem. Earlier the officer thoroughly knew everything that the subunit had in its inventory and was able to use the equipment skillfully. Now he had more complicated equipment at his disposal. Until this equipment is mastered, man involuntarily gravitates to the habitual and thus the more familiar methods of military work.

The new equipment requires a higher level of overall technical training for officers and sergeants. Now it is important for weapons commanders and drivers to know the principles of radio engineering and radio electronic equipment. As practice shows, there are few planned exercises to acquire this knowledge. We must develop nets of technical societies and other forms of training.

There is also another issue. Do those people who come to units to inspect always occupy the correct position? We representatives of senior staff at times are unjustifiably condescending to those who are inspecting. We argue in this way: people reform and this requires time, so we should not judge them on a strict scale. This position dampens personnel and gives rise to vaccinations. At the same time life convinces one that if one has a serious attitude toward business, then the new equipment can be assimilated in a compressed timeframe and can be mastered completely. At recent tactical exercises, for example, battery commanders Captains A. Lisovoy and Yu. Ozherel'yev, who were assimilating the new equipment along with their subordinates, showed good skills.

Equipment is changing. And the requirements for the time and quality of its mastery are changing. The experience of those foremost individuals, the right flank people, is convincing: there are many untapped resources in this important matter. Look for them and put them in the service of combat readiness -- the mission for both those who "relearn" and for those who go out into units with the responsible mission of inspecting.

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CSO: 1801/161

GROUND FORCES

BATTALION DELAYS TANK FIRING EXERCISE FOR MONTHS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Feb 85 p 1

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel N. Fedoseyev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Red Banner Siberian Military District: "A Stroll On The Firing Range"]

[Text] While at the headquarters of a motorized rifle regiment I expressed an interest in whether there would be field exercises that day. I was told, "There are and they are very important exercises. A tank battalion has gone out to fire."

I hurried to the range along with political worker Major G. Fesenko. We supposed that firing was already in full swing. However, battalion commander Major Yu. Spesivtsev met us with, "We will begin firing after lunch. The lifts are snow-bound and we are clearing them".

There are often snow storms in these regions. One could have learned to arrange things in such a way as to waste as little time as possible clearing the moving target gunnery range and to plan at a time when firing is impossible.

People in the battalion were really working at secondary issues but we were convinced that this was purely improvisation. Sergeant A. Portnyagin was leading a group of tankers in firing theory training and he was simply reading aloud from one of the chapters in the tank gunnery manual.

In his defense he said, "I have not prepared for this class for I was assigned this mission ten minutes ago."

According to the exercise training schedule company commander V. Khusainov was supposed to conduct this training, but he was sent as vehicle commander to situate subunits for lunch. No one ever explained exactly why he was the one who had to do this.

The exercise at the adjacent training site was also listless. For platoon commander Lieutenant S. Peretok, who had just been called up from the reserves, much of this training was a novelty. He could not be torn away from the normative lists and the descriptions of the ways for completing them.

"Yes, today is not going well for the tankers," unhappily stated Major Fesenko. "Maybe firing will make them happy."

No, firing didn't make them happy. Firing began a little later than planned. The snow had already been cleared but the tanks could not complete the exercise -- they were short one tank.

Lieutenant Colonel A. Kuleshov, an officer from a senior staff who had come to the range to act as controller recognized with annoyance, "There is a discrepancy." He explained that the tank had not been filled with anti-freeze and the depot chief had been somewhere on business since morning. Finally a tank showed up and firing began.

One run took place, then a second and a third... No one could get above a satisfactory rating. Some gunners were totally unable to cope with the exercise. Even the most experienced tankers who were to complete their service obligation in spring felt uncertain behind their sights. The battalion commander even allowed crew commander Junior Sergeant D. Antonov to do the exercise twice and both times the latter returned frustrated: there were not enough hits for a rating of good.

The battalion commander confessed, "They have not fired for quite a long time and have lost their skills and confidence".

Trying to decipher this mysterious "for quite a long time", I was surprised to discover that the last time the battalion's tankers had completed train firing had been in August of 1984.

Major Spesivtsev explained the situation. "Here is what happened. The battalion was not held responsible for the final evaluation in the fall. They did not go to the range in the new training year because of the unit's distance from the training center. Then there was unfavorable weather and details."

What reasons! The tankers had not completed the train fire exercise for almost six months and this didn't excite anyone in the battalion or on the regimental staff. And the party organization missed that fact. Can one seriously discuss the qualitative mastery of equipment and weapons under such conditions?

Not only the modest results of firing, but also the numerous breakdowns during the exercise became clear. In fact, the firing instructor had to put down his microphone and run to crews. Sergeants and soldiers were unable to work their radio sets.

During the exercise gunners often exchanges "courtesies" and shot at other people's targets. It is clear why. They had lost the habit of observing the battle field.

The concept of train fire is to analyze the completion of a fire mission by each crew, note the positive areas, uncover the gaps in knowledge and skills and prompt crews on how to eliminate them. In this case none of this took

place. The battalion commander was striving for one thing -- to "pass" as many firers as possible.

Not able to give any meaning to the results of daylight firing, subunit personnel set out for night firing. The earlier shortcomings were still there. During the exercise I didn't see even a timid attempt to organize competition among the firers or to use visual propaganda methods to show the results .

The battalion commander agreed with my conclusions. "You can't expect perfection on the first try, but you don't expect disaster. We will rest for a couple of hours and fire again. We will make up for our negligence."

Leaving the range, I thought that such measures do not make up for negligence. Train firing for tankers is not measured by the number of rounds they expend. It depends on the quality and regularity of tank fire training and on well-organized, planned firing. Strolls on the firing range do not increase skills.

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GROUND FORCES

MEETING ENGAGEMENT REQUIRES ENERGETIC APPROACH BY COMMANDER

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Feb 62 p 2

[Article by Guards Lieutenant Colonel A. Penzyakov, Guards tank regimental commander, Southern Group of Forces: "The Energy Of the Attack"]

[Text] The episode I am going to relate occurred not long ago during two-sided tactical training. It turned out that the advanced guard subunits of the opposing sides met in a duel on terrain that allowed the tanks to effective use direct fire. Thus the meeting engagement immediately took on the character of a firing duel.

In general, for the personnel of the tank battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel A. Zubarev who were operating in the regiment's first echelon, fighting a battle under these conditions was normal. Understanding that so much now depends on the outcome of the fire fight between the sides, Guards Lieutenant Colonel Zubarev, just as other subunit commanders, puts special attention on his tankers' fire training. And naturally direct firing at high speeds has a deserving place in their training.

And yet initially the situation did not favor the tankers. The enemy's advanced guard subunits stopped the point of the vanguard from deploying into a favorable position. Would Guards Lieutenant Colonel Zubarev be able to deal with the forces and means that he had so that his battalion would come out the victor in the battle under conditions unfavorable to them? This question excited everyone who was at the command point at that moment. Certainly we also intently followed the actions of Guards Senior Lieutenant A. Petrochenkov, commander of the company assigned to the GPZ [point of vanguard].

Meanwhile the situation on the battlefield was quickly changing. The situation became really aggravated when Guards Senior Lieutenant Petrochenkov decisively attacked the "enemy" from the march. The attack was so impressive that the commander of the opposing side's mobile defense took the vanguard as the main battalion force and couldn't make up his mind to continue the attack.

After receiving information from Guards Senior Lieutenant Petrochenkov about the "enemy's" confusion and the fact that the enemy had concentrated his forces and equipment on one line, Guards Lieutenant Colonel Zubarev ordered

the commander of the attached artillery battalion to open fire on the accumulation of infantry combat vehicles and tanks. He then reinforced the fire capabilities on the opposing advanced guard yet again by moving an anti-tank and an artillery unit forward. While the enemy was repulsing the onslaught along his front, a motorized rifle company attached to the battalion outflanked him.

I will not go further into the details of this battle. I will only say that the decisiveness of the point of vanguard commander and his timely support with all types of fire found at the disposal of the battalion commander did their part. The energy of the attack was stronger than the attempts of the opposing side to hold onto a favorable position.

The energy of the attack... Watching the actions of the subunit at this exercise, I involuntarily remembered another episode. One of the primary players in it once again was Zubarev, then only a major.

"Look how slow he is. You can wring such a speed from tanks, but the company is barely crawling," the regimental chief of staff who was observing the battalion's movement along with me said indignantly. Zubarev's slowness was really puzzling. I tried to encourage the battalion commander by radio, I demanded that he increase his speed. And for an answer I got the impassive "I understand; 'Sokol-3' is receiving."

"He understands nothing," in a temper noted the chief of staff who had heard our conversation. And indeed the companies continued their movement literally at a turtle's pace. It was clear that the battalion would not be able to reach the indicated line at the designated time in an organized manner. We had to hold up the attack.

After reading this, some front-liner would surely be surprised. "An attack with interruptions!" And I, a regimental commander, now have a difficult time recalling such a thing. Then too, of course, we did not want to halt, but training is training. In order not to burn up fuel and ammunition in vain, we had to look into why the attack lacked the energy without which there cannot be success in modern battle.

And this is what had happened. It turned out that Zubarev had seen that one of his companies was lagging behind and had begun to even up his combat line. Naturally someone had to slow up and as a result the motion in a number of sections stopped and it stopped being a harmonious, swift attack. The attached motorized rifle and artillery subunits dropped out of the battalion commander's field of vision and at the same time he lost radio contact with them. And the battalion commander for some reason had forgotten about other communications means that had been proven in front-line experience.

Officers in regimental headquarters had a lot to think about after this event. In particular, they had to think about how to elevate the level of professional training for subunit commanders and how to attain a practical tenor to their training. We saw one of the ways for resolving this task as making the command training as close as possible to real battle conditions.

This turned out to be difficult. The organizational discrepancies which had arisen in connection with the fact that we had to correct the command training plan by considering training lessons and the increased requirements on them hindered not only the various branches. We also had to overcome difficulties of another type, those associated with overcoming outdated views and with the adherence of some subunit commanders and chiefs of branches of services to stereotyping in military art.

I remember how during one of the officers' exercises conducted in accordance with the command training plan, they had to criticize battalion commander Guards Lieutenant Colonel A. Chernavin. This officer (he is now serving at a new location) had not bothered to search for nonstandard solutions and for the most effective ways for employing the forces and equipment that he had at his disposal. He had also acted in an unsophisticated manner and without guile. Moreover, having yielded to the temptation to be strong along his whole front, he committed all his reserves to the battle in the first few minutes of the attack, so there was no way to develop the energy of the attack.

To the battalion commander's credit, he accepted the criticism correctly and after that, just as with Guards Lieutenant Colonel Zubarev, he began to have a more serious attitude toward his own professional growth. I stress this because there are those among you unit commanders who feel that it is difficult or simply impossible to surprise an officer at the rank of lieutenant colonel with tactical innovations. You say that they have a lot of experience and a thorough tactical outlook. But it is primarily this experience that convinces me that improving the ability to organize military operations must be constant. If you weaken training efforts for only a short time and rely on old baggage, you can seriously fall behind and become stiff in your views. We try to inspire this idea in every officer. In the battle against stereotypical reactions and the adherence to old, standard methods for organizing a battle we are relying on front-line experience which proves that those who surprise the enemy with novelty, the unexpected and with energetic actions and military cunning are the ones who will achieve success.

By the way, addressing front-line experience at the aforementioned command exercise also helped very much to turn Guards Lieutenant Colonel Chernavin face to face with tactics. In the regiment's history there is an episode where a battalion fought under the command of Guards Major A. Ivanov. The battalion attacked a populated point that was strongly defended by fascists. The plan was to attack with tanks on the flank that was most vulnerable according to reconnaissance information, where the enemy had quickly spread his weapons. But during the attack Guards Major Ivanov unexpectedly gave the order to the first echelon companies to sharply change their direction and to attack an area of the village where the fascists had concentrated the largest amount of troops and military equipment. The maneuver relied on suddenness, the high speed and fire power of our 34's and, certainly, on the skill of the tankers. The battalion commander was not mistaken -- the battalion won the battle.

I related this episode from the regiment's combat chronicles to the officers without any special remarks, as they were not necessary. Each of them, including Guards Lieutenant Colonel Chernavin in my opinion, understood where

the commander was headed. In any event, the people's attitudes toward the various types of indulgences and simplifications in military training became entirely different from what they had been. Yes, and the actions of Guards Lieutenant Colonel Zubarev and his subordinates at the last exercise, as related above, also says a lot. The battalion is now viewed as being much better than it was earlier.

I am not convinced that Guards Lieutenant Colonel Zubarev was blameless in this training battle. At times he was not persistent enough in carrying his idea to fruition and he also did not display enough ability in organizing close coordination.

In the two-sided training we received a number of other positive lessons. In particular, it turned out that not all crews were able to destroy targets with the first round at maximum range. Not all driver-mechanics could confidently drive their vehicles in a column and the reason for this was easy to find. After looking at the military training report books for the first company, for example, we were convinced that half of the planned tank force training was not held for a month of winter training. From time to time some subunits held exercises in the tank park under simplified conditions.

And as we all know, the energy of the attack is based primarily on the skills of personnel. There is still a lot we have to do to raise the technical and tactical-firing training of subunits to the required heights. The references for our growth in this area are clearly marked in the plans and in socialist commitments.

There is also a lot we must do to improve the coordination of the various forces and means. A tank regiment is the basic combined-arms tactical and administrative element in armor forces and it is a very complicated organism, the most complicated technical complex. Everything in it is interdependent. And everything must be in adjustment.

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GROUND FORCES

EDITORIAL: PROBLEMS WITH NIGHT TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Feb 85 p 1

[Editorial: "Night Training"]

[Text] The history of the Great Patriotic War has many clear examples that show that one of the decisive factors in achieving victory in battle is the ability of troops and naval forces to operate at night. Under modern conditions, when the outcome of battle depends more and more on which side has the element of surprise and on the ability of units and ships to have an uninterrupted influence on the enemy, the significance of night training is growing immeasurably. It is therefore totally understandable that resolving missions associated with its improvement is the subject of special concern for commanders and staffs.

We know that the increased technical equipment level of troops and naval forces, the presence of effective night vision devices, illumination, radar and other means reduces the unfavorable influence that the hours of darkness have on military operations. But even with all of this, night command and control of units and ships, their interaction and the development of measures to eliminate the consequences of the enemy's use of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction are becoming significantly more complicated. In the dark it is more difficult to conduct aimed fire, to get oriented and to maneuver and the physical and psychological load on personnel increases. All of this must be considered when organizing night training.

This is exactly what is happening for example in a North Caucasus Military District unit. The ability to get oriented in varied terrain at night, to move on an azimuth, make a reconnaissance, effectively use illumination and light signals, equipment and weapons, to interact with aviation -- these and other tasks associated with training personnel for operating under conditions of limited visibility are constantly at the center of attention of the unit commander, staff and party committee. There is good reason for the fact that many subunits here are noted for the excellent training and psychological and physical tempering of their soldiers. At a recent exercise the artillery battery commanded by Captain A. Kishchuk completed a difficult military training mission in the mountains. The artillery men had to overcome rocky spurs, cross a water barrier and fire into defensive positions, all at night. Despite all the difficulties the mission was completed at a high level and in time.

Unfortunately there are other type examples and these show that in some locations indulgences and simplifications are allowed in the night training of personnel, that exercises and training are conducted without taking into account the character of modern battle and the requirements of advanced methods. Such shortcomings in particular are found in the battalion commanded by Guards Major V. Dudin and in several other subunits of the Guards motorized Tamansk Division imeni M. I. Kalinin. Many of the specialists here are not trained to fire and drive during the hours of darkness either with night vision devices or without them and many officers do not have solid skills in organizing a night battle and in controlling subunits and their fire.

As winter military training is showing, individual subunits are poorly trained for night marches and transportation, and especially when enemy aviation and airborne elements and reconnaissance and sabotage groups are operating or the enemy is using weapons of mass destruction. On many ships the results of night artillery firing were lower than daylight firing. And there are places where the required attention is not being put on developing issues, transitioning from daylight operations to night and vice versa and organizing repair and recovery work at night. Some commanders do not really know regulations from field manuals and other documents regulating the sequence of their work in organizing and conducting night battle and they find having to operate in the dark while separated from the main force and independently resolve military, technical and rear area support missions difficult. All of this means that increasing the level of night training is inseparably linked with the further improvement of professional officer skills. We must therefore more actively use the various methods of command training and frontal experience toward these goals.

As is known, one of the most important issues in training for night battle is organizing unit cooperation. In order to clearly coordinate the actions of the various forces and means taking part in an exercise, the commander must thoroughly know their combat capabilities, the means and peculiarities of using them under various conditions and must make the necessary calculations quickly. Much also depends on his ability to guarantee secrecy to the preparations for night operations and to organize their illumination support, using artillery, aviation and other combat means for this. Naturally this presupposes the constant readiness of artillery men and aviators to complete illumination missions and target marking missions for motorized and armor subunits.

Along with improving officer skills, we must also be very concerned with increasing the level of methodological training for junior commanders. We must more carefully prepare the sessions held for them, their instructor-methodological and display exercises and training and instruction and must more strictly control independent methodological preparation for instructors, help them and equip them with the foremost experience. The experience of organizing and conducting a night battle in the mountains, the desert, on the taiga and tundra and in other difficult geographical and climactic conditions is especially valuable for those who train and indoctrinate personnel.

Factors such as military coordination, organization and the discipline of personnel also take on special significance in a night battle, be it offensive or defensive, an operation on the sea or in the air. In the process of training soldiers we must indoctrinate them with high moral-military qualities, psychological stability and the ability to sustain significant physical loads by using all the tenors of army life.

Party-political work must be directed toward educating personnel with the feeling of extreme vigilance, bravery and readiness to operate under any conditions of modern battle. Commanders, political agencies and party and Komsomol organizations must show special care for the political security of night exercises and training and must make stricter demands on those who underrate their significance and allow weakening and simplifications in military training. We must constantly strive to reach the point where communists and Komsomol members provide a personal example in mastering the skills of operating in night battle.

The persistent improvement of night training for troops and naval forces is one of the reliable routes to the new heights in combat readiness planned in the competition for a worthy meeting for the 40th Anniversary of Victory and the 27th CPSU Congress.

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AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

MILITARY TRANSPORT TRAINING FLIGHT IN POOR WEATHER DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Feb 85 p 1

[Article by Colonel A. Andryushkov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Take Off For The 40th"]

[Text] Dense snow fell at night and the aviators had not seen such snowfall since the beginning of winter. Although the duty meteorologist confidently stated that the weather would not change for the near future and that a powerful cyclone was standing over us, Guards Major General of Aviation I. Koziy was in no hurry to give the "stand down" order to the flight shift. Experience made him feel that better meteorological conditions had to start soon.

And actually the snowfall stopped at dawn. Special vehicles went over the landing strip (VPP) and scraped the concrete strips to a dark polish.

"This is the weather we need," the general's blue eyes laughed. Koziy did not hide his satisfaction that he had correctly guessed the weather and that today aviators would improve their skills.

"This is the weather we need." I involuntarily repeated Koziy's words to myself after glancing at a sky that had continuous cloud cover. The lower edge of the cloud cover was uneven and individual tendrils seemed to sag to the earth. Visibility hardly allowed one to see the middle of the VPP. I thought, "The general is joking. How can we fly in this?"

"We will begin work at the first minimum and then we'll see," Iosif Ivanovich said.

This flight version is considered the most difficult in aviation. Completing a mission under such conditions is within the power of only experienced aviators. Guards Major General of Aviation Koziy is a first-class pilot, able to fly day or night in minimum weather.

From afar the silver-blue Il-76 resembles a large albatross with flapping wings. Up close the airplane affects one with the severe finish of its lines, but one feels in its elegance the terrible power of a combat machine. This airplane was set up for the airborne assault load variation.

I climbed along the steep rungs, literally along the aircraft ladder and into the cockpit behind the general. Below us on the "first level" of the aircraft navigator Colonel V. Sergeyev settled into the nose section. He had at his disposal the sighting pilot-navigational complex and the complicated on-board computer system, the "brains" of the aircraft, or as they jokingly call it in military transport aviation, the "piano" (this had to be because of the numerous keys on the control board).

"Crew. Report on flight readiness!" The general took the left seat, the command seat. Military pilot 1st class Colonel V. Popov took the right seat. Today he was checking Koziy's technical proficiency to give the general clearance to fly solo in the most difficult weather conditions, the first weather minimum. Between them bent over the instruments was the senior on-board technical instructor, Captain I. Soldatenko.

"Navigator ready!"

"Assistant ready!"

"Ready!" "Ready!" "Aerial gunner ready!" Last to report was Warrant Officer V. Nechitaylo from the stern cabin firing position.

Twilight thickened. And somehow things went directly from off-white to heavy darkness. One felt that the clouds had become darker and closer to the earth.

"Take off for 40"

Captain Soldatenko set the engines at maximum and the force of the acceleration pushed me to the rear wall of the cabin and pressed me against it.

"140, 160, 180," the navigator read the increasing speed in kilometers. The take-off run was unexpectedly short. The altitude indicator spun as if it belonged on an interceptor with its afterburners on. In an instant we were in the cloud.

The Il-76 automatic pilot allows flight without human interference but the goal of today's flight was to train the commander. Therefore all information came directly to the commander. He made the decisions that the whole crew was obligated to carry out.

We broke through the first layer of clouds. A narrow, winter-like, faded-orange strip of horizon illuminated by rays from the setting sun separated the top layer. The aircraft navigator passed information to the commander.

"Course. The needle is drifting four degrees."

"I Understand," answered Koziy and he changed the course with a light movement of the flight controls. Ahead of us was the most critical part of the flight -- the landing approach and landing.

"Crew. Prepare for landing, drop the landing gear!"

Captain Soldatenko touched the control with his hand and the massive undercarriage of the landing gear smoothly came out of the recesses. The green lights indicating that the equipment was ready for landing softly lit up on the signal board.

"The 40th. Range 10 kilometers, on course, on glide path."

Colonel Sergeyev, the aircraft navigator, aligned the aircraft exactly on the landing strip and the landing control system verified it. Several hundred meters of altitude separated us from the earth that was still covered with clouds. And at this point the instructor, Colonel Popov, made completing the mission as difficult as possible; he switched on the canopy hood system (SIV).

Pilots have always trained and still train "blind" in any weather. Usually the instructor covers the student with a special helmet and the student controls the aircraft right up to the landing using the instruments. And only when there are one-and-a-half to two kilometers left to the VPP does the check pilot open the helmet. After such flights, aviators leave the cockpit with their jacket darkened with sweat. But without this training it is impossible to confidently fly in the clouds which at times reach down to the earth.

Guards Major General of Aviation Koziy had experienced first-hand how the clouds can suddenly become. At the time there was still not a silver lock in his hair and two small lieutenant's stars radiated on his shoulder boards on either side of the blue gap. But he was already an aircraft commander and was responsible for a crew of six men.

The airport became covered while he was about 20 kilometers from it. A bit of cloud cover was carried in from the Pacific Ocean and lay between the far approach and the end of the VPP. The aircraft had to land on its first attempt as fuel was running low. And the Koziy made an error, one that was almost fatal for the whole crew. He wanted to break through the clouds a little faster and catch sight of the landing strip. He could not remember when the controls had wrung more out of him. He saw that they had tumbled out of the clouds although they still had a way to fly to the strip and he heard the shout of the flight instructor "RPM, RPM" in his headset. Right seat pilot Senior Lieutenant N. Zaytsev was able to push the engine control lever forward and they landed.

Guards Major General of Aviation Koziy has flown more than 4000 hours since then.

The canopy hood system is not a helmet. The instructor turns on a switch on his control panel and a dull screen comes up in front of the pilot. The screen's transparency depends on the flight conditions. You literally fly in the clouds and you cannot look through the chinks like you can with a helmet. And if, for example, the flight instructor assigns cloud cover conditions of altitude -- 60 meters and visibility -- 800 meters, the pilot will not see the landing strip until the aircraft has gone through these parameters.

One would not think that the hood cover would be necessary with weather conditions such as today. But nonetheless. For a new pilot such meteorological conditions in and of themselves are difficult, but for the experienced general they were a level that he had passed. Koziy, arriving on a VTA [military aircraft] unit with a check pilot, had to train aviators himself. Thus the aircraft commander had to keep the combat vehicle exactly on course and on the glide path.

"5..4..3..2..1," aircraft navigator Colonel Sergeyev counted off the altitude in meters.

The touchdown on the strip was soft.

After the landing Guards Major General of Aviation Koziy immediately hustled over to the next aircraft.

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NAVAL FORCES

PACIFIC FLEET PAPER ON MILITARY SOVKHOZ

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Feb 85 p 2

[Article in the "On The Pages Of Military Press" section: "On The Farms Of Naval Sovkhozes]

[Text] BOYEVAYA VAKHTA, the newspaper of the Red Banner Pacific Ocean Fleet, is systematically covering issues associated with improving the quality of life and the dietary organizations in units and aboard ships, including during prolonged cruises. Articles and correspondence under the rubric "The Food Program -- A National Affair" are often on its pages. As a rule these cover the economic activities of military sovkhozes and in particular the wintering of cattle that is now on-going.

BOYEVAYA VAKHTA often refers to the experience of the Romanovskiy Sovkhoz in its publications. This organization was concerned beforehand about preparing feed and creating the conditions necessary for the indoor winter maintenance period for cattle and as a result, despite the capricious weather, their milk yield per fodder cow for all intents and purposes did not drop in the sovkhoz.

The true worth of the work of cattle-raisers at the Romanovskiy Sovkhoz has been verified by degrees, medals and valuable prizes from the VDNKh USSR [Exhibition of Achievements of the National Economy of the USSR]. The first and second brigades of the milch herd at the naval sovkhoz, milkmaids Mariya Aleksandrovna Danilevskaya and Raisa Pavlovna Derkach and brigadier Alla Mikhaylovna Slyun'kova all received awards.

Unfortunately, as the newspaper BOYEVAYA VAKHTA noted, the experience of those progressive individual has still not been emulated by cattle-raisers in other sovkhozes and specifically by those on the Rechitskiy Sovkhoz. Milk yield there has fallen sharply. Why? Because only 60 percent of their plan's succulent feed and 85 percent of its crude feed were prepared and animals are being housed in a decrepid enclosure.

However, as was related in the newspaper account of the meeting of the most active naval rear area party members, sovkhoz managers community M. Shokurov, N. Pyr'yev and others are not taking any measures to improve matters on the farm.

One would think that the navy newspaper BOYEVAYA VAKHTA would reveal the experience of the best cattle-raisers more thoroughly and would uncover shortcomings in farm work. And in any case, it should not reconcile itself to the individual sovkhos and farm manager's irresponsible attitude toward resolving cattle-wintering issues and should strive to reach the point where the printed word is effective and promotes the comprehensive improvement of labor organization and discipline.

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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

GALERS

LIZICHEV, GDR'S KESSLER SIGN 'PLAN'--Col Gen A. Lizichev, Military Council member and chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in the German Political Directorate, and Col Gen G. Kessler, deputy defense minister and chief of the GDR National Peoples' Army Main Political Directorate, signed a plan for joint measures to strengthen the cooperation between the troops in the Group of Forces in Germany and the GDR National Peoples' Army. A military cooperation week, to be held in February of this year, is a special part of those measures. [By Maj V. Babitskiy] [Text] [Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Jan 85] 12747

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AFGHANISTAN

KHORUNZHIY ON 'BATTLES FOR THE REVOLUTION'

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[Article by Col A. Khorunzhiy]

[Text] "Let me introduce my father, (Mukhamed Fattekh)," stated Captain (Mukhamed Ivaz). "He came to Kabul on business for his detachment and at the same time to see me."

The venerable old man extended his toil-worn hand with dignity. So here he is, (Mukhamed Fattekh)! I had already heard about him and about the activities of the detachment for the defense of the revolution which he leads. In Herat Province the dushmany [rebels, bandits] had repeatedly run afoul of (Mukhamed) and his fighters. Just before his departure to Kabul a band of the perfidious (Nur Akhmed) tried to catch the detachment by surprise, but the fighters were on guard. The dushmany lost several men.

"The April Revolution gave us simple Afghans much," said (Mukhamed Fattekh). "It gave us land and opened the door to knowledge. I could hardly dream before the revolution that my children would learn to read and write and receive qualified medical assistance. Despite the intrigues of the counterrevolutionaries, in a short time more than a million people in the country have learned to read and write. How can we peasants not defend the revolution!"

In the ranks of its defenders are all the grown members of the family of (Mukhamed Fattekh). His oldest son, Lt Col (Gulyam Dzhelani) was killed in battles for the new government. Captain (Mukhamed Ivaz), his youngest son, a deputy battalion commander for political affairs, was wounded five times in clashes with the dushmany, but each time returned to action after his wounds healed. The battle in (Pandzhsher) became especially memorable to him. Bands of (Akhmat-shak Masud), the offspring of a family of feudal lords well-known in their day, were dug in there. Owing to generous assistance from abroad, they had created a base from where they were committing marauding attacks on the peaceful population. Now major formations of bandits in this area had been done away with.

(Khorbibi), wife of (Mukhamed Fattekh), who had seen much grief, kept pace with her husband and sons.

"Teach me to shoot the automatic weapon. I will defend our home," she told her husband.

A few years ago such behavior on the part of an Afghan woman would have been impossible to understand. Today it is a common occurrence for many Afghan families, who have accepted the revolution and are defending it from its enemies with weapons in hands.

In Afghanistan today many know whose money is arming the "fighters for the faith." They also know that at the end of July 1984 the Appropriations Committee of the U. S. House of Representatives agreed to allocate \$50 million more in 1984 to the program of assistance to Afghan counterrevolutionaries. In all, since 1980 Washington had paid out more than \$300 million for these purposes. U. S. allies are also helping the U.S. many. True, this is only that part of the sum being sent to the counterrevolutionaries through secret CIA and Pentagon channels which has become known to the world at large.

In a report at the 14th Central Committee plenum of the NDPA [People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan], Babrak Karmal, general secretary of the NDPA Central Committee and chairman of the DRA [Democratic Republic of Afghanistan] Revolutionary Council, noted that in the Spring-Summer campaign more than 23,000 rebels were killed and some 3,000 captured. A large number of storehouses with arms and ammunition were seized and destroyed. The NDPA Central Committee Politburo approved a decision on effectively closing the border with Pakistan and Iran.

It is appropriate to discuss Pakistan in particular, since its territory has become the main military bridgehead for the undeclared war against the DRA. Here, according to numerous press and eye-witness accounts, the headquarters of several dozen counterrevolutionary organizations are deployed, and an extensive network has been created of military training points for armed bands, weapons and ammunition stores and foodstuffs being delivered to elements hostile to the DRA by their supporters. A constant flow of weapons, ammunition and equipment for the rebels is under the control of the Pakistan Administration. It comes by sea to Karachi and Gwadar, by air to Karachi, Gwadar and (Mesrura) as well as along the Karakoram high mountain road from China to Gilgit, and then to Chitral and (Ravalpindi). In addition, the authorities in Islamabad are resorting ever more extensively to acts of direct interference in the affairs of a sovereign neighboring state and direct armed provocations against the DRA. Pakistan army units frequently provide cover for bandit groups during their movement to DRA territory and return to Pakistan. Nor can one keep quiet about the widespread malicious propaganda campaign against Revolutionary Afghanistan, which is being conducted by Pakistan and numerous imperialist "psychological warfare" centers.

The generosity of the overseas supporters is causing new difficulties for the Afghan Revolution and new victims. Trains of the marauding by bandits in (Pandzhsher) immediately strike the poor, being abandoned houses and since everywhere -- anti-personnel, anti-tank, cluster, fragmentation, napalm and

pneumatic mines. The markings indicate the addresses of the "Friends of Islam:" the U. S., China, Belgium, Britain and Italy.

Chasing one of the bands, the subunit where (Mukhamed Ivaz) is a political worker found itself in a difficult situation. It seemed that the Afghan soldiers had foreseen everything: they had conducted reconnaissance; combat engineers had checked the route of march and disarmed dozens of mines in the most improbable places; they took precautionary measures as they advanced. But the dushmany insidiously struck from "foxholes," almost from point blank range. The enemies knew: if they did not succeed in making short work of the forward detachment and separate it from the attacking Afghan Armed Forces unit, it would mean that they would have to pay for all their crimes against the people. But the defenders of the revolution fought staunchly and courageously. Having absorbed the first strike by the band, they held on until reinforcements approached. (Ivaz) was wounded in the battle, but he continued to carry out well-aimed fire and inspired the troops by his personal example. And when the battalion commander became a casualty, he replaced him and capably led the battle. The band, which had come from beyond the border, ceased to exist.

At almost the same time, Captain (Mukhamed Ivaz's) father and his fellow villagers were destroying the counterrevolutionaries southeast of Herat. Two detachments, numbering 720 men, formed mainly from peasants from villages adjoining the city, destroyed the band of (Gaffar Kali). Some 110 insurgents were captured with their weapons. The people's power was restored in the seven villages liberated from the dushmany. For the first time the strong, well-trained enemy was defeated not by regular forces, but by detachments of armed peasants. The victory raised the spirit of the fighters. They had fought for what was right and won.

Suffering one defeat after another in open battle, the imperialist hirelings began more and more often to operate according to the principle of the Afghan proverb: " ."

On a spring day a funeral procession appeared at the western edge of Herat. The Afghan soldiers were interested in who was being buried.

"Children. Russian soldiers killed them," came the answer.

Russian soldiers kill Afghan children? This was a monstrous and insulting lie against the Soviet soldiers, who had frequently come to the aid of the defenders of the revolution in battle, and shared with them and with Afghan children their last drink of water and bite of food. The procession stopped. It turned out that the dushmany had killed five peasant children and concealed packets of heroin on their bodies, which they planned to send to Iran.

To the "fighters for freedom," operating supposedly independently and out of "patriotic motives," as the organizers of the underground war against the USSR try to present them, it is necessary to show in the country a method of the Middle Ages. The bandits have nothing against organizing opium and heroin dens in each village and thus filling their purses, instead of school books

hospitals, which they have blown up and burned down in accordance with all the rules of the science courses taught to them by their foreign instructors.

"'Dushman,' in the majority of languages spoken in Afghanistan, means enemy," Captain (Abdul Khalil') explained to us in a garrison near Herat. The word 'basmach,' which is well known to the Soviet people from the history of the civil War, came from the verb 'basmak,' which means 'to crush,' 'to oppress' and 'to force.' No matter what he is called, an enemy is an enemy. His weapons are not only mines, bullets, grenades, rockets and the other latest arms from U. S. arsenals, but also slander and political and economic sabotage. By the way, also from overseas arsenals.

(Abdul Khalil') and his fellow regimental soldier, Captain (Mukhamed Said) stood dust-covered and tired after a long trip through the most distant villages in the province. They wanted very much to speak with Soviet officers. Joy shown in the eyes of the Afghans. Everything had gone well. Afghan officers and party workers, members of the agitation brigade, are carrying truth to their villages on people's government policies, uncovering the lies of the enemies of the revolution and explaining the reasons for the presence of the limited contingent of Soviet forces, which entered the country exactly five years ago, in December 1979, at the request of the DRA government. The political fighters of the revolution tell about the feats of Soviet soldiers assisting the Afghans in their just struggle.

The brigade also has soldiers who are members of the Democratic Organization of the Youth of Afghanistan (DOMA). For example, soldiers (Abdrazan Shaknin), (Mukhamed Zaman), (Nekpur) and many others are working actively with the local population. Serious discussions are going on in the villages. The most varied questions are asked. They must be answered. Frequently it is necessary to take up arms to beat back attacks of dushmany bands.

Grief and tears, blood and death are the crippled destinies of many people. The dushmany bands fighting against the people leave this in their wake. And American, Pakistani, Chinese and other foreign instructors in more than 100 training centers teach them: to fire from recoilless rifles, mortars and anti-aircraft weapons; to master mining and methods of sabotage and diversion; and to kill, rape, plunder and burn "skillfully."

Counterrevolutionary bands have destroyed and burned some 2,000 schools built by the new government. More than 150 teachers have been killed. Frequently mosques of mullahs loyal to the people's government have become objects of evil deeds. More than 100 hospitals have been burned and destroyed. Hundreds of bridges and irrigation structures have been knocked out. Dozens of kilometers of roads have been rendered unusable. If one considers that there are no water or railroad means of transport, roads truly are arteries of life. Camels and trucks are the main type of transport which support economic activity in the country. Helicopters, especially our Soviet helicopters, are a great help. But, after all, not everything can be delivered by air.

The working masses of Afghanistan are building a new life in a situation of sharpest class warfare. They see with their own eyes who is the true friend and who the enemy. The lower classes of the city population and the peasants

Peasants are ever more decisively supporting NDPA initiatives, are uniting around it and rebuffing the forces of counterrevolution. It goes without saying that there are many difficulties. Battles, and extremely serious ones, are not ceasing. The counterrevolution still has considerable forces and they only profiteer from difficulties and mistakes when, for example, extremes were permitted in the first stage of carrying out the agrarian and water reform. Today large land-holder agriculture in the country has been eliminated. Some 500,000 peasant families, almost two-thirds of the landless villages, have received land allotments.

"The building of a new life on the principles of equality and social justice, about which many generations of Afghans could only dream, has come up against furious resistance from counterrevolution instigated from abroad," we were told by (Gulyam Khazrat Ibrakhimi), chairman of the Herat Provincial Committee of the DRA National Fatherland Front. "The undeclared war against Afghanistan, unleashed by Washington and its allies, is continuing. Terrorist and sabotaging bands, taught overseas by American instructors and armed with weapons delivered by the U. S., are continuing to infiltrate our territory. In the province of Herat, as throughout the country, units of DRA Armed Forces, security organ subunits, tsarandoya (people's militia) and self-defense detachments are giving the bandits a decisive rebuff."

The battle against the enemies of the revolution is becoming ever wider in scope. Hundreds of new fighters -- men, women, boys and girls -- are entering the ranks of the defenders. Young people have a tremendous desire to be in the front ranks of the battle against counterrevolution. Burning hatred toward the dushmany and a fervent desire to see their homeland happy more quickly and to live and work under a peaceful sky is bringing young people into the combat units, security force subunits and civil defense detachments.

Security Force Post Number 1 in (Beker Abad), Herat Province, was created three years ago. Since then a detachment for the defense of order, consisting almost entirely of members of DOMA, has been constantly on watch there. There was a time when the dushmany actually controlled this area. Subunits of the people's armed forces along with the local population cleaned the bandits out of this territory. But the border with Iran is close by, from where new gangs of hired killers trained in special camps, traitors to the Afghan people, can come in at any moment. Permanent posts manned by volunteers were created. The fighters there live, study, help the local population and talk to the peasants about the measures taken by the people's government aimed at improving the lives of Afghans and strengthening the country's independence.

Such detachments have been organized throughout Afghanistan. Today, according to official data, they number approximately 20,000 young men and women, who are carrying out military training and at any moment can take up arms to defend the gains of the revolution. Moreover, the detachment fighters are providing tremendous assistance to the local organs of people's government. There are also special medical assistance groups in these detachments, as well as groups for eliminating illiteracy among the population.

The plow and the automatic rifle, the dictionary and the mine detector exist side by side, are the harsh fate of present day Afghanistan. This is

explained by only one thing: the unceasing interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign country by imperialist circles who took the April Revolution as a blow to their strategic positions in the Near East and to their plans to draw Afghanistan into the orbit of anti-Soviet policy.

Yes, the roads of revolution are not easy. The country is greatly in need of assistance. The Afghan people are filled with resolve to continue their uncompromising struggle and in the future to rain devastating blows down on the enemies of revolution. At the most difficult sectors in this struggle, whether plant or factory, peasant cooperative or Afghan Armed Forces subunit, self-detachment or construction project, along with the members of the NDPA are tens of thousands of the best sons and daughters of the Afghan people. Today DOMA unites 125,000 young men and women of various nationalities -- Pushtuns, Tadjiks, Uzbeks, Turkmen, Khazareytsy and others.

I recall a talk with (Farid Mazdak), first secretary of the DOMA Central Committee, well-known poet and member of the Afghanistan Writers Union. Talking about the activities and concerns of Afghan youth, he noted that the government, considering their desire to be in the front ranks of the struggle against counterrevolution, considered it possible to include young men from 16 years of age and women from 18 years of age in civil defense formations.

The increased role and authority of DOMA among the youth is also having a favorable impact on the country's pioneer movement. Children strive to follow the example of their senior comrades. They are learning to be staunch fighters for a happy future for their country. In September 1984 the fourth anniversary of the day of founding of the DRA pioneer organization occurred. Approximately 100,000 young citizens of the republic wear on their chests the tricolored pioneer tie: the black band signifies the dark days of the country's past dependence on foreign colonizers; the red, the blood shed by the people in the struggle for liberation; the green, the fields of progress turning green, which the country has entered.

Pioneers are taking part actively in the social-economic transformations being carried out by the NDPA and the people's government. They are helping to eliminate illiteracy to the best of their ability; taking part in the days of unpaid labor; rebuilding schools and hospitals burned and blown up by the enemies of the revolution; organizing public services in cities and villages; and looking after hospitals and the families of persons killed in the war.

"Imperialism is the true guilty party for the evil on our land. On order of Mr. Reagan, bandits sent across the Pakistan border are taught sabotage and killing of the peaceful population, and they are paid generously for murder," sounds a clear child's voice in the hall of the capital of Angola, where the international tribunal, "Children Indict Imperialism," was conducted. The lips of (Abdulla), an Afghan school child who lost a leg and was deprived of the joy of childhood after being wounded by a dushman bullet, spoke the truth about the April Revolution and the children of Afghanistan.

To this voice could be added that of (Nasirakhmad Dodmukhamad), a boy from Kandahar, a city which today is living a peaceful working life. The dushmany were displeased that this pioneer spoke the truth about the Soviet Union and the Soviet internationalist troops. One day they seized the lad.

"Stop your Russian agitation, you mangy kid. Or else you will pay with your life."

But the young Afghan was not frightened by the threat from his enemies. And then the murderers dealt with him brutally.

The enemies of Afghanistan nourish cruel hatred toward those who support the people's government, defend the gains of the April Revolution and see in the Soviet people true and loyal friends and class brothers. In places where dushman weapons are powerless, slander is put into action.

The family of (Said), a junior lieutenant in the Afghan Armed Forces, named its newborn son Viktor. This name was given to him in honor of a Soviet officer, Major Viktor Nosov, commander of a helicopter squadron. And what happened? An anti-Afghan lie appeared about "forcible Russification" of Afghans. Of course it went unsaid that the Soviet pilot in his MI-8 risked the life of his crew and, in a most difficult situation, assisted Afghan soldiers wounded in the mountains in battle with the dushman and got them to a hospital in time. What happened was that the dushman and those who are carrying out an undeclared war against the people of a sovereign country have the same masters. And, as is well known, he who pays calls the tune.

The bomb blasts in the Kabul International Airport, which occurred on 31 August 1984, caused a wave of hatred and indignation in the DRA at the criminal activity of hired killers. Its victims were dozens of peaceful citizens, mostly women and children. Explosions arranged by bandits in the mosque at the Kabul Polytechnical Institute, the "Arian" movie theater and the editorial offices of the newspaper, PAMIR, took away many lives. Only owing to the courage and skill of the crew did hundreds of passengers escape death after bandits struck a DC-10 airplane with a rocket on 21 September 1984. But no terrorist acts and sabotage will frighten the people. The nation has seen enough of the cruelty of the dushman. It is on the side of the revolution; there is no turning back to the past.

The process of rebuilding the country is underway everywhere. All strata of the population, including Afghan soldiers, women, young people and children, are taking part in liberating her from the shackles of the Middle Ages, ignorance and backwardness. Of course, the rebuilding process would be much more successful and fruitful, were it not for the bandit attacks by the traitors to the Afghan people, were it not for the underhanded explosions and shots by the murderers coming from Pakistan and Iran.

The revolution's struggle for the vital interests of its people is continuing. The class experience gained in it enables the democratic forces in Afghanistan to look forward with confidence.

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